*Weinberger on Isolationism*

# THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 3 ◇ SPRING 1986 ◇ $4·50

## PLAYING TO WIN
*by* SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

## THE SOVIETS IN CAM RANH BAY
*by* ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN

## THE IDEA OF A THIRD FORCE
*by* OWEN HARRIES

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly, in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues, by National Affairs, Inc. EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 1627 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington DC 20009. (202) 483-0630. SUBSCRIPTIONS: $18 for one year, $36 for two years (add $2 annually outside the United States). For subscription orders (prepayment required) please write: *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834; for credit card orders call toll-free 1-800-222-2990. Application to mail at second class postage rates is pending at Washington DC and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: send all address changes to *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834. "The National Interest" is a registered trademark of News Group Publications, Inc., and is used by National Affairs, Inc. under license; it may not be used without permission of News Group Publications, Inc. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed envelope with sufficient postage. © 1986 by National Affairs, Inc. *The National Interest* was designed by Tod Lindberg and is printed by the William Byrd Press, Richmond VA.

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# The Idea of a Third Force

## Owen Harries

THE IDEA of a "third force" is one of the most seductive and persistent of our time. Indeed, in a bipolar world it is, in a sense, a necessary idea. Since 1945, it has played an important role in Europe's thinking about itself and an even more important one in Western thinking about the Third World (the very concept of a Third World, after all, is only that of a third force writ large). The idea holds a particular fascination for Western liberals and socialists, since it promises to relieve them of the burden of choosing between unattractive alternatives—a particularly onerous burden for those whose political temperament is perfectionist and who are inclined to regard the choosing of a lesser evil as evidence of moral turpitude. But as it also carries the promise of freedom from dependence or domination, and of control over one's own destiny, it is not without appeal to those conservatives and nationalists who are anxious to restore or enhance the status of their country. The concept can be applied both to international and domestic politics, and the criterion of "thirdness" can be either ideological or power political. All in all, a very convenient and adaptable concept. But how does it correspond to the real world?

Repeatedly, faith in the idea has been shaken by events: by brutal reminders from the Soviet Union that it is an illusion to think that American protection is dispensable; by the exposure of the true nature of some "agrarian reformer" or "progressive nationalist" who had been eagerly touted as the leader of a third force; or by the evident ineffectuality and venality of a Third World demagogue put to the test of office. But faith quickly recovers, as it always will when it meets a deeply felt need.

Today it is certainly alive and well. Witness the growing attraction for Europeans of a policy of "equidistance" from the "superpowers," a policy buttressed by the doctrine of "moral equivalence" and supported by many American intellectuals, even if it means being equidistant from their own country and its principal adversary. (As I write, the latest issue of *The New York Review of Books* carries a letter asserting that "To escape from the current global impasse we must find a Third Way in which democratic activists and movements from around the world make common cause to build an alternative to both blocs." The substitution of the peaceful "Way" for the more militant and usual "Force" is a nice touch. But otherwise the sentiments are thoroughly familiar, as are most of the Western names attached to the letter.) Witness, too, the way in which much of the discussion of the crisis in the Philippines proceeds: not in terms of what is possible given the character of the Filipino political culture, nor of what is desirable given the interests of the United States, but on the assumption that, given the respective characters of the Marcos regime and the "New People's Army," there *must* be a viable third force, even if it is led by someone with virtually no political experience (though, to be fair, the *Washington Post* assures us that there has already occurred a "phenomenal metamorphosis" in Corazon Aquino). At a

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different level, Charles Krauthammer maintains that "in much of the Third World the most reliable repository of American strategic interests is what is sometimes called the third force."

The idea of a third force appeared almost as soon as the cold war became a reality. By the spring of 1947, for example, George Orwell was wrestling with the problems that a bipolar world presented for a social democrat. Unlike many other proponents of the idea, then and since, Orwell had no doubt that, faced with a choice between the Soviet Union and the United States, the latter was infinitely preferable. But as a socialist who found capitalism repellent (and who believed that in any case it was doomed), he resisted the conclusion that such a choice was necessary. "In the end," he wrote, "the European peoples may have to accept America's domination as a way of avoiding domination by Russia, but they ought to realize, while there is time yet, that there are other possibilities." Orwell put his faith, though without any great conviction as to the prospects of success, in a socialist United States of Europe which would be "self sufficient and able to hold its own against Russia and America."

In France in the same year Robert Schuman formed a government composed of parties that were actually known collectively as the Third Force, because they were both anti-communist and opposed to de Gaulle's *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*—a movement that, as it was pro-American, anti-communist and, in some superficial respects, disturbingly reminiscent of fascism in its political style, confirmed the democratic left's worst fears about the cold war.

Events in the late 1940s—Stalin's coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO—overwhelmed the budding idea of Europe as a third force. But it did not die. In the 1960s, de Gaulle, in charge of a recovered France and decidedly more critical of the United States (the humiliation inflicted on France and Britain during the Suez crisis was still a recent memory), produced a conservative, nationalist version of the idea in the form of a "European Europe." In the same decade, the emergence of "Eurocommunism" fueled hopes of a left version of a third force.

The failure of these and subsequent attempts to give the idea substance has not been due to any lack of European resentment of dependence on America. That exists in abundance. Nor, at least since about 1970, has it been due to an incapacity in objective terms to constitute a third force. If Europeans really wanted to play the role, it would be well within their competence. The trouble is that while the end is attractive, the means required to achieve it involve a degree of effort and sacrifice that, after decades of comfortable dependence on American protection, is very unattractive. And there is also the paradox, described by Josef Joffe in this issue, that the unity required for Europe to constitute a third force is itself dependent on a continued American commitment to the protection of Europe—take that away and the reappearance of old fears and rivalries will mean that there is no "Europe" capable of playing the role.

THE IDEA comes into full flower in relation to the Third World. From the time the decomposition of Western empires began, liberals have argued passionately that the salvation of the new states and the true interests of the West depend not on authoritarian governments prepared to accept American protection, but on something—anything, really—that occupies the middle ground between the authoritarian right and the communist left domestically, and is internationally nonaligned. These Western liberals have scoured the Third World landscape to find social democrats or liberals to play the part, and have usually been prepared to accept at face value anyone who declares himself to be such (while liberals pass harsh judgment on the corruption of a Marcos or Somoza, they have shown a much higher tolerance of those described by Conor Cruise O'Brien as having "socialist slogans in their mouths and contractor's money in their pockets"). They have insisted that these centrist elements represent true nationalism, and that nationalism represents the true bulwark against communism. When all else has failed—when it has become



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patently obvious that really there is nothing viable in the middle—Western liberals have often been prepared to argue that the local communists themselves, properly understood, are a nationalist third force; or, at least, that they can be converted into such if handled sensitively and not "driven into the hands of Moscow." Thus, in their time, even Castro and Ho Chi Minh were confidently presented as two of nature's "Titoists."

Much of this sort of stuff calls to mind Dwight MacDonald's description of Wallaceland, the spiritual home of one of America's most fervent upholders of the idea of a third force, as "a region of perpetual fogs, caused by the warm winds of the liberal Gulf Stream coming into contact with the Soviet glacier." But the validity of an idea is not destroyed because some of its promoters are confused or silly. Whether or not the conditions for a viable third force exist in a particular instance is an empirical question. Clearly in some cases those conditions have existed. The outstanding example is that of India. Currently it looks as if Duarte is making a success of it in El Salvador (though he is not exactly the third force that most liberals had in mind). But overall in the Third World, conditions are extremely inhospitable to third forces. The nuanced and complex positions characteristic of third forces require educated, relatively sophisticated middle class constituencies; these are in short supply. Such middle classes as do exist tend to be attracted to doctrinaire and ideological politics, rather than to the more pragmatic variety. The harsh winner-take-all politics that results from the absence of consensus and a civic tradition—a politics in which, all too often, the cost of losing is not relegation to the opposition benches, but exile, prison, or the firing squad—is not conducive to a thriving center. (I remember visiting Manila in the early 1960s—pre-Marcos—and seeing a notice in the foyer of the senate building: "Firearms must be left here." Business was brisk.)

In such conditions, even the genuine social democrats or liberals are likely to be forced, if they are to survive and be effective, to act in ways that destroy their third force credentials in the eyes of the Western left. Take the case of Lee Kuan Yew. It is hard to remember now, but he was once the darling of that left. As his government embraced capitalism, however, as it established good relations with the United States and imposed firm control over a society that was intrinsically volatile and vulnerable to communist penetration, the romance quickly soured and Lee was relegated to the authoritarian right. (A second memory: of Goh Keng Swee, then Singapore's Minister of Defense and of the Interior, profoundly shocking a preponderantly liberal Australian audience in 1967 by telling it that "The first and most important of the prerequisites to success is, I regret to say, an efficient secret police.") It is hard to be both effective and an acceptable third force.

What of the nationalism on which the case for a third force leans so heavily? It is true that, with some notable exceptions, Western nationalism has been closely linked with political values—liberalism, democracy—that are supposed to characterize third forces. But Third World nationalism is a different animal. It is based not on a pre-existing sense of nationality, a cultural and linguistic homogeneity, but on the political struggle to end colonialism. The "self" in whose name self-determination is demanded is an uncertain entity, defined by the arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries and usually characterized by deep ethnic, tribal, regional, religious, and linguistic cleavages. While in progress, the anti-colonial struggle provides some cohesion, but once it succeeds there is little to hold things together. Hence the reliance on force that characterizes Third World politics; hence, too, the invention of "neocolonialism" in an attempt to overcome post-independence disunity by perpetuating the unifying struggle.

The point is that Third World nationalism has no particular affinity with liberal or democratic values, apart from finding them rhetorically useful to shame the West in the anti-colonial struggle (which is fair enough). It is as compatible and comfortable with the authoritarian right or left as it is with the center—perhaps more so (John Kautsky once argued that, far from being natural enemies, nationalism and communism are virtually identical: historically,



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they both represent the drive of intellectuals for industrialization and against colonialism). Indeed, in pinning their hopes on "Titoism," as they have often done, the advocates of a third force end up themselves insisting that nationalism and communism can live happily together.

Although the two overlap in practice, it is worth bearing in mind the distinction between the idea of an ideological third force and one defined in terms of power relations. In the 1940s, it was the former that had the stronger appeal and the greater plausibility. The prestige of capitalism was low, illusions about the Soviet Union were widespread and intellectual opinion-makers were overwhelmingly socialist. At the same time the weakness of Europe and the absence of any other candidate for the role deprived the notion of a power political third force of credibility.

Today, things are rather the other way around. While the prevalence of the doctrine of "moral equivalence" testifies to the fact that hopes of an ideological third force are far from dead, there is no doubt that in this respect the advantage has shifted heavily in favor of democratic capitalism. Over the last few decades it has provided unprecedented freedom and prosperity to the vast majority of people living under it. In the same period, the brutality and inefficiency of communism in action have left few but the ideologically naive or demented (admittedly not negligible categories) with any illusions. But in terms of power, the relative decline in the dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the emergence or re-emergence of other power centers (Europe, China, Japan in economic terms, a few other countries in regional contexts) has given the idea of a power political version of a third force greater plausibility than it had 40 years ago.

SO THE IDEA is not going to fade away. As it is not, it is worth considering what relevance it has to American foreign policy. In the current debate about the U.S.-European alliance the term is rarely used, but the idea permeates the discussion. Conservative American critics of NATO see Europe as already approaching a *de facto* third force, one simultaneously constraining the United States and accommodating the Soviet Union. On the other hand, as Josef Joffe is concerned to point out, in the absence of American protection Europe would constitute neither a reliable ally nor a third force, because it would once again be torn apart by internal conflicts and suspicions. If both are right, as I think they are, what follows? First, that the present state of affairs cannot long remain acceptable to America; and second, that complete U.S. withdrawal from Europe is not the answer. If one rules out as inadequate mere exhortation and organizational tinkering, what one is left with is the application of graduated, limited, but serious pressure on Europe by the United States. Such pressure would aim at reordering European priorities without producing trauma. To be effective it would need to include a firm commitment to an orderly withdrawal of a limited number of U.S. ground troops from Europe over a period of years. Nothing short of that is likely to end the European inclination to take the American commitment to its defense for granted—and it is that inclination which sustains most of Europe's third force illusions.

As for the Third World, the first problem—whether a convincing basis for a third force exists in any particular instance—has already been discussed. Honest and realistic advocates of the idea recognize the validity of raising it (Krauthammer: "the democratic center must exist, and not just in the imagination of Americans...supporting a nonexistent center means having a nonexistent policy"). But there is a more fundamental problem. Consider a country which is ruled by an authoritarian regime. Assume that that regime is, at the same time, reasonably stable and effective, somewhat corrupt, unsatisfactory (though not horrendously so by the going Third World standard) in its human rights performance, and friendly towards—perhaps even allied to—the United States. Assume two other things: that there is convincing evidence of the existence of a significant third force, and that there is an organized communist force in the wings. Many Third World countries fit this general description. It is they, not the outrageous case of a Duvalier or a



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Bokassa, that represent the difficult cases for American policy-makers.

What should the U.S. do in such circumstances? As I understand him, Krauthammer advocates that, as a general rule and in terms of its own strategic interests, America should support the third force. He believes that, both because it is right in itself and because it will enhance American power, the foreign policy of the United States should aim at encouraging the establishment of new liberal polities, especially in the Third World. It seems to me that two problems arise. First, as a preference for nonalignment is characteristic of third forces, replacing a friendly authoritarian regime with one of them will often involve the risk of losing strategic assets of a significant kind: bases, staging facilities, over-flight rights, passage through straits, the locating of communications facilities, and so on. These may appear mundane compared with the extension of democracy, but cumulatively they are extremely important—for the protection of freedom among other things. Given that the fate of these assets is likely to be a pertinent question in many cases, the question of how trade-offs between the establishment of Third World governments and the protection of such assets are to be determined is a crucial one.

Second, the withdrawal of support from friendly authoritarian governments and the granting of it to third forces is a very serious act of policy. One should be very confident that the outcome will be an extension of freedom—rather than, say, chronic instability, outright chaos, or a worse authoritarianism—before engaging in it. There are not many circumstances in which it is possible to have that confidence. And while it is easy enough to set things in motion, it is very difficult to see them through and assure the desired outcome. The American record in undermining friendly authoritarians is not reassuring in this respect: think of Diem in Vietnam, the Shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua. Were American interests—defined in terms of power, the extension of freedom, or any other way—served by their removal? Perhaps the case of Marcos will be different: perhaps in five years' time those Americans involved will have cause to congratulate themselves for the prominent role they have played in removing him. But perhaps not. For it is unfortunately true that, bad as he had become, there are fates far worse than being ruled by a Marcos.



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# Playing to Win

Samuel P. Huntington

IN HIS STUDY of the Pacific War, Edwin Hoyt sums up the role of Chester W. Nimitz as follows: "One could say that Halsey was the man to win a battle for you, Spruance was the man to win a campaign, but Nimitz was the man to win a war." He won that war in large part because the determination to win had been with him throughout his career. There is the story that a midshipman who used to box with Nimitz at Annapolis once gave him a bloody nose. That midshipman subsequently commented: "When I saw what I had done, I took off my gloves and walked out of the gym. I could see that he'd kill me if he could, so I just broke off the action." In an interview many years later, Nimitz summed up his philosophy in the words: "You always play to win. That's the only way."

No one could have expressed more bluntly the basic point about American strategy which I wish to make.

For the past several years the American public and American elites have been preoccupied with the problem of nuclear war. Newspapers and TV constantly emphasize the horrors and the dangers of nuclear conflict. Carl Sagan has expounded on the end of summer and Jonathan Schell on the end of the earth. Concern has once again focused on the escalating arms race, the difficulty if not impossibility of limiting a nuclear war, and the urgent necessity of achieving nuclear arms control, of making nuclear weapons impotent. Foundations are showering academics with more millions than could ever usefully be spent to find a solution to these problems. At my university, for instance, thanks to the largesse of the Carnegie Corporation, colleagues of mine have been conducting for several years a major project, the title of which is "Avoiding Nuclear War."

Clearly no question is more important than preventing nuclear war. Clearly also, few, if any, public policy questions are less challenging or less interesting. Why is this the case? Because we know how to do it. The prevention of nuclear war is one goal which we have, so far, achieved. It is one of our few success stories in public policy. We have not solved the problems of recessions, deficits, unemployment, economic productivity, not to mention others such as acid rain, waste disposal, illegal immigration, housing shortages, grossly inferior educational systems, inadequate mass transport, or even racial discrimination. In none of these fields have we achieved our goals. But we have prevented nuclear war, and we have prevented it without suffering major losses to the freedom and prosperity of ourselves or our allies. In 1945, in 1950, in 1960, in 1970, informed and experienced people again and again said that this would be impossible, that unless nuclear weapons were abolished or there were some other dramatic change in the international scene, nuclear war was inevitable. (The most famous but far from atypical prediction of this genre was C.P. Snow's assertion in 1960 that, "Within, at the most, 10

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years, some of these bombs are going off. I am saying this as responsibly as I can. *That* is the certainty.")

The magnitude of this achievement is historically unprecedented and largely unrecognized. The past four decades have seen the longest sustained period in modern Western history without war between the major powers.[1] As far as the maintenance of peace is concerned, we must have been doing something right. What is now needed are not emotional declamations on the horrors of nuclear war, of which no one needs convincing, but rather serious study of recent history to ascertain what it is we have done that has enabled us so far to avoid nuclear war and what the lessons of that experience tell us we must do in order to continue to avoid nuclear war in the future.

Given the nature of the problem, however, three cautionary notes are in order. First, past success is no reason for complacency and for stopping doing what we have been doing to prevent war. Second, there is always the possibility that as a result of changing conditions what has worked in the past may not work in the future, and one has to be alert to that possibility and prepared to deal with it. Third, conceivably what has worked in the past may by its very success, through a pattern of cyclical interaction, generate failure in the future. One has to be sensitive to that danger. Even with all these caveats, one can only be impressed by what has not happened, although some people remain profoundly dissatisfied with the success which we have achieved and unwilling to learn how we achieved it. They passionately demand a certainty that we cannot have.

This 40 years of success in preventing nuclear war contrasts rather dramatically with our 40 years of failure in winning conventional war. The record is not a happy one: two major conventional wars, one ending in stalemate, the other in total defeat; a record of blunders and failures in smaller operations: the Iran rescue mission, the massacre of the Marines in Beirut, the air strike that followed that tragedy, the *Mayaguez* rescue, the *Pueblo* seizure, the Son Tay raid, to name only the more recent and the more notable. That we point to our successful invasion of a small island defended by a few hundred poorly armed construction troops as evidence of our military prowess only underlines the extent of our failures. This seemingly dismal record has prompted a whole series of sarcastic journalistic headlines: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: In 35 years, they've never won a war" (*Chicago Tribune*); "Why Johnny can't fight and Uncle Sam can't win" (*New Republic*); "Can't Anybody Here Run a War?" (*U.S. News & World Report*). In a more serious vein, Edward Luttwak in *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (Simon and Schuster, 1984) alleges that "Vast sums of money and the true dedication of many have gone into the upkeep of American military power, only to yield persistent failure in the conduct of war." While it may be more important to avoid nuclear war, it clearly would appear to be more difficult to win conventional wars, to use military force effectively in small or modest sized encounters.

BEFORE WRINGING our hands in despair over the extent of our military incapacity, however, it would be well to put this record in context by raising three questions.

First, is the record of military incompetence really as bad as has been suggested? In

[1]See the comments of Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy's Law Apply to History?" *Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (New Year's 1985): "The period of almost four decades without major war is significant in a way few laymen recognize. Since the second century A.D. under the Pax Romana, the Western world has known no long periods of general peace. The modern record was 38 years, nine months, and five days (June 22, 1815, to March 27, 1854), from the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo to the effective beginning of the Crimean War between the French and British, on one side, and tsarist Russia, on the other. That record was broken last year on May 15, 1984. The news media did not accord it the attention given to records achieved by Atlanta's Hank Aaron for home runs or Cincinnati's Pete Rose for base hits, but the fact is worth noting."



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fact, it is not totally black. We did not win either of our prolonged major wars, but with a few exceptions, of which the disastrous advance to the Yalu is most notable, our armed forces did win the overwhelming bulk of their tactical engagements. "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," Col. Harry Summers quotes himself as saying to his North Vietnamese negotiating counterpart in Hanoi as South Vietnam collapsed in April 1975. He reports: "The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. 'That may be so,' he replied, 'but it is also irrelevant.' " Something is certainly wrong with the way in which a war is fought if unbroken tactical successes lead to unmitigated strategic defeat. Another form of military operation in which the U.S. has been involved is the brief, isolated military intervention, often in the nature of a rescue mission, carried out against armed opposition. Here the U.S. has virtually no successes to record. There are, finally, larger-scale order-restoring and peace-keeping interventions, such as Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Lebanon again in 1982 and 1983, Grenada in 1983. The first two would have to be counted as military successes, the third as ambiguous, the fourth as disastrous in part because it ceased being a peace-keeping operation, and the fifth as a success. Overall, the U.S. record is not as bad as it may seem, but it still is not very good.

Second, is the U.S. record in military operations over the past several decades any worse than that of other major powers? The French lost major wars in Indochina and Algeria, although they won tactically in Algeria even as we did in Vietnam. The Soviets intervened successfully in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but got bogged down in Afghanistan. The Chinese fought us to a stalemate in 1951, administered a rather neat military drubbing to the Indians in 1962, but did not exactly distinguish themselves against the Vietnamese in 1979. The British retreated under fire from Aden and have not been able to pacify Northern Ireland. They did, however, score what are widely perceived to be victories in two significant wars: the counter-guerrilla war in Malaysia in the 1950s and the Falklands war in 1982. Their success in the Falklands, however, only equalled what the United States succeeded in doing in Korea: restoring the status quo ante. Yet the Falklands is generally viewed as a triumphant military victory for the British and it certainly was an immense political plus for Margaret Thatcher, while Korea is viewed as at best a military stalemate and was a major political liability for Harry Truman and his party. Why these differences in perception and political impact? Perhaps because the fighting in the Falklands came to a definitive end with an Argentine surrender as the status quo ante was restored while that in Korea dragged on for two years before ending in a negotiated armistice. Perhaps also because unlike the U.S. the British never expanded their war aims beyond restoration of the status quo ante and hence did not look bad when they did not achieve anything beyond that. In any event, in the years since World War II, no major power has had an unalloyed string of military successes. While maybe not the worst among the major powers, the American record still does not compare all that favorably to the records of other powers.

Third, is American military incompetence since World War II any greater than it was earlier in our history? Or can we take solace in the thought that this is the way in which we have always behaved? We have all been taught that at least before 1946 the United States never lost a war. At the very least, that claim stretches a point for the years 1812 to 1815. In addition, looking back over American military history, one can find repeated instances of strategic blindness, tactical stupidity, gross deficiencies in training and discipline, incompetent and vainglorious leadership, and sheer cowardice. One can also find many instances of just the opposite. It would, however, be hard to make the case that war and the military arts have been a sector of human activity where Americans have distinguished themselves compared to other peoples. We do not fall in the Spartan, Roman, Prussian tradition. By and large, the virtues of American civilization have not been the military virtues and this has been reflected in American military performance. The American "Revolution," as one standard history



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states, "was fought in a folly of mismanagement and direction." Our victory in Europe in World War II, another historian, Russell F. Weigley, concludes, "was more expensive and more often postponed than it might have been, because American military skills were not as formidable as they could have been." More generally, as measured in a variety of ways, German army units in World War II consistently outfought American army units (as well as those of other Allied armies). That is a tough standard, for among modern peoples the Germans seem to have a unique capability for war. "He who has not fought the Germans," says a British military aphorism, "does not know war." If we ever have to fight Germans again, happily more are likely to be fighting with us than against us. Yet the record is still disturbing. As Martin van Creveld has bluntly put it: "the American officer corps of World War II was less than mediocre. . . . Far too many officers had soft jobs in the rear, far too few commanded at the front. Those who did command at the front were, as the official history frankly admits and the casualty figures confirm, often guilty of bad leadership. Between them and their German opposite numbers there simply is no comparison possible."

At least in some dimensions, American military incompetence is thus not entirely of recent origin. The image of total success before 1946 may be even less valid than the image of total failure since 1946. Yet the differences in success and the differences in perceptions of success and failure still remain to be explained. They became more noticeable more recently because with the exception of the War of 1812 (where Jackson's victory at the end obscured our earlier military failings), we did win our previous wars.

WE ARE THUS still left with the question: Why have we been so successful in preventing nuclear war but so unsuccessful in winning conventional wars? Is success in one conceivably linked to failure in the other.[2] In the 1980s a rather intense debate has developed over the reasons for our record of military failure. This debate has largely focused on the question whether the fault lies primarily with our political leadership and its policies, on the one hand, or with the military forces and their leadership, on the other. The former approach, which I will term the "all or nothing" approach, is largely concerned with the failure to achieve victory in our major wars in Korea and Vietnam. It is highly popular among military officers and reflects the extent to which the Vietnam syndrome, which has faded away in most other areas of American life, remains alive and well in the Pentagon. This view has been articulated by several chiefs of staff; it was set forth succinctly by Secretary Weinberger in his November 1984 Press Club speech in which he listed the six conditions under which American forces should be committed to combat; and it has been elaborated in highly sophisticated terms by various military writers. According to this view, the absence of military success is due primarily to two factors.

First, the political leadership, that is the administrations in charge, failed to mobilize the American public in support of the war, among other things failing to secure declarations of war from Congress which would have committed the country to winning the war. The country was divided, and the military suffered as a result. Never again, consequently, should the U.S., as Weinberger put it, commit its forces without "national unity of purpose" and "firm national resolve." Before we again send our forces out to fight, he went on to say, "there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the people and their elected representatives in Congress. We cannot fight a battle with Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas, or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win but just to be there."[3] "All of America's previous wars," Col. Summers argued in *On Strategy* (U.S. Army War College, 1981), "were fought in the heat of passion. Vietnam was

[2]For a perceptive discussion of this important and neglected issue, see Gregory D. Foster, "The Effect of Deterrence on the Fighting Ethic," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 10 (Winter 1984).

[3]Caspar Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Address, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1984.



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fought in cold blood, and that was intolerable to the American people." The commitment of forces must involve not just the calculation of government but the passion of a people.

The second source of failure the "all or nothing" school focuses on is the political constraints imposed on military action in limited wars such as Korea and Vietnam. The advocates of this approach attack the whole limited war philosophy that developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Once war is declared, victory must be pursued. Once it is necessary, as Weinberger said, "to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning." While people are reluctant to push the point hard, the clear implication is that once the issue comes to arms, the military should have a relatively free hand to achieve their objectives without political restraints of the sort that made victory impossible in Korea and Vietnam.

The alternative approach locates the source of military failure not in politics but in the military itself. This view, as one might expect, is found more often among civilians than among officers. Its exponents include many of those who have been identified with the so-called military reform movement of the past few years. It has been articulated in its most dramatic form by Edward Luttwak. Whatever other factors may contribute to American military losses, Luttwak argues, "the armed forces have failed us . . . the failure of the entire military structure and command system—not just leaders now gone but institutions still unchanged—looms large and unforgivable." The argument here is that military failure stems from the over-bureaucratization of the military establishment, its stress on producing managers rather than warriors, its reliance on mass and technology rather than strategy and operational skill, its organizational redundance and complexity, its devotion to bureaucratic harmony and paperwork, its pitiful and ridiculously small ratio of combat power to support structure. The American military, in this picture, is fat, complacent, and, for all its weapons, quite unprepared intellectually and psychologically to wage war successfully. Drastic reforms in personnel selection, rotation, education and training, organization and command structure are required to turn this glumpfy mass into an effective fighting force. Most necessary of all is a drastic shift in the pervading spirit and ethos of the officer corps. What is needed is a lean, mean, and deft military establishment, on the models of the Israeli armed forces, the Wehrmacht of World War II, and the professional core of the British Army.

THE COMBINED effect of the "all or nothing" and the "lean, mean, and deft" explanations of American military failure is to make it almost impossible for the U.S. to employ military force abroad. Secretary Weinberger declared that he was focusing on the problems of using U.S. military force in gray area conflicts, but he then defined criteria which would, if applied with only modest rigor, virtually limit the use of those forces to the defense of U.S. territory. Reluctance to recommend the use of military force is one of the most valuable, enduring, and endearing characteristics of American military leaders. But as we know from the history of the 1930s, there is also such a thing as being too reluctant to fight. The record of the past three decades plus the diagnosis of the "lean, mean, and deft" crowd, on the other hand, raise real questions about the capacity of the American military to fight. The argument has been made, for instance, that whatever the merits of retaliating or not retaliating in response to terrorist attacks, the U.S. should not retaliate because inevitably that action will be goofed up, the wrong targets will be hit, civilian casualties will be excessive, American losses will be too great, and the whole effort will end in humiliation and be counter-productive to boot. In somewhat similar vein, in a critique of Weinberger's argument, the *New Republic* editorialized that the good reasons for being slow to act were not those given by Weinberger, but rather, in its phrase, "the incompetence of our forces after Korea." A situation thus exists where the military do not want to act because they fear the absence of public support, and the politicians do not want to act because they fear the absence of military competence.



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No reasonable proponent of either the "all or nothing" view or the "lean, mean, and deft" view would deny some validity to the opposing argument. In fact, there is much validity to both arguments. The sources of failure have been both political and military. The problem comes with their prescriptions for reform. These are, I would argue, often quite unrealistic. The "all or nothing" remedies run right into the face of powerful political realities. There is, first, as Secretary Shultz put it in his riposte to Secretary Weinberger, "no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance." (Address at Yeshiva University, December 9, 1984.) There will be many times when an administration can and must act promptly and cannot wait to build support in Congress and the public. Any commitment of American forces to combat, apart from the defense of Japan, Western Europe, and North America, is bound to be controversial. Efforts to build public support for such an undertaking could as likely backfire as not: they could simply stimulate the opposition. In addition, even if public support exists for an initial commitment of forces to overseas combat, that support is not likely to last long. "A democracy," General George C. Marshall said 36 years ago, "cannot fight a Seven Years War." Our experience in two wars plus that of the French in Algeria and Indochina underlines the point. Indeed, one can argue that Secretary Weinberger has it backward: public support is not the prerequisite for successful military action; successful and decisive military action is the prerequisite for public support. And if that military action is not successful in a short period of time, that support will evaporate. Whether or not Congress has declared war will not make any significant difference.

The "all or nothing" school is also unrealistic in the extent to which it suggests that presidents will give free rein to their generals in the conduct of military operations. The world is too closely interlinked for them to allow that to happen, and because it is so closely interlinked, presidents have the means of command and control to prevent it from happening. Nothing is politically more risky for a president than the commitment of troops. If this is successful, he will be a hero; if it fails, it will be his fault, as it was with Presidents Truman, Johnson, and Carter, unless he is able, as President Reagan was with the Marines in Beirut, to deflect criticism by fast political footwork and a counter-balancing military success. These considerations normally lead presidents to be cautious about undertaking military actions in the first place. They also necessarily lead presidents to insist on the maintenance of tight controls and constraints on military action to guard against escalation of the conflict or other politically damaging developments.

The principal prescriptions of the "lean, mean, and deft" advocates for reform of the military establishment have much the same unreality as the "all or nothing" prescriptions do for politics. The U.S. military establishment is a product of and reflects American geography, culture, society, economy, and history. A major, disastrous defeat may provoke a military establishment to reform itself. The U.S., however, has not suffered a military catastrophe; it has suffered a series of modest military reverses and the absence of military success. These do not have the same effect. One may well admire the extraordinary fighting power of the Wehrmacht against much more numerous and logistically far superior enemies in World War II, or that of the Israeli Defense Force against numerically superior Arab armies. But one should not be swept off one's feet by the romantic illusion that Americans can be taught to fight wars the way Germans, Israelis, or even British do. That would be both ahistorical and unscientific.

American strategy, in short, must be appropriate to our history and institutions, both political and military. It must not only be responsive to national needs but also reflect our national strengths and weaknesses. It is the beginning of wisdom to recognize both.

The United States is a big, lumbering, pluralistic, affluent, liberal, democratic, individualistic, materialistic if not hedonistic, and technologically supremely sophisticated society. Our military strategy should and, indeed, must be built upon these facts. The way we fight necessarily will reflect the way we live.



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The most salient criticism that can be brought against recent American strategy is that it has deviated from these premises. For three decades, we have generally pursued, with the best of intentions and the best strategic analysis, a strategy for the use of conventional force that deviates sharply from earlier strategic traditions. It has emphasized not how to use force to win but how to avoid or to limit the use of force. In the nuclear age, these latter are clearly critical objectives, but they cannot be the only ones. The question we must ask is: What does the nature of American society and of earlier American strategic traditions tell us about how Americans can use force successfully?

A STRATEGY designed to achieve this purpose should include at least five elements. First, so far as Third World involvements are concerned, the United States must pursue objectives it can hope to achieve quickly and use means that minimize the time required to achieve those objectives. We must aim for a first round knockout. Public opinion will not support a prolonged "slow bleed" of American blood. Secretary Weinberger and other leaders of the Reagan administration castigate the War Powers Act, which, among other things, makes it illegal for the president to commit U.S. troops to combat overseas for more than 60 days without the explicit consent of Congress. That legislation, however, reflects political reality. If a president is in serious doubt whether he can accomplish his objectives within 60 days, he would be well advised to reconsider those objectives. U.S. wars in the future may or may not be limited in goals, geographic scope, or material resources. They will inevitably be limited in time. This means that when the U.S. applies force, it must be able to apply it expeditiously. Hence, high priority should be given to creating the transport capacity and support which will enable the U.S. to deploy substantial numbers of troops to Third World trouble spots in very short periods of time. If we are going to win, we are going to have to win quickly.

Second, from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, the American military tradition stressed the central importance of the offensive. This was appropriate for a rising industrial power. After World War II or, more precisely, after the failure of the advance to the Yalu in 1950, the commitment to the offensive began to fade in American military thinking, at least with respect to conventional conflicts. It is rather striking that, in contrast, the offensive came to be viewed as the only legitimate strategy in nuclear war. Even more striking is the fact that those who have been most in favor of exclusive reliance on the offensive in nuclear war are also those who are most in favor of exclusive reliance on the defensive in conventional conflicts. Apart from strategic nuclear war, the cult of the defensive permeated American military thinking. It was evident in Vietnam. It has been painfully evident in our preparations for a European conflict. Few things could be more debilitating than NATO strategic planning which has provided for only defensive conventional action reinforced by an increasingly incredible threat of nuclear escalation. If the United States is going to achieve its objectives in timely fashion, however, in either Europe or in the Third World, it must engage in prompt offensive action against the central enemy targets. For 100 years after Scott took the war to the heart of the enemy in 1847, the offensive aimed at the center of enemy power was the core of American strategy. It has, unfortunately, been lost during the last 30 years.

Third, the United States is the most technologically advanced society in the world. U.S. strategy can and should reflect this fact. In this connection, it is useful to recall the repeated comments made by North Vietnamese military officers on what they feared most from us during the Vietnam war (see box). Almost without exception, they were, first, the mobility we had from our helicopters, second, the destructive firepower of our artillery, and third, the physical destruction and, more important, the psychologically crippling effects of the B-52 bombings. In effect,the Vietnamese say: "When we could get you, the United States, to fight our sort of small unit, man-to-man war in the jungle, we could beat you. When you stuck to the type of warfare which you dominated, we couldn't." The conclusion to be drawn, I sug-



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gest, is that if we should unfortunately ever become involved in a comparable situation, we should capitalize on American technological prowess and not think that we can win by sending out small counter-insurgent teams to best the guerrillas at the type of war they know best.

Fourth, the United States is a big country and we should fight wars in a big way. One of our great advantages is our mass. We should not hesitate to use it. Secretary Weinberger is absolutely right in rejecting the slow, gradual commitment of limited units of force over a prolonged period of time. Since 1815 we have never (with the partial exception of the Korean war) fought a country bigger than us. If we can avoid a central conflict with the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that we will have to do so in the immediate future. We won World War II because we were able to overwhelm the Germans and the Japanese with men, machines, and material. Reviewing our military history, General David Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed to the way in which we rather consistently mismanaged our military operations and concluded that in the past we won, in his words, "by being bigger, not smarter." He is right. Bigness not brains is our advantage, and we should exploit it. If we have to intervene, we should intervene with overpowering force. As everyone points out, there were goofs galore in the Grenada operation, but when you deploy 7,000 troops against the minuscule opposition that existed on Grenada, you can afford the goofs. Our successful intervention in 1964 in the Dominican Republic was similar: we deployed 23,000 troops there in a few days, although it was not clear that anyone on the island particularly wanted to fight us. In 1958 we deployed about 17,000 troops into Beirut; in 1983 we deployed less than one-tenth that number. The 1958 intervention was a success; the 1983 intervention ended in tragedy. Surely the differences in the numbers account in part for the differences in outcome. In this connection, I do not find it necessarily bad that it is almost impossible for us to undertake any military operation, however trivial, without all four services getting into the act. Redundancy is, from one view, duplication, but from another view, it is insurance, reinforcement, and strength. We can afford four services; we can afford four air forces. When the need exists, we should use them all.

Finally, if American forces have to be used, they should be used to achieve military objectives. Military forces are not primarily instruments of communication to convey signals to an enemy; they are instead instruments of coercion to compel him to alter his behavior.[4] Nor are

## Fighting With Chopsticks

When the Americans entered the war, we spent all our time trying to figure out how to fight you. Everyone, from the lowest soldier to the highest general, talked about it constantly. It was a matter of life and death. The incredible density of your shelling and your mobility were our biggest concerns. I myself saw the first B-52 raid, on Highway 13, on June 18, 1965. I will never forget it. Twenty-six B-52s dropped their bombs about four kilometers from me. It was horrible. Two or three hectares of land were simply blown away. Our losses were huge. We had to admit you had a terrible strength. So how could we preserve our forces but still engage you? We decided we had to force you to fight our way—with chopsticks, piece by piece.

And then it came to us that the way to fight the American was to grab him by his belt, to get so close that your artillery and airpower were useless. The result was interesting—our logistic forces, who were farther from the Americans, took greater losses than the combat units, who engaged you.

*Viet Cong General Hoang Anh Tuan, quoted in William Broyles, Jr., "The Road to Hill 10,"* Atlantic Monthly *(April 1985).*

[4]For a penetrating analysis of how the purpose of American military action in Vietnam shifted



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they normally good instruments of political and social appeal, to win the hearts and minds of people. Military forces are designed to defeat opposing military forces; they are not very useful in the pursuit of most other goals. The American military tradition from Grant and Sherman to Eisenhower and Nimitz was that the major military goal was to seek out and destroy the enemy's military forces. This may at times lead, as the critics allege, to a total disregard of strategic maneuver and deception and to a commitment to attack head-on where the enemy is strong, but it does rest on the correct understanding that the principal purpose of military forces is to crush other military forces. Napoleon once observed that, "There are in Europe many good generals, but they see too many things at once. I see only one thing, namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves." This spirit imbued American military and naval thinking in the past. It should be resurrected for the future.

The five key elements of American strategy that I have sketched out here are not new. Indeed, in many respects they are simply restatements of the traditional principles of war set forth in the manuals of all the services: the objective, offensive, mass, simplicity, economy of forces. They can almost be summed up in the familiar phrase about "getting thar fustest with the mostest." They do represent a shift back to more traditional American ways of thinking about strategy and the use of military force compared to those that have dominated strategic thinking in recent years.

My analysis has not addressed when or why we should use military force. Instead, it has attempted to focus on how we should use it, that is, what strategy should guide its use, if we have to use it. It in no way constitutes an argument for promiscuous intervention overseas, and, in fact, very few situations will justify the commitment of U.S. forces to combat. What I have argued is that when those situations arise, the U.S. should intervene rapidly, in an offensive mode, in a decisive manner, and so far as possible with overwhelming force, with a view to defeating enemy military forces in the shortest time possible. "You always play to win," said Nimitz. "That's the only way." Before 1951 it was also the American way, and both the imperatives of foreign policy and the necessities of domestic politics demand that American strategy once again be guided by that precept.

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from counterinsurgency to signaling, see Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security* (Fall 1982).



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# The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay

Alvin H. Bernstein

THE EXPANSION of Soviet naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region has been proceeding for nearly two decades. It began in March 1968, with naval deployments to the Indian Ocean that were encouraged by major policy decisions of the Western powers. Great Britain had just announced its intention to accelerate its military withdrawal east of Suez, while a newly-elected Nixon administration had reevaluated U.S. military strategy in Vietnam and declared its intention to "Vietnamize" the war in Southeast Asia. As the Western presence waned, the Soviets stepped gingerly into the vacuum. Through the Malacca-Singapore Straits, they deployed ships to the Indian Ocean from their Pacific fleet based at Vladivostok.

The Soviet presence in the area became more apparent in 1971 when India tilted away from the U.S. following the Indo-Pakistan War and concluded its "Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" with the USSR. (A growing Indian Navy—the largest, most modern, and best equipped in the area, and very much oriented toward sea control—already occupied a strategic position in relation to the Malacca-Singapore Straits, with its new naval base in the Andaman Islands.) Under the treaty, India promised to make port facilities available to the Soviets, thereby at least raising the specter of a Soviet presence at the gateway between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Throughout the 1970s, and especially after the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975, the U.S. simultaneously played its China card and pursued detente, while the Soviets gradually increased the size of their naval contingent in the Indian Ocean. Despite the gentle warming of U.S.-Soviet relations implied by detente, the first half of the 1970s saw occasional indirect challenges between the two countries. During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, for example, the U.S. sent through the Malacca-Singapore Straits its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, which was closely shadowed by a Soviet naval squadron. Similar deployments occurred at the time of the Yom Kippur war in 1973.

In 1978 the U.S. military presence and its credibility around the southern and eastern rim of Eurasia reached their lowest point. Many of the regional powers, who had once been friends, were now making virtue of necessity and inclining towards a defenseless neutrality. Two Soviet actions in that year brought them bolt upright again: the fortification of the Soviet bases in Japan's northern territories and, in November, the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship with Vietnam. In December 1978 the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea and in March 1979, they announced the arrival of Soviet warships in their ports. That spring, at the SALT talks in Vienna, Leonid Brezhnev promised President Carter that the Soviet Union would not establish military bases in Vietnam; Vietnam meanwhile was assuring the

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




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United Nations that it had no intention of allowing Moscow to turn Cam Ranh Bay into a Soviet base. In mid-April, however, the State Department announced that two Soviet Navy TU-95/Bear D reconnaissance aircraft were operating from Da Nang, and in May U.S. press reports stated that a diesel-powered Foxtrot-class submarine had been photographed in Cam Ranh Bay.

At the end of the decade, two events—the radical change of regime in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—not only changed the general international climate drastically, but greatly enhanced the importance of the waterways between the Persian Gulf and Japan. Both the Americans and the Soviets began publicly flexing their naval muscles in the region.

Since 1980, the Soviet Union has added a naval presence in the South China Sea to its already substantial, flexible task force in the Indian Ocean. Thanks to the Vietnamese and to their successful invasion of Kampuchea, the Soviets have increased their ability to project naval and airpower in the area. During the past five years, they have gained access not only to facilities in Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, but also to the ports at Kompong Som and at nearby Ream in Kampuchea, on the Gulf of Thailand. They thereby continue to strengthen their capacity to perform anti-ship operations in the South China Sea and now have substantially improved their reconnaissance resources. The establishment of an electronic intelligence gathering facility at Cam Ranh Bay is expected to handle regional communications for the Soviet Navy and Air Force in both the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, and access to the ports of Kompong Som and Ream increases the range of Soviet naval power. In May 1980, it was reported that the Soviet Union had stationed nuclear-powered attack submarines in the South China Sea for the first time, in an apparent demonstration of its power to disrupt some of the world's busiest and strategically most important sea lanes. Above all, the permanent basing of Soviet naval contingents and air power in Vietnam helps the Soviet Pacific fleet solve its problem of having to pass through the narrow straits of the Sea of Japan to gain access to the Pacific.

The Soviet geopolitical position in East Asia, in the Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific is thus substantially stronger than it was 20 years ago. Since 1965, the Soviet Pacific fleet has nearly doubled in size and is now the largest of the four Soviet fleets. Since the late 1970s it has received some of the best ships available. It now has two of the Soviet Navy's three operational Kiev V/STOL (Vertical or Short Take-Off Landing) aircraft carriers, one of its two Ivan Rogov large amphibious ships, between 30 and 40 Backfire air-to-surface missile bombers, Delta III ballistic missile submarines and Victor III attack submarines.[1] In 1965 the Soviet Pacific Fleet contained 25 percent of all Soviet naval assets; by 1975 the percentage was 28, and today it stands at 32. Its Pacific fleet has grown to over 800 ships (including the two V/STOL carriers), well over 120 submarines, half of which are nuclear-powered, and about 98 surface combatants (see Table I). Moreover, this naval build-up has been accompanied by a parallel increase in ground forces in the Far East, which, during the same period, have more than doubled: from 200,000 men to 450,000 in nearly 52 divisions, a quarter of the total military manpower available to the Soviet Union.

This build-up of Soviet forces in the Asia-Pacific region shows no sign of abating. In November 1985, a new Soviet Surface Action Group[2] was en route to the Western Pacific, where it will probably become a permanent part of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The quality of Soviet air and naval forces in the East can be expected to improve as well with the introduction of new tactical and strategic aircraft possessing more

[1]Donald C. Daniel and Gael D. Tarleton, *The U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific*, 473–474.

[2]It consists of a Kirov class nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser, the *Frunze*, and two guided missile destroyers, the Udaloy class *Admiral Spiridonov* and the Sovremenny class *Osmotritelny*. All three ships are less than two years old, and their transfer from the Soviet Northern Fleet and the Baltic Fleet late in August indicates a commitment to boost significantly the capability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.



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Table I

Major Soviet Far East Naval Forces[1]

| | 1968 | 1973 | 1978 | 1983 | 1985[2] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Ships* | | | | | |
| Carriers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Surface Combatants | 55 | 60 | 67 | 88 | 98 |
| Submarines (General Purpose) | 95 | 90 | 90 | 95 | 102 |
| Submarines (SSN/SSBN) | 10 | 20 | 30 | 31 | 31 |
| Amphibious (LPD/LST) | 0 | 4 | 9 | 22 | 23 |
| Mine Warfare (Ships/Craft) | 110 | 115 | 110 | 95 | 95 |
| Logistic, Support, Misc. | 390 | 357 | 420 | 475 | 475 |
| *Total* | 660 | 646 | 726 | 808 | 826 |
| *Aircraft* | | | | | |
| Naval bombers | 0 | 0 | 110 | 110 | 190 |
| ASW Patrol | 65 | 125 | 120 | 145 | 150 |

[1]Adapted from the table provided by Anthony Preston, "The Changing Balance in the Pacific," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (September 20, 1984); 548–550, and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, 1984), 21.

[2]See also, *Jane's Fighting Ships 1985–1986* (London, 1985), 511. Cf. Lebayl, Couhat, Baker, *Combat Fleets of the World, 1984/85*, (Annapolis, 1984), 671–818.

capable systems, such as the *Foxhound* and *Mainstay* (AWACS), and quieter, more operationally sophisticated submarines. In addition three Soviet-made MI24 helicopter gunships and five MiG-19 jets, all apparently flown by Kampuchean crews, have now been stationed permanently at Pochentong airbase. The MiG pilots were reportedly trained at Bien Hoa airbase in southern Vietnam in 1984, after returning from basic instruction in the Soviet Union.

The size of Soviet forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans does not yet compensate for the superior quality of the U.S. naval forces (see Table II), nor is it likely to do so in the immediate future, since the current administration shows no sign of renouncing America's long-standing role in the region. The Soviet Union does not, however, focus on the U.S. alone. Its Pacific forces remain more than a match for the burgeoning Chinese navy. Moreover, the trends in the correlation of U.S./USSR Pacific forces should not leave us entirely sanguine. The impressive Soviet build-up is unlikely to have a specific, aggressive, regional intent since that would be quite out of character for a power that, at least until now, has revealed itself as a cautious and nonconfrontational, if determined imperialist. Probably we are seeing yet another example of the Soviets' seeking to enhance their role as both an Asian and a global power, and to be prepared for all contingencies and opportunities. Linked with the Soviet build-up is the increase in the number of SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Far East (one-third of the total force), and the likely introduction of the longer range land mobile SS-X-25 that could threaten Australia. All these developments add up to an exercise in coercive diplomacy typical of a power that relies on the long-term effects of fear to achieve its ends, the most immediate of which is probably to intimidate the regional powers into distancing themselves from the United States.

Some of the Asian nations seem prepared to resist this coercion. The Japanese appear to be inching their way toward higher defense expenditures, and Indonesia and Malaysia, in spite of formal opposition to American naval facilities in Diego Garcia, have muted their reaction and showed considerable tolerance toward the pas-



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sage of American naval task forces through their Straits. Moreover, the U.S. and Indonesia seem to have come to an arrangement whereby American nuclear submarines may pass through the Lombok and Makassar Straits, as well as through the Ombai-Wetar Strait, with advance notification.[3] In recent years several of the ASEAN navies have acquired impressive capabilities for anti-ship operations in the maritime corridors, and for monitoring Soviet fleet movements there.

THE SOVIET Pacific Fleet operates from three bases inside the Soviet Union itself: Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk and Sovetskaya Gavan. When its ships need to reach open sea from either Vladivostok or Sovetskaya Gavan, they must cross the Sea of Japan and then pass through one of three, relatively narrow straits: Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya (or La Perouse, as it is sometimes called). Tsushima—sandwiched between Japan and South Korea, and within range of U.S. bases on Okinawa—is inhospitable to the Soviets. Soya freezes over during the winter. The Soviet Union, therefore, must rely heavily on the Tsugaru Strait. Petropavlovsk is located well north and east of Soya Strait, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, and is the only major Soviet base with unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean, though it too is icebound several months every year. Of the minor bases in the Soviet Union only Korsakov, on the southern tip of Sakhalin astride the Soya Strait, warrants mention because it is supposedly being transformed into a major facility.

The difficulty of operating from these bases largely explains the importance the Soviet Union attaches to its basing rights at the warm water port of Cam Ranh Bay, where it now has both ship and air facilities and where it rapidly

[3]See Yaacov Vertzberger's "The Malacca-Singapore Straits: The Suez of Southeast Asia," *Conflict Studies*, no. 140.

Table II

U.S. and Soviet Naval Forces in the Pacific[1]

| | *West Pacific 7th Fleet* | *East Pacific 3rd Fleet* | *Total U.S. Pacific Fleet* | *USSR Pacific Fleet* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Attack Aircraft Carriers | 2 | 4 | 6 | 0 |
| Helicopter Aircraft Carriers | 1 | 5 | 6 | 2 |
| Battleships | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Cruisers | 2 | 15 | 17 | 14 |
| Destroyers | 6 | 25 | 31 | 22 |
| Frigates | 14 | 31 | 45 | 55 |
| *Total* | 25 | 81 | 106 | 93 |
| Strategic Submarines | * | * | 3 | 31 |
| Attack Submarines | 9 | 31 | 40 | 91 |
| *Total* | 9+ | 31+ | 43 | 122 |
| Amphibious | 6 | 26 | 32 | 22 |
| Underway Replenishment | 5 | 25 | 30 | 25 |
| Other Support Ships | 3 | 7 | 10 | 60 |

[1]Source is Benjamin F. Schemmer, "The Pacific Naval Balance," *Armed Forces Journal International* (April, 1984). Updated by the author, November, 1985.

*Deployment location of three U.S. SSBNs is classified.



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established a standing naval presence of as many as 30 ships and submarines in the South China Sea. Just how important these rights are is indicated by the enormous price tag which the Soviet Union is prepared to accept: $4.8 billion in military aid to Vietnam since 1979, continuing now at the rate of $3 million to $6 million per day, somewhere between $1 and $2 billion a year. These vast sums are used to shore up the crumbling Vietnamese economy, to allow the Vietnamese to continue their all-but-complete occupation of Kampuchea, and to enable the Vietnamese army to counter Chinese military pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Over 2,500 Soviet military advisors are in Vietnam to help accomplish these objectives. In addition to the direct Soviet economic assistance that the Vietnamese have been receiving, they can also lay claim to aid packages from the Soviet Union's East European allies, thanks to membership in the Communist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

In five years, the Soviets have transformed Cam Ranh Bay into their largest naval base for forward deployment outside the Warsaw Pact. Beijing claims that the facilities there are operated exclusively by the Soviets and that all Vietnamese have been systematically excluded from the area. The Soviets already have missile loading and handling equipment in place and have set up ordnance ranges and aircraft maintenance depots, as well as the communications and intelligence facilities already noted. Usually some 20 ships together with six attack and cruise missile submarines, some of them nuclear-powered, operate daily in the area, an increase of 25 percent since 1982.

A composite aircraft unit of TU-16/Badgers, TU-95/Bear D's, and TU-142/Bear F's has been at Cam Ranh Bay since January 1984 and a squadron of MiG-23/Flogger G's has been present since December 1984. With the arrival of seven additional TU-16/Badger aircraft in late 1984, the squadron at Cam Ranh Bay now totals 24 reconnaissance or strike aircraft, with 8 Bears and 16 Badgers, 10 of which have strike capabilities. Depending upon Soviet strategic priorities, the Badger force could, at least in part, be replaced with Backfire bombers at some future date. Even now, the Badger's range from Cam Ranh Bay extends over an area that includes not only the sovereign states of the immediate region, but also U.S. bases at Clark and Subic, and perhaps as far as the U.S. territory of Guam and the western portion of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The TU-95/Bear D aircraft conduct regular flights primarily over the South China Sea, where they carry out reconnaissance and surveillance of U.S. and Chinese naval units and collect intelligence against the PRC, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The TU-142/Bear F, a long-range, anti-submarine warfare aircraft (ASW), also operates over the South China Sea in maritime reconnaissance and probably ASW flights. Bear D's based at Cam Ranh Bay have reconnoitered everything from single U.S. Navy ships to carrier battle groups, with some missions indicating that the Soviets were using the ships and battle groups as convenient targets for tactical training. The V/STOL aircraft carriers (*Minsk* and *Novorossiysk*) have also called at Cam Ranh Bay as part of their distant water operations, and the Soviets recently conducted an amphibious exercise not far from Hanoi and only 100 miles from the PRC border. The most significant shift throughout the Soviet Pacific Fleet, however, is likely to be an increase in the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines operating throughout the area. They would be able to function well beyond local waters and might be used for patrolling against nuclear submarines, indirect support for surface battle groups, and interdicting the U.S.'s sea lanes of communication.

It should be underlined that Cam Ranh Bay provides the Soviet Union with facilities from which it might sustain combat operations in the South China Sea in the initial stages of a general war. Any serious U.S. naval analyst must pay attention to that fact, the implications of which become more ominous if the base's defense improves or if the U.S. geopolitical situation in the region changes as a result, say, of political deterioration in the Philippines, or of a rapid and significant Soviet build-up in Vietnam in response to the outbreak of PRC-Vietnamese hostilities.



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As things now stand, however, the primary object of the Soviet military presence in Vietnam is unlikely to be the use of Cam Ranh Bay as a staging area against U.S. Pacific forces, for it would at present be difficult to defend against a determined attack by U.S. Pacific forces. (An analogous statement might be made about U.S. bases in the Philippines.) This relative defenselessness means that Cam Ranh Bay is more useful to the Soviets for the following purposes:

- to constrain U.S. power projection in the area by presenting the U.S. with the possibility of superpower confrontation;
- to provide support to pro-Soviet communist insurgents should they become active in the region at some future date;
- to counter any future Chinese submarine threat;
- to facilitate rapid reaction between and in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific;
- to use in any limited, regional conflict involving only local powers like the PRC, Vietnam, and the member states of ASEAN, rather than in a general war in which the U.S. had become directly involved.

In sum, as presently constituted, Cam Ranh Bay is ideal for menacing the southern coastal areas of China, and for deterring or defending against Chinese naval operations in the South China Sea.

In the years to come, however, the defenses of Cam Ranh Bay will surely be strengthened both by the improvement of Vietnamese capabilities in the vicinity and by increasing and upgrading Soviet forces there. There are already six Vietnamese-manned surface-to-air missile sites around Cam Ranh and Nha Trang airfields, and Vietnamese fighters are stationed at the latter base about 18 miles north of Cam Ranh Bay. The improved SAMS and the introduction of interceptor aircraft (a squadron of MiG-23/Floggers arrived late last year) should be all the more formidable when operating in association with the ground-based early warning and command and control system.

Finally, the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay are used to service and augment the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron (SOVINDRON), whose numbers rose dramatically following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to some 30 ships and remained at that level until the last months of 1982. The number has since decreased and stabilized at about 20 vessels on continuous deployment, yet there appears to be a rough chronological coincidence between that decrease and the ship deployments at Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron conducts operations and port visits designed to enhance the military position and the political image of the Soviet Union. The squadron's activities have demonstrated a willingness and a capability on the part of the Soviet Union to employ its naval power, not only for defensive purposes, but to support its political objectives in South and Southwest Asia. Most of this force normally operates in the northwestern Arabian Sea astride the vital oil lines from the Middle East. Support facilities for the squadron are maintained in Ethiopia, where a floating drydock is positioned at Dahlak Island, on Socotra Island, and in Aden. The Soviets are also trying hard to broaden this naval access throughout the area to strategically located islands and littoral sites in countries like Mozambique, Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Comoro Islands, and, of course, India.

### *Missions and Strategies*

TWO MOTIVES lie behind Soviet Far East deployment: to cover eventualities in case of war between the U.S. and the USSR, a war whose main focus would be in Europe; and to meet opportunities and threats arising in the Far East itself.

How would Soviet dispositions in the Far East meet the problems presented by a war between the U.S. and USSR centered in Europe? If a conventional, global war were to break out, the Soviets would probably mount a determined attack in Europe while trying to eliminate the possibility or at least blunt the edge of any U.S. counter-offensive in the Pacific. The Soviet Navy would be instructed to place the highest priority on two complementary tasks. By seeking to protect and deploy its own ballistic missile submarine force, it would



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


Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1985, U.S. Government Printing Office



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indicate to the U.S. that, should advantage or necessity so dictate, those SLBMs could be called upon to conduct strategic nuclear strikes against U.S. targets. At the same time, the Soviet Navy would try to defend its country and presumably the countries of its allies against similar nuclear (or conventional) strikes, whether delivered from U.S. ballistic missile submarines or from U.S. aircraft carriers and ships armed with long-range cruise missiles. The Soviet fleet would have other missions, to be sure, but none so vital as these.

To protect its ballistic missile submarine force in the Pacific region, the Soviet Navy intends to keep many of those submarines confined inside bastions. These would be located close to the Soviet homeland and deep within waters from which the Soviets would attempt to exclude U.S. naval forces as completely as possible. In the Pacific, these areas of sea control, as they are called, would be the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk (where the Soviets would attempt to prevent entry by controlling the narrow passages that lead to the Pacific), the Northwest Pacific Basin east of the Kamchatka peninsula. In all, the Soviets have allocated to their Pacific fleet 31 ballistic missile submarines that might require such protection. Seven of these are old, diesel-powered Golf-class submarines which could be deployed in the region but only against targets in Asia. The remainder of the force is made up of 9 Yankee- and 15 Delta-class submarines, though only the Deltas have the range to strike targets in the continental United States from within the bastions. The Yankees would have to cross a substantial portion of the Eastern Pacific before their ordnance could reach targets in North America.

Beyond these exclusion areas the Soviet Navy would try to establish zones in which U.S. vessels could operate against Soviet targets only by placing themselves at constant risk of Soviet attack. These, referred to as areas of sea denial, are currently intended to reach about 1,250 miles beyond the territory of the Soviet Union. They will soon have to be extended to over 1,850 miles in order to counter U.S. platforms armed with Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles. The Soviets would use all major surface combatants and combat aircraft together with most of the attack submarines of the Pacific fleet to effect the twin tasks: sea control, whereby they would protect Soviet ballistic submarines and sea denial, whereby they would hold at bay U.S. ballistic missile forces and aircraft carrier battle groups.

How these Soviet strategies develop will depend largely on technological changes. Soviet technology is unlikely soon to give the USSR the ability to destroy U.S. SSBN forces before their missiles can be launched. The U.S. will therefore continue to enjoy the deterrent capability it now possesses thanks to the naval leg of its nuclear triad. This capability will keep substantial pressure on the Soviets to improve protection of their own SSBN force. It will also lead them to prepare for the likelihood that war with the U.S. and her allies would be conventional and protracted, waged under the technological umbrella of a nuclear standoff.

A conventional war between the U.S. and USSR would, of course, be fought on or around the Eurasian mainland, giving the Soviets a strategic advantage over the U.S., whose forces would have a long logistics tail that might be vulnerable to attack. That tail would make an especially inviting target if the Soviets succeed in establishing their areas of sea control and sea denial, depleting U.S. naval assets in the process. In such circumstances the Soviet fleet might well be tempted to send a small number of submarines beyond its purely defensive perimeters to damage the U.S.'s ability to reinforce and resupply its combat forces. In the Pacific theatre this would mean interdicting the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) to South Korea and Japan. These sea lanes stretch westward across the Pacific from North America and Hawaii, and eastward from the Persian Gulf through the Indonesian Straits, or around Australia.

With respect to these missions and strategies, it is important to note that not only is the number of Soviet attack submarines increasing but that their quality is improving. The Pacific fleet already has 55 diesel-powered attack submarines, and as the number grows along with



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that of their nuclear counterparts, the Soviets will almost certainly add them to the attack force available to operate against Western naval assets in sea-denial areas. They might also be used to interdict western SLOCs. The Soviets are now preparing to deploy significantly quieter attack submarines, which Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces will have more difficulty detecting and tracking. Within the next 10 years, the Soviets will probably neutralize the acoustical advantage now enjoyed by U.S. submarines by producing nuclear attack submarines as quiet as the quietest in the U.S. inventory, the 688 class. The most critical, and therefore the most likely mission for these new, quieter attack submarines would be to protect the Soviet SSBN force. The older submarines that they relieve would then probably go to swell forces available for deployment in the areas of sea denial and to interdict SLOCs in the Pacific.

If, after the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviets wanted to deploy their older submarines for the purposes of interdiction, a secure Cam Ranh Bay, able to survive the initial stages of the war, would serve as an especially valuable base of operations. Attack submarines could slip away from it without having to pass through the more easily patrolled choke points to the north. A small fraction of the available Soviet attack submarines would require a substantial diversion of U.S. naval assets to respond to the threat. The operational life of the U.S. Pacific fleet could be further complicated if the Soviets supplemented assaults on SLOCs with an offensive mining campaign against U.S. naval bases from Subic right across to the coast harbors of the U.S. mainland. If the Soviet Pacific forces could accomplish it, such a campaign would be particularly worrying, both because the Soviets possess the world's largest and most sophisticated inventory of naval mines and because the U.S. Pacific Fleet has only very modest mine countermeasure forces, probably insufficient to deal adequately with even a relatively limited Soviet mining effort. Of all the operational contingencies that a protracted war in the Pacific could bring, active and passive SLOC interdiction are the most likely and the most troublesome.

SOVIET POLICY-MAKERS have frequently exploited with opportunistic skill the tensions and changes in various parts of the world. Except for Vietnam, the Asia-Pacific region has largely escaped these attentions. It has offered the Soviets few opportunities to secure such decisive political, economic, or diplomatic influence as would enable them to improve their position among the region's various non-aligned powers. Nor until very recently has there been much evidence to suggest that the Soviets were seriously thinking about how they might do so. There are, still, a number of political trends and possibilities that do not augur well for the preservation of the status quo. These are at least as critical to the delicate and complicated balance of power in the Pacific as the accumulation of military hardware by the parties concerned. At least five potential causes of serious regional realignment or destabilization can be identified: further Vietnamese aggression; reaction to the Soviet introduction of IRBM's in the Far East; increased protectionism on the part of the U.S., the West Europeans, and Japan; a severe economic downturn in the area; and problems attendant on the numerous changes in national leadership that will occur in the various countries.

First, we cannot know if and for how long an imperial Vietnam will remain satiated after it swallows Kampuchea, as it soon must. Nor can we predict with any confidence how the member states of ASEAN will react to that event. Vietnam's past acts of aggression and the Soviets' support of them have worked to keep the members of ASEAN together and leaning, if only at a gentle angle, toward the U.S. Future aggression could reinforce this trend, but it could also have the opposite effect. Vietnam's continued expansion might serve to drive a wedge between ASEAN allies that would split the Association apart. A noticeable and possibly divisive difference already exists, for example, between Thailand's attitude to the problem of Vietnam and Indonesia's.

Second, the verdict is not yet in on local response to the Soviet nuclear build-up in the Far East, and therefore on how that response will affect regional alliances with the U.S. It is



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too early to tell how the people of the region will react, especially in those countries where popular opinion heavily influences public policy. Moreover, the issue could be complicated by French nuclear testing in the South Pacific as well as by the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative. Is Mr. Lange's New Zealand a maverick or a harbinger? With it as an example, how will Australians behave when they discover that their country lies within the Soviet nuclear strike zone, as eventually it will?

Third, American, West European, and Japanese protectionist policies could become a serious obstacle to plans for both formal and de facto security cooperation. Japan's relations with the West should and probably will remain close, barring some shock with unpredictable consequences, such as a major crisis in Taiwan or a collapse of the American position in the Philippines. Strident criticism of Japan's embarrassment of riches, on the one hand, and her military niggardliness, on the other, might unleash a wave of nationalism in Japan. That could strain relations, not only with the U.S. and NATO nations, but also with Asian neighbors.

Fourth, protectionism might well spread to the rest of the Far East as a result of the sharp decline in the economic growth rate of this hitherto dynamic region, a decline whose signs are now unmistakable in many of its countries. This slackening of growth could well bring with it the particularly persistent and virulent form of political instability that usually accompanies the frustration of rising expectations.

Finally, a fair number of the most prominent, pro-Western, heads-of-state in Asia, people who have used a form of soft authoritarianism to bring both economic growth and political stability to their countries, are elderly. In Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and quite possibly Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, leadership changes will probably take place during the next decade. It would be a mistake to assume that all will be smooth. Most worrying for the U.S., of course, is the prospect of economic collapse and continuing political upheaval in the Philippines, which would have grave implications for security and for the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

### *Clark and Subic*

THE SITUATION in the Philippines constitutes the most immediate and the most serious problem for the U.S. as it plans the future security of the Western Pacific. Continued use of Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base, the largest American military centers outside U.S. territory, depends upon the Philippines' political future. But the country has experienced so many years of political decline that the prospects for arresting that decline are uncertain.

The economic problems that were exacerbated but not entirely caused by the former political regime in Manila are so severe and complex as to make it unlikely that even the most generous largesse from the U.S. or the International Monetary Fund, or both combined, can do much to solve them.[4] Interest and inflation rates are chronically high, the national debt has passed the $25 billion mark, and there is every reason to believe that prices for the Philippines' agricultural produce will remain severely depressed. All these problems will persist at least to the end of the decade and probably well beyond. Any non-communist regime that can hold power peacefully will necessarily consist of leaders and coalitions whose political and economic base will prevent them from reforming seriously the political system or the economic processes sustaining it. Those economic processes created the conditions that make the current insurgent movement so attractive to increasing numbers of the Philippine populace, and without real economic reform the movement will continue to grow. Whatever position the new regime might take on whether to keep U.S. bases on Philippine soil, it probably cannot stem for long the rising tide of insurgency.

This apparently indigenous, Maoist insurgency has been growing recently at an alarming rate and shows no signs of diminishing. Penta-

[4]For this section on the future security of the bases in the Philippines, I am indebted to Andrew Findlayson's article, "The Philippines after Marcos: Quo Vadis?" forthcoming in *Orbis*.



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gon experts put the number of guerrillas, the New People's Army (NPA), at 16,500, with as many as a million Filipinos actively supporting them by providing food, equipment, and housing. A recent CIA report estimates that within three years the insurgents will achieve parity with the Philippine military. Until now, the NPA has scrupulously avoided seeking outside support from sympathetic communist states. As their rebellion grows, however, and as they approach the point where they can force the overthrow of the government and seize power, their need for outside arms and equipment may become irresistible. The Armed Forces of the Philippines are unlikely to prove effective at counterinsurgency. Not only are they not properly equipped for such operations, they contribute to the growth of the opposition by abusing their citizens. The army will continue to perform poorly until its officer corps is purged of unprofessional officers, corruption is ended, and adequate training standards and facilities established. In their present form the Armed Forces of the Philippines are not capable of defeating the insurgents. They are also incapable of protecting the U.S. bases from an unconventional attack. In fact, the security of our bases has already been breached. In September 1985, a delegation from a Senate subcommittee discovered empty guard towers and missing fencing around much of the perimeter of Clark Air Base, which, like Subic, is supposed to be patrolled by the Philippine military. The subcommittee reported evidence of communist guerrilla presence within the perimeter of the Subic installation, which includes miles of fields and hilly jungles. The subcommittee report describes the signs of the guerrilla presence on these outer parts of the base as "nothing short of incredible."

The threat to Subic and Clark is not only from the NPA insurgents. The Philippine government is responsible for the air defenses of the islands, but these are unreliable because the local Philippine radar system frequently does not operate and neither Clark nor Subic has any adequate U.S. early warning radar or air defense. Given the state of the Philippine economy and the pressing need to spend military funds on counterinsurgency operations, no government is very likely to devote any of its scarce resources to improving the air defense system. The bases' consequent vulnerability to preemptive, conventional air attack becomes a matter for deep concern when viewed against the background of the expanding Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Clark and Subic are only two hours' flying time from the Soviet bases in Vietnam, while the Soviet submarine forces routinely patrol in the South China Sea. If a crisis were to develop and approach boiling point, Soviet aircraft, with little warning and opposition, could do significant damage to the facilities at Clark and Subic as well as destroy a substantial amount of U.S. war reserves now located in the Pacific.

It is, in fact, difficult to overestimate the amount of damage that such a second "Pearl Harbor" might do. Outside Japan and South Korea, Clark and Subic are our main bases in the Western Pacific, and were they to be destroyed at the onset of a conventional conflict all Southeast Asia would immediately become vulnerable to a Soviet attack. The U.S. would at the same time lose control of the vital Indonesian Straits, with the result that Japan's southern flank would be exposed and our forces would have to journey much further in order to gain access to and from the Indian Ocean. Preemptive destruction of the bases could also cost our Pacific forces large portions of the aviation fuel, spare parts, sonobuoys, aviation and naval ammunition in the Western Pacific, and a substantial part of the Seventh Fleet's repair capability. Such loss, accordingly, would make it extremely difficult for the U.S. to sustain a protracted conventional war in the Pacific. The 13th Air Force and the Seventh Fleet both require unhampered logistical support to operate; the destruction of Clark and Subic would thus seriously disrupt the early stages of any planned campaign.

In light of these considerations, there are some who argue that we should be exploring the possibility of alternate basing in the Marianas, on the islands of Guam and Tinian. Bases there would cost somewhere between $2 billion and $8 billion to build and would move U.S. forces 1,500 miles further away from the nations of



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Southeast Asia. As it is, the U.S. performance in the role of guarantor of regional security does not inspire full confidence in the area, and if circumstances were to force the abandonment of Clark and Subic, our credibility would be undermined further. The U.S. ought, therefore, to locate its new bases to the west rather than the east of Clark and Subic. The problem would be best solved if one of our ASEAN friends could be persuaded that the region's security and its own required a U.S. presence nearer to, rather than farther from, the Malacca-Singapore Straits. Certainly if we do give up the Philippines, the lessons of the past would demand that we leave behind us no Cam Ranh Bay waiting for the tenancy of our enemies.

## How Long to Stay

— Paul Gigot

Clark Field and Subic Bay provide several things that no other place in the Southwest Pacific or Southeast Asia can offer. In practical terms, the bases benefit from thousands of highly skilled Filipino workers who would be very difficult to replace. They repair some 70 warships in the average month and work for perhaps a tenth of U.S. wages. Transferring ship-repair operations to Japan or Singapore or somewhere in the Pacific would raise those costs through the roof. The bases also offer a friendly home port for airmen and sailors and their families. And over more than 40 years they have built up docking, landing, and other facilities that could only be duplicated at great expense. Estimated current cost of moving them elsewhere: at least $5 billion.

A few Pacific nations are already cheering the possibility that the bases will be dispersed. Many Singaporeans, for example, hope they'll inherit the ship-repair operations in order to give a fillip to their flagging economy. And Guam, which already looks from the air like a giant Air Force landing strip, is another eager suitor.

The U.S. will probably have to think hard about moving the bases within the next few years. Filipino nationalism is on the rise, especially among the young who don't remember World War II. The bases are a major sore point. This is true even among many pro-American Filipinos. The critics don't like the terms (the $900 million over five years is less than what the U.S. pays Greece or Spain) and they fear the bases make Manila a nuclear target. Indeed, in February's election, both candidates took similar stands on the bases: honor the current agreements until they expire in 1991, but then renegotiate them on better terms or, if most Filipinos prefer, get rid of them. At the very least, the U.S. will probably have to pay much more after 1991 than it does now, no matter who is in power.

Pragmatism still could prevail in Manila, of course. Corazon Aquino was persuaded to drop her initial anti-bases position after her advisors suspected it might cost her some votes. Though the left clearly wants these bases out now, other Filipinos aren't so sure. The bases employ thousands of Filipinos and give a big boost to the Luzon economy—no small matter in an economy as depressed as the Philippines'. A national survey taken last summer by the Philippine Bishops-Businessmen's Conference found that 43 percent agreed that "the U.S. military bases should be kept/tolerated in the Philippines." Only 23 percent disagreed. But the margin of approval narrowed to only 35–28 percent among those under 24. Half of the Philippine population is under 18.

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# The Cost of Abandoning Europe

—Josef Joffe

EUROPE-BASHING has had a checkered career in American foreign policy debates since World War II. In the early 1950s, it was conservative Republicans—Herbert Hoover and Robert Taft, for instance—who sought to halt, if not to reverse, the nation's deepening entanglement in the affairs of the continent. And it was the Democratic Party of Truman and Acheson—then a party of *both* the big heart and the strong fist—which joined forces with moderate/liberal Republicans like Eisenhower to turn the United States into what it has remained: a power-in-Europe. By the mid-1960s, the loudest critics of the Alliance were liberals like Democratic Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, and by decade's end it was conservative tenants of the White House—Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger—who held the line against the would-be retractionists. We are now witnessing the most recent swing in what seems to be a 15-year cycle, with the harshest indictment of the Alliance emanating from neoconservative quarters and bearing the message of "nationalist unilateralism."

To spell out the indictment, it bears citing Irving Kristol, who wrote in the inaugural issue of *The National Interest*:

> Abroad, an assertive American foreign policy meets with great resistance from our allies, most of whom are utterly risk-averse, and some of whom believe that a grudging appeasement of Soviet power will mollify its messianic appetite. This is especially evident in Western Europe, where, under the American nuclear umbrella, national pride has softened into something that resembles national pique. But that umbrella has become moth-eaten with time. It functioned when the United States had a clear superiority in nuclear weapons over the Soviet Union. Today, the umbrella is more myth than reality. There are very few Americans, however much they cherish Western Europe, who are actually willing to engage in mutual nuclear annihilation with the Soviet Union in retaliation for non-nuclear Soviet aggression against Western Europe. This means that NATO, as currently structured, is an archaic institution, that the defense of Western Europe will become primarily a West European responsibility, that Western Europe will have to gird itself to fight and (hopefully) win a conventional war against the Soviet Union—with American help, if needed, but not with a recourse to nuclear weapons.

The vision of an America free from the bondage of alliance and the existential threat it has come to carry dovetails, ironically, with a European dream that might be labeled "nationalist neutralism." "What has come to be known as the peace movement today," proclaimed the West German socialist Erhard Eppler, one of its ideologues, "is also part and parcel of the nation's will to self-assertion." This dream feeds

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on the fear of Europe's victimization at the hands of the superpowers: It is the United States and the Soviet Union that have taken possession of the continent. They have sliced Europe in two, imposing their alien systems and ideologies on an ancient civilization. Without them, Europe would be whole again; without them, Europe would not serve as the "shooting gallery of the superpowers" (in the words of Heinrich Albertz, former SPD mayor of West Berlin) but live in harmony ever after.

Though hailing from hostile political camps (*les extrèmes se touchent?*), both views share a number of unspoken assumptions, to wit: The United States does not really belong in Europe; the defense of the half-continent does not really matter—either because there is no Soviet threat or because the United States could survive alone *in extremis*; finally, and most important, Western Europe's post-war order can stand on its own.

The solidity of that last assumption is the *sine qua non* of any retractionist policy. Unless we can be confident that the West European order will endure, we can hope for none of the other good things decommitment is expected to foster. We must be able to assume, for example, that European integration—one pillar of the post-war order—will not only persist but in fact expand to encompass defense. We must also be convinced that the Alliance will flourish, rather than languish, once the American guarantee is withdrawn. And this raises a fundamental question: What is the nature of Western Europe's contemporary order, and what role does the United States play in it?

## *Alliance as Order*

BY ENDURING for more than four decades, the post-war structure of Western Europe has already demonstrated an impressive capability to discharge the three key tasks of any international order worthy of the name. It has preserved the security and independence of its members. It has been stable, i.e. free of hegemonial ambitions. And it has muted—indeed, inhibited—the use of force. That track record stands in stark contrast to Europe's past. In the first half of the 20th century, the West European state system failed miserably on all three counts. In fact, by the end of the second Thirty Years War, which engulfed the Continent from 1914 to 1945, the European state system had almost destroyed itself. By contrast, the post-war West European system has not only been stable, but ultra-stable. While wars and civil wars multiplied elsewhere around the globe, Western Europe remained an island of peace. No army has ever marched against another; not a single border has been changed by force. And the independence of tiny Luxembourg has been preserved just as religiously as that of France, Britain, or Italy.

Western Europe's post-war order has endured beyond expectation because it succeeded in solving two existential problems at once. It managed to envelop the potential of Germany, Europe's most recent claimant to hegemony; and it succeeded in containing the might of the new contender, the Soviet Union. Those are two historic feats, yet neither would have been achieved without the United States's lasting entanglement in the affairs of Europe.

The United States's role in the containment of the Soviet Union is familiar enough to require no elaboration. What is widely neglected, and by the critics first and foremost, is the protector's role as *pacifier*—as *agens movens* in the construction of an interstate order in Western Europe that has muted, if not removed, ancient conflicts and shaped the indispensable conditions for cooperation. For in addition to creating a balance of power within Europe, the extension of a unilateral American security guarantee to Western Europe also dispatched the prime *structural* cause of conflict among nations—the search for an autonomous defense policy.

States go to war for many reasons—greed, ambition, glory—but an irreducible reason is built into the very nature of a sovereign state system, whose members must ultimately rely on themselves to protect their security and independence. In an anarchic self-help system, the very search for security turns into the root cause of insecurity, as each nation's quest poses a threat to the others. What John Herz has called the "security dilemma" and what Herbert Butterfield has described as "Hobbesian fear"



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does not necessarily and always lead to war. But the perverse dynamic of self-reliance explains why wars can break out even in the absence of such motives as ambition and aggrandizement.

Europe, a fount of international conflict for centuries, has never suffered from a dearth of these motives. Yet by underwriting the security of the West European nation states, by sparing them the necessity of self-reliant choice in matters of defense, the United States banished the *systemic* cause of conflict which had underlain so many of Europe's past wars (World War I providing perhaps the best example). By protecting Western Europe against others, the United States also protected the half-continent against itself. Without the embrace of a "security community," the success story of European integration might never have been written.

Nor might Western Europe ever have turned into the world's largest bastion of democracy. From the Enlightenment onward, liberal theory—from Condorcet to Comte—has routinely claimed that war is the "game of princes," that republics would hearken to the commercial spirit rather than the heady lure of arms and aggrandizement. This may or may not be true; the record of peaceful intercourse among democracies, like their existence itself, is still too short to vindicate Enlightenment optimism. In the post-war West European case, however, the causal relationship between democracy and peace might well have operated in reverse: democracy could flourish precisely because the peace was assured. With their security guaranteed by a powerful outsider, the nation-states of Western Europe did not face the kind of peril abroad that would justify the "primacy of foreign policy," the 19th-century ideology that set the imperative of national strength against the demands of mass-based democracy. Without a sense of impending victimization, ultra-nationalism and the "garrison-state" mentality could not overwhelm democratic experiments. If insecurity, real or pretended, helped to legitimize the politics of totalitarian mobilization in the first half of the 20th century, its absence in the second half cleared the ground where the habits of pluralism could take root and thrive.

It can obviously be argued that Joseph Stalin was the true "federator" of the half-continent. But the historical facts simply do not bear out the idea that the Soviet dictator was a more important influence for European cooperation than Messrs. Truman, Eisenhower, and Dulles. West Europeans did not cooperate in order to assure their security; they began to cooperate only *because* their security was assured—by a powerful outsider, the United States. As late as March 1948, when the cold war was already in full swing, Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries signed the 50-year Brussels Pact whose preamble explicitly identified Germany as a potential aggressor. Thereafter, France, which was consistently more concerned about its status and security vis-a-vis a resurgent half-Germany than about the hegemonic pressures of the Soviet Union, did its worst to prevent the rearmament of the Federal Republic in the framework of a European army. And thus the European Defense Community (EDC), the most ambitious integrationist venture Europe has ever tackled, died an unceremonious death at the hands of the French National Assembly in 1954. That failure is no mere footnote in the history of Europe, but an emblematic episode: Europe has never again tried to organize its own defense.

Even at a time of excruciating weakness, neither the Soviet challenge nor the destruction of the European balance during World War II proved powerful enough to prompt the West Europeans to transcend their history. Why then was the Federal Republic admitted to the Western coalition in 1955? Whence the enduring order both American and European critics of the Alliance take for granted today? The all but permanent intrusion of the United States into the system, secured by solemn treaty pledges in 1955, answers both questions. After the demise of the EDC, France accepted alliance with its German nemesis only because the United States and Britain (then still a kind of America writ small because of its unblemished great power status and "special relationship" with the U.S.) committed themselves contractually as well as concretely (i.e., with several army divisions) to a permanent presence on the continent. This was an event far more momentous than the



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simple birth of a new coalition. For the integration of *les Anglo-Saxons* and the commitment of American power to the protection of Western Europe against the Soviet Union *and* against itself swept aside the rules of the self-help game that had governed and regularly brought grief to Europe in centuries past.

The perverse, age-old logic of international politics came unhinged in favor of West European cooperation once the *Pax Americana* was in place. Thereafter, the international relations of Western Europe came to resemble domestic politics in one crucial respect: insecurity, the underlying condition of statecraft, and force, its *ultima ratio*, were banished from the system. Once the problem of security was dispatched, collective gain could overwhelm the zero-sum logic of rivalry and relative gain. In contrast to the interwar period, when the fears of the victors and the resentment of the vanquished made for a vicious cycle of repression and revanchism, France and Germany could join hands in the Alliance and the European Community because there was somebody more powerful than both to insure them against the perilous consequences of their credulity. The smaller nations of Western Europe, especially the wary Dutch, could swallow integration with the large because they did not need to fear domination. Even Great Britain ultimately joined the continental venture because America's presence blunted the hard edge of its traditional rivalry with France and Germany.

Today, the once obsessive preoccupation with Germany's power, both past and potential, has also yielded to a more sober and benign assessment. The West German successor to the Third Reich has proven a model ally and a model European precisely because it was not pushed into the poisoned atmosphere of the post-Versailles period. Cooperation between ancient enemies has been routinized within the expanding framework of the European Community.

IT IS ONLY tempting to conclude that so stable an order might stand on its own and dispense with the foundation laid by the United States in the early 1950s. Could not Western Europe—pacified, prosperous, and with an economic and demographic base larger than either superpower's—do without its patron power from across the sea? Put differently, could not Western Europe solve the twin problem of protection and pacification on its own?

The critics of America's presence in Europe would not hesitate to answer in the affirmative. In doing so, they would echo the classic conviction of the Europeanist faith. Since the West Europeans have learned to cooperate on all other matters, they should be able to do so in the realm of the common defense, too. To argue thus is to base a tenuous conclusion on a shaky premise. As to the premise, the record of European integration since the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 does not show that the West Europeans have learned to cooperate on all matters save defense. Not even the Common Market, Western Europe's minimal aspiration, is a reality.

Nor does this failure reflect only bureaucratic inertia or technical complexity, either of which could be overcome by political will and diligent effort. The root problem is that a common will requires a single sovereign. Yet in Europe, there is not one sovereign; there are 12. These sovereigns do not obey "Europe" but listen to the voice of the national interest as articulated by the chorus of their domestic politics. There is nothing—certainly no hegemonial unifier—to force the West European nation-state into liquidation. Nor is there any incentive potent enough to lure the states into self-abandonment. Decades ago, the Community's founding fathers thought that they had found the right combination of pull and push. "Functionalism," their *idée clef*, posited the steady subversion of sovereignty—"unification on the sly," as it were. The process would begin with the merger of certain sectors such as coal, steel, and agriculture. As it unfolded, it would generate irresistible pressures for the integration of more and more sectors. That "spill-over" effect would set in motion a self-perpetuating, unstoppable march toward unification of economies, polities, and armies. In reality, the march was never more than a series of straggly, quickly abandoned forays.

The counter-offensive against Brussels was



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prepared as early as 1960—only three years after the Treaty of Rome had established the EEC—by de Gaulle when he instructed his prime minister Michel Debré: "The Europe of [state to state] cooperation will be launched as of now. The Europe of [supranational] integration cannot but yield forthwith." In 1965, a year before the Community of the Six was to submit to a veritable constitutional revolution, by passing from unanimity to qualified majority voting, the campaign was unleashed in earnest. Since then, Western Europe has charted its course as nations have always done: in the shadow of each member's veto.

If functional necessity does not make for union in the realm of "low" politics (where even a single internal market still awaits completion), why should it do so in the realm of "high" politics—in defense and foreign policy—which is the most jealously guarded bastion of *raison d'état*? Necessity surely demands, and Western Europe's staggering resources surely permit, the birth of a common defense identity as distinct from the United States. But resources alone have never amounted to a solution. As Dean Acheson pointed out almost a generation ago: "Prosperity is not power. Power is a combination of population, resources, technology, and will. Will is the lacking element in Western Europe as a whole, the will to use the other elements for agreed ends."

The absence of will—or more precisely, the presence of too many separate wills—prompted the demise of the EDC, Europe's first and last try at a common defense. Then, the problem of too many wills was overcome by the intrusion of one very large will—that of the United States which would henceforth act in the double role of protector and pacifier. And that historical fact suggests a curious twist on alliance theory. Conventional theory holds that states coalesce *in order* to assure their security. In the case of post-EDC Western Europe, however, they coalesced *because* their security was assured—by a powerful outsider who delivered an external shield as well as an internal order. Security came first and cooperation came second. If that logic still holds some thirty-odd years later, Western Europe minus its protector-pacifier would face not just the familiar gulf between the dream and the power, but also a vicious cycle: Without a quantum leap in cooperation, Western Europe could not generate sufficient security to hold its own against the Soviet Union; yet could the West Europeans take that leap if their security were no longer guaranteed?

Without the United States, Western Europe might well fall back toward a pattern of interaction resembling the prewar period. Facing a new demand curve for security, its members would not necessarily engage in communal production of that commodity but scour the market for substitutes. These might range from a limited defense cartel (e.g. the Anglo-American "special relationship") to a limited detente cartel whereby the weak would seek to reduce their demand for security by appeasing the dominant power on the continent. In the absence of the United States, that mantle would fall on the Soviet Union, which would loom not as the "great federator" but as the paramount power, using its overweening strength to play one West European state against another and to dictate the terms of the relationship to them all. History, at any rate, does not assure us that the weak will always band together against the strong. More often than not, they have sought refuge in a policy of reinsurance, neutrality, or subordination. It is worth recalling that, although mainly driven by the quest for reconciliation with the East and the overdue acceptance of Europe's post-war realities, the "New Ostpolitik" of Willy Brandt was also—and not surprisingly—inspired by "Mansfieldism."

## *Europe Without America*

SUCH SPECULATIONS about the future of Europe minus the United States, invite the twin charge of historicism and faint heartedness. Still, whatever cooperation the post-war experience might have taught the West Europeans, it has unhinged neither geography nor the nation-state. France, as usual, provides the most instructive case in point. If France worried about German strength in the 1950s, it worried about German weakness in the 1980s—and in both cases, ironically, as a threat



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to French security. Europe was treated to a double-twist of French policy in the early 1980s when French *raison d'état* (another word for "history") triumphed predictably over both Gaullist orthodoxy and socialist sentiment. First, the French warmly embraced the deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles on the continent—as a counter not only to Soviet SS-20s but also to German pacifist nationalism. Thereafter, François Mitterrand, a socialist, demonstratively supported conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl's 1983 bid for reelection because the French president no longer trusted his Social Democratic *confrères*' devotion to the Atlanticist cause. The underlying logic of that irony is not hard to fathom. France's security (and its policy of splendid aggravation) rests on the twin pillars of a credible American nuclear guarantee and a well-defended glacis to the East, meaning a Federal Republic reliably bound to the Atlantic Alliance.

It should come as no surprise that security concerns lurk so close beneath the surface of stable, long-term cooperation. Even in a system sheltered by a mighty superpower, nations worry above all about survival, security, and status. How would the West Europeans assure their independence outside the American-built shelter? At the core of the question stands the problem of the atom. Western Europe could only dispense with the United States if it could field a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union. Yet how could the Europeans live up to that task in the absence of true unification?

The problem cannot be solved by postulating that demand, as the American critics of the Alliance would have it, will create its own supply—that a dramatically increased need for self-sufficiency in matters nuclear would finally push the West Europeans into political community. If anything, the opposite should be true. Nuclear weapons are inherently divisive. On the level of day-to-day politics, that truth has been dramatized by the endless strife over strategy that has rent the Alliance since the mid-1950s. Yet the problem runs far deeper.

For Western Europe, there are three theoretical alternatives to the American umbrella. One is a European super-state with its own nuclear deterrent. The second is a European deterrent-on-loan, so to speak, whereby each or one of the two existing nuclear powers—France and England—would commit its nuclear arsenal to the protection of the nuclear have-nots. The final alternative is a western Europe of nuclearized nation-states.

***One Europe, One Bomb***: This first alternative *presupposes* a European sovereign; it cannot create one. As a purely theoretical exercise, one might construe a Hobbesian state of general nuclear insecurity so oppressive that each state, feeling equally threatened, would be eager to yield its powers to a European nuclear sovereign. Yet the states of Western Europe do not live in a Hobbesian state of war, nor are all of them equally vulnerable. France and Britain have independent deterrents; for them, nuclear weapons are the *ultima ratio*, hence the very essence of sovereignty in the post-Hiroshima age. Britain and France built their national forces to *preserve* their status and independence; they will not relinquish the former for a European Behemoth that will destroy the latter.

***One Europe, Two Bombs***: The second alternative—a nuclear umbrella of French and/or British manufacture—is only seemingly more plausible. The reason that it is not genuinely so has been reiterated *ad infinitum* by French leaders, strategists, and ideologists—and the more discreet British, if pressed, would concur. *Le nucléaire ne se partage pas*—nuclear weapons protect only their possessors. "Deterence is exclusively national," hence "the nuclear risk cannot be shared." (Thus the French *White Book* on defense of 1972—which is still the official doxology.) A more drastic way of phrasing the same message is to assert, as the French have also endlessly done, that no nation will commit suicide on behalf of another. Such epigrams do not bode well for cordial *ententes*. Mutual control and mutual succor are the very stuff of alliance. If all vows and pledges are null and void when the existential crunch arrives, it must follow that nuclear alliances are impossible. If ever uttered, any French guarantee must perforce be a hollow one.

To accept that logic without qualification is



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also, of course, to reduce to pure pretense the American deterrent threat that is supposedly the linchpin of the Atlantic Alliance. Is the American nuclear guarantee then nothing but a hoax? And does the case against a British or French guarantee hold equally well against the American, now that the American heartland itself is vulnerable to nuclear attack? The fact that the Euro-American alliance has endured in the face of drastic changes in the nuclear balance suggests not. In fact, superpowers are in a different class of guarantors for at least three reasons.

The first is the factor of quality. Threatening nuclear strikes on behalf of allies requires, at a minimum, a counterforce potential. To maneuver between the shoals of suicide and surrender, great powers must have weapons that are accurate enough to threaten the common enemy's *forces*. The French and the British do not now possess such weapons; their arsenals are essentially structured to serve a countervalue strategy (i.e., attacks against population and industrial centers). Apart from 18 French land-based missiles on the Plateau d'Albion, the Franco-British forces are concentrated at sea. The British Polaris (64 missiles with three warheads each) and the French MSBS M-20 (80 missiles with a one-megaton warhead each) are neither accurate nor "small" enough to serve with precision against the enemy's military assets.

The second factor, closely linked, is quantity. Great numbers of strategic weapons confer options short of Armageddon. A first volley would not be the last; nor would an initial breach of deterrence signify its complete collapse. A counterforce blow would not necessarily bring on an apocalyptic riposte because large nuclear reserves should still make for "intra-war deterrence." Possession of abundant assets raises the probability of American first-use above zero—which may well be enough. The prospect of unlimited damage at the end of the day must instill caution in those who contemplate aggression against America's allies.

Extended deterrence options are denied small nuclear powers like France. Though modified at the edges over the years, France's deterrent doctrine remains based on the Gaullist premises laid down in the mid-1960s. The key premise is "proportional deterrence" or *la dissuasion du faible au fort*—the deterrence of the strong by the weak. Since France could not hope to match Soviet might, the criterion of "sufficiency" must endow its small nuclear force with a great deterrent effect. Accordingly, it is enough "to tear off an arm," to inflict a level of damage on the Soviet Union that would exceed the value represented by a conquered or annihilated France.

But the ability to mutilate a superpower does not suffice for the protection of allies. For that purpose, there is too deep a gulf between inherently limited means and potentially unlimited penalties. Tearing an arm off the Soviet body politic would result in the death of France. Hence it is only the impending destruction of France that lends weight to the threat of a suicidal strike. Moreover, the French force represents a "one-shot" potential only. If credible at all, it can be wielded only in defense of the supreme national interest, that is, the very existence of the nation.

France's future options, it might be argued, will no longer be chained to a puny potential like the present one. By the beginning of the 1990s, France might be in possession of seven missile-carrying submarines capable of hurling 592 warheads into Soviet territory. (It has six at present.) Similarly, if the British Trident II program survives as planned, Great Britain's nuclear capability might vault to anywhere between 512 to 1088 sea-launched warheads. It is not self-evident, however, that such auspicious arithmetics would change the fundamentals of the current imbalance between the weak and the strong and thus enhance the ability of the former to protect those who are even weaker.

The British will have many warheads—but still only four missile-bearing submarines. Since two of them are likely to be in port for overhaul or resupply at any one time, while the others might be shadowed easily by Soviet hunter-killer submarines, a preemptive first strike against the British deterrent would not be dramatically more difficult than it is today. The same logic would militate against the six or



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seven French boats and their multiple-warhead loads in the 1990s, although France might by then have acquired some additional insurance in the form of the land-mobile SX missile. Moreover, all bets will be off if the Soviet Union deploys a nation-wide ballistic missile defense system in the 1990s. In short, France and Britain may well increase the number of their warheads by a factor ranging from three to seven in the 1990s, but even such assets will not catapult them out of the danger zone where their second-strike capability is held at risk by a vast and sophisticated Soviet arsenal. As long as they remain in that zone, France and Britain cannot even think of extending a nuclear umbrella to their European allies.

Indeed, the point must be sharpened. The French and the British umbrellas depend for their effectiveness on the larger umbrella of the United States, and hence the former cannot substitute for the latter. The weak can deter the strong because the strong deter each other. The words of General Jeannou Lacaze, then chief of staff of the French Armed Forces, underline that point: "Should an aggressor decide that he could absorb the risk of our strategic strike, he would still have to consider the situation in which he would find himself after suffering the destruction of a non-negligible part of his cities [and his infrastructure] while *the other great nuclear powers would retain their intact economic and military potentials*. This argument seems fundamental to me and shows how advisable it is to keep firmly in mind the global geopolitical context when assessing our strategy of the weak deterring the strong."

The third and most important factor that renders credible the American nuclear guarantee is a hostage relationship. Why would the West Europeans continue to believe in the solidity of a guarantee that, if executed, might trigger the swift and complete demise of its author? The problem is common to *all* alliances, before and after Hiroshima, and it bears the name of "abandonment." Nuclear weapons have exacerbated the issue by orders of magnitude because they place the very existence of guarantors in jeopardy. Yet we must ask why NATO has endured nonetheless. The reason is that the Atlantic Alliance has developed some potent antidotes for this deadliest bane of coalitions. The antidote for the poison of "abandonment" goes by the name of "coupling," and NATO has produced it in profuse variation. The technique is as old as alliances themselves. In *The Guns of August*, Barbara Tuchman recounts a paradigmatic exchange between French Marshall Foch and his British counterpart Wilson, in 1910. How many British soldiers on their soil would it take to assure the French that Great Britain would indeed fight on their side in a war against Germany? Only one, the French officer replied, and we will make sure that he dies in the first hour of the war.

IN 1910, a single hostage may have been enough. In the nuclear age, the price of credibility has risen as precipitously as the damage a guarantor would have to sustain if deterrence failed. In Western Europe, the supplementary guarantee consists of 330,000 American troops plus thousands of American battlefield and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Their message to friends as well as foes is twofold.

First, large numbers of soldiers-qua-hostages signal that an attack on Western Europe threatens values almost as precious as American security. Hostage armies mute the harshly divisive logic of nuclear weapons. The United States might not put American cities at risk in order to shelter European ones, but the deterrent threat does wax a good deal more solid when wielded on behalf of allies that harbor city-sized American contingents.

Second, large numbers of nuclear weapons in a forward position signal that there may be no sanctuaries, that war may expand to engulf principals as well as junior partners, that an attack on America's *ultima ratio* in Europe is an attack on America itself. Precisely because nuclear weapons might protect only their possessors, the Europeans have perennially pressed for strategies which chain patron and clients to a common nuclear fate. Pershing II and cruise missiles were merely the latest act in NATO's ongoing drama titled "Coupling."

In attacking Western Europe, the Soviet



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Union would have to attack a part of the American arsenal that is "strategic" by Moscow's own definition because it can devastate Soviet territory. But it would not make sense for the Soviets to destroy a minuscule portion of American strategic systems and spare the rest, thus leaving themselves open "to riposte by an absolutely intact U.S. strategic arsenal," as one of their recent propaganda brochures put it. By that reckoning there is no profit in a "small" war, and the Soviets would have to go for the United States' "central forces" if they want to take on Western Europe. With the United States and Western Europe so "coupled," extended deterrence soars because an aggressor must face the costs of an all-out war as he countenances an attack on Western Europe.

Of such cloth are strategies made that soften the cruel verdict of Gaullist nuclear logic (according to which all nuclear alliances are impossible). Perhaps, then, such a web might also be spun between France and its continental neighbors, the Federal Republic in particular, so as to relieve Western Europe of its dependence on the United States? On the French side, there has been a series of tantalizing offers—extending from de Gaulle to Mitterrand—to make common military cause with West Germany. There have been recurrent allusions to a *sanctuaire élargi* that might encompass France's neighbors across the Rhine as well as the much-celebrated FAR—the French "Rapid Action Force" that might be thrust to the inter-German border to aid in the "forward battle."[1] In the 1990s, there will also be the vaunted Hadès tactical missile that, unlike the current Pluton, will reach into Warsaw Pact territory, raising the possibility that France will join the nuclear battle before Soviet forces have overrun most of Germany. Pierre Mauroy has opined that France's vital interests extend beyond the "Hexagon's" borders to "their approaches. Aggression against France does not begin when an enemy enters the national territory."

On the other hand, there is the first principle of French defense policy, also laid down by Mauroy, then prime minister, in a language echoing the iciest of Gaullist dogmas: "France does not intend to suffer the consequences of conflicts that are not its own." Thus the new dispositions set in motion by the Mitterrand government in the first half of the 1980s merely *increase* French options; they do not limit them, as all anti-abandonment strategies must do, if they are to forge a community of risks that will truly assure. Whereas American troops are deployed in a "hostage position," that is, close to the inter-German border, French forces in Germany are grouped in the southwest, close to the *French* border so as to maintain France's nonbelligerency option. While American tactical-nuclear weapons are stationed near the potential locus of battle, French assets are based at home. The FAR may join the "forward battle," but then it may not.

Nor are such decoupling strategies destined to disappear with the passage of time. As Mitterrand put it in 1984: "The Atlantic Alliance is not about to be replaced by a European Alliance. The reason is that no [European] military power can substitute for the American arsenal. France, at any rate, will use its nuclear strike force for its own deterrence strategy only." It is the Atlantic security system that allows the weak to deter the strong. Demolish it, and the weak will not even be able to take care of themselves, let alone of others.

***One Europe, Many Bombs:*** If nuclear weapons protect their possessors only, then the ultimate implication of a Western Europe minus the United States is a nuclear-armed Federal Republic, with other West European states to follow. Such a scenario requires that history no longer matter; that Europe's separate pasts and memories have vanished. The nations of West-

[1]The *Force d'Action Rapide* comprises 47,000 men and more than 200 helicopters, the bulk of which will be configured in an anti-tank mode. It is theoretically capable of ranging as far as 400 kilometers from the initial zone of deployment. The new strike force has a dual mission: to allow for intervention in the Third World and to serve as expeditionary corps that would aid NATO forces "in any zone where it would be needed." (Charles Hernu, then defense minister)



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ern Europe accepted West Germany's integration into their common defense and communitarian pursuits only because the Federal Republic accepted some extraordinary constraints on its power—among them the contractually sanctified renunciation of nuclear weapons. Cooperation depended on constraints in the past; has history's hold on leaders and nations loosened enough to permit cooperation without them?

Every once in a while, even the French talk as if history has at last been unhinged. Yet for all their attempts at proffering a continental anchor to a seemingly more restless Federal Republic, the French can offer neither community nor equality in matters nuclear to their German allies. Nuclear weapons, plus residual Four Power rights over Germany as a whole, are the only badges of distinction France can hold up against the superior economic, demographic, and conventional potential of its ancient rival. The French will always beckon but never deliver. Making common nuclear cause with the Federal Republic founders regularly on the immoveable rock of French *raison d'état*.

But assume that history no longer matters. If so, West German and other West European nuclear weapons also require a leap of logic: that defense self-sufficiency, as symbolized by national deterrents, will make for unity among many small nuclear powers rather than for disintegration. The logic of nuclear weapons points in the opposite direction. They *harden* the shell of national sovereignty; they make alliances more difficult; indeed, they may make them unnecessary.

Classic alliances depend on the aggregation of strength. But for credible nuclear deterrence, it is quality rather than quantity that matters. Quality, however, does not grow from aggregates. To deter, nuclear forces must be able to withstand surprise attack, cover vast distances, elude defenses, and hit with precision. Linking national deterrents in alliance will add to numbers but not to sophistication. A state either has the requisite (qualitative) assets, or it does not. If a state has them, it does not need the help of others. If it does not have them, it will not get them because donor nations, being self-sufficient already, garner no profits from sharing.

The logic of nuclear egotism, then, does not bode well for cooperation among nuclear-armed states. Whatever else a Europe of nuclearized nation states might be, it will not be the security community of decades past. With their national security policies once more nationalized, the states of Western Europe would return to the not-so-halcyon setting of yesterday: They would again conduct their affairs in a self-help system. Too strong to need one another, they would still be too weak to hold their own, on their own, against the Soviet Union.

## *America Without Europe*

WESTERN Europe left to its own devices is not likely to achieve what critics of the Alliance expect. Looking at the consequences rather than at the cause of European stability, NATO's detractors ignore the central role America has played in pacifying a state system that almost consumed itself in two world wars. Significantly, American policy makers have usually understood and accepted this momentous responsibility, even though it was acquired by default rather than design. "The presence of our forces in Europe under NATO," said Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1967, "has also contributed to the development of intra-European cooperation . . .But without the visible assurance of a sizeable American contingent, old frictions may revive, and Europe could become unstable once more."

In the 1950s and 1960s, the main argument against the American role as power-in-Europe was the financial burden; today, in the age of "peril parity," the weighty factor of existential risk has been added to the cost side of the ledger. In the language of popular fantasy, that point was driven home by the 1983 television film *The Day After*, in which a city in Kansas is destroyed by nuclear war—a war triggered by an escalating crisis *in Europe*. The moral hardly needs belaboring. It is America's commitments—to areas that bear the stamp of that commitment without being fully controlled by American might—that endanger America's existence. It is this risk above all



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which prompts latter-day American critics of the Alliance to advocate a strategy of retraction.

In addition to removing the frustrations of dealing with allies who are usually less-than-cooperative and rarely grateful, such a strategy would surely reduce the risk of entrapment in conflicts which are not of America's choosing. Were the United States to unshoulder its commitment to Western Europe, were the country to retreat into a refurbished Fortress America, nuclear insecurity would surely diminish. The risks of "mutual nuclear annihilation" (as Kristol put it) would vanish, along with numerous points of friction where Soviet and American interests are fated to collide. Pleading "no contest" in Europe, the United States would dispatch in one fell swoop a host of motives that prompt the Soviet Union to challenge America's position.

The neo-isolationist message can be put more forcefully still. Its underlying logic bids us to conclude that alliances *diminish* the security of great powers. They did so in pre-nuclear times too, but then the risk of entrapment in other nations' conflicts was balanced by the presumptive gains of power by aggregation. Not so today. For a full-fledged nuclear power like the United States, such gains are *sensu strictu* nil when it comes to core security, that is, the protection of borders and populations. By definition, a superpower is capable of deterring any conceivable combination of challengers, and for that task, the United States does not need the help of allies. Nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles have brought the will o' the wisp of isolationism within theoretical grasp.

In other words, the absolute weapon promises absolute security if employed for an absolute cause only: the nation's survival. Why, then, does the impeccable logic of nuclear neo-isolationism ring so hollow? There are two critical assumptions behind the neo-isolationist plea: one sanguine, the other unstated. The sanguine assumption is about the educational power of withdrawal: Disengagement will have an entirely salutary influence, reminding Western Europe's "free riders" of their responsibility for their own security and forcing them to assume the heavy burden the United States has for so long carried *gratis*. I have tried to show why this optimistic assumption cannot be taken for granted, why Western Europe, if left to its own devices, may grievously fall short of managing either its internal order or the military balance on the Eurasian continent.

The problem is not only that the optimists may wager on Western Europe's hidden strengths and lose, but also that the next experiment with a policy of abandonment may also be the last. Twice in this century, the United States entered the European state system in obeisance to a rule that history has not yet proven obsolete: prevent Europe's unification under a hostile hegemon. The rationale for staying in Europe after the second intervention was outlined succinctly by Harry S. Truman when he asked: "Which is better for the country—to spend twenty or thirty billion dollars [over the next four years] to keep the peace or to do as we did in 1920 and then have to spend 100 billion dollars for four years to fight a war?"

Deterring a war is surely cheaper than having to fight one, but today there is an additional problem. Were the United States to withdraw from Europe, the consequences of a wrong bet might no longer be undone as quickly as after 1917 and 1941. A third rescue effort would have to be undertaken in the shadow of nuclear weapons, and against an entrenched opponent who would have the great psychological advantage of forcing the United States to take the first step into the nuclear unknown. Assuming that the United States had left Europe in order to escape the abstract nuclear risks of alliance, is it conceivable that she would court the *real* risks of nuclear war that a forcible re-entry would entail?

The second, unstated assumption is that Europe no longer matters, indeed, that allies no longer matter. True, the United States will gain a margin of freedom and physical security once it forces its troublesome allies to fend for themselves. But it will gain little else. Indeed, the United States will lose everything that great powers cherish above and beyond their core security. Great powers define themselves not only in terms of great strength but also in terms of great interests. Their character as great powers cannot be divorced from *les vastes entreprises*, as de Gaulle would always remind his compatriots. Nor do such visions spring merely from misbegotten im-



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perial ambitions. Nations are not just security-maximizing entities; they are also political communities beholden to moral norms and aspirations. As such, they seek legitimacy, hence *le juste milieu* where their own values flourish. To preserve a compatible setting, they seek influence beyond their borders; and to preserve their values, they seek not only security but friends. In short, it is not just sentiment or hubris but the sober calculation of self-interest that prompts obligations to nations other than one's own. To argue that Western Europe does not matter, or does not matter enough to eschew the wager of abandonment, is also to argue that totalitarian domination of the largest bastion of democracy outside the United States will not grievously affect American national interests.

It is not even clear whether security would thrive behind a palisade of intercontinental missiles. Nations must fend off threats to values other than territorial integrity, yet against less-than-existential threats nuclear weapons are impotent. Assume a radical neo-isolationist stance whereby the United States would renounce the quest for balance in all arenas save the nuclear one. In such a world, the United States would expose itself to all manner of threats ranging from limited conventional attacks to the psychological nightmare of being alone in opposition. While the United States would undoubtedly survive under conditions of autarky, it would not survive very well.

PURE DETERRENCE theory, then, captures only part of international reality—and not necessarily the most important one. In the real world, nations have interests above and beyond their core security. These invariably extend beyond their territorial base, and hence they require order beyond borders. To achieve it, power must be balanced across the full spectrum, not just in its nuclear segment. Rivals must be contained, their moves must be blunted. Strategic assets which affect the balance must be secured, or, at a minimum, denied to adversaries. How to do so without allies—and commitments to them—defies even the post-nuclear imagination. And so there is no exit. Even a surfeit of deterrent power does not undo the necessity of extending it to others—and of shouldering the risks which such an extension entails.

"Pure" isolationism, however, is not what motivates neoconservative critics of the Alliance. Theirs is a vision of unilateralist activism that would oppose the Soviet Union across the board. Though they see the global balance as endangered, they regard the West Europeans as allies in defense of their parochial interests only, hence as a drain on American resources better invested elsewhere. They want to shift America's post-war policy away from its Eurocentric base—to the Pacific, perhaps, where China and Japan loom as tomorrow's giants in a partnership of containment against the Soviet Union. This is a curious vision. Japan is a nation that spends one percent of its GNP on defense (the major West European powers allocate between three and five percent) and is even more thoroughly cocooned by American might than Western Europe. How such a country, almost a perfect "free rider," could serve the maritime sword of the United States in the Pacific defies the most optimistic of imaginations. Nor is China a "card" that can be played by anyone but China; it will oppose the Soviet Union where its interests so dictate but not as handmaiden of American policy.

The key issue, however, is not the future role of Asia in the global balance, but the weight that Europe represents in it. The United States could only count on a net gain in disposable resources if the West Europeans proved willing and able to defend themselves and thus neutralize a considerable portion of Soviet power on their own. And if they did not? "In that event," argues the lapsed isolationist Robert W. Tucker with incontrovertible logic, "Moscow would have much less to worry about in the theater of greatest importance to it. Freed from this concern, while progressively strengthened by the resource base Western Europe would then afford it, Moscow might be able to turn its attention elsewhere and with greater effect. . . .Having abandoned what had heretofore been the center of our interest for the periphery, we would find the periphery increasingly difficult to secure against the improved power position of the Soviet Union."

Unlike the contemporary critics of America's Eurocentric policy, the Soviet Union has never



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underestimated Western Europe's true weight in the global balance. The Soviet Union has probed American positions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, in Africa and the Caribbean. Not once, though, has it lost sight of the grandest prize of them all: Europe. Cold War I, *circa* 1947–1962, was about the containment of the Soviet advance into Europe, and in particular, into the pivot country Germany. Cold War II, *circa* 1979–1986, has not been about Angola or Afghanistan but again about Europe and the sway of Soviet influence beyond the Elbe. Western Europe represents the largest combination of economic, demographic, technological, *and* military power outside the United States. To yield such an asset, or merely to shift toward a policy that would wittingly accept the risk of Soviet primacy on the continent, can only amount to a prescription for self-defeat.

If these are the costs of disengagement, what are the costs of commitment? Unlike other areas around the world—the Middle East or Cuba, for instance—where the United States and the Soviet Union have intermittently eyed the brink of confrontation, stability in Europe has an astounding track record. Nor is so much tranquility merely a fluke of history. In the nuclear arena, where no contestant would wittingly start a war, it is not too much but too little commitment that sows the seeds of confrontation. The United States is vulnerable where it extends deterrence without bridging the gap of geography and sovereignty that separates "core" from "periphery," that separates, say, Boston from Beirut. Beyond the writ of a nation's sovereignty, obligations are always blurred, and interests are always less than "vital," no matter how solemn the incantations. From this uncertainty stems the single most important threat to the nuclear peace: the miscalculation of interests and will, of stakes and obligations. Ambitious adversaries may underestimate the value of the stake at hand, as did Hitler vis-à-vis Poland in 1939; unruly allies may overestimate the extent of their patron's tolerance, as may have been the case when Israel plunged into a wider war in Lebanon in 1982, which would ultimately embroil U.S. Marines.

Clarity of commitment and the certainty of control compress the dangers of entangling alliances, and this is why Europe, with two exceptions in the distant past[2], has not been a locus of confrontation. The presence of large numbers of American troops and nuclear weapons demonstrates a clarity of commitment to Western Europe that pushes the chance of miscalculation toward zero. That presence as well as the rigorous integration of the North Atlantic coalition under an American supreme commander makes for a degree of control over allies that militates against entrapment in conflicts that could escalate into a confrontation of the two principals. Conversely, it is the lack of clarity and control that has underlain all of the great power crises of the post-war period—notably in the Middle East where the two superpowers lined up on opposite sides of the conflict, yet without fully clarifying the extent of their commitment or gaining full control over their clients. Not all bonds, then, breed existential risks—only loose ones. And thus to cut, or merely lengthen, the tie that binds the United States to Europe is likely to bring about precisely the calamity that disengagement is said to forestall.

[2]The exceptions are the Berlin blockade in 1948 and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1962. In both cases, there was a remote chance of military clashes—significantly, however, because American commitments were not clear. In 1948, Stalin underestimated America's stake in the freedom of the West Berlin enclave within the Soviet Occupation Zone; in 1961, Khrushchev thought he could count on Kennedy's connivance because the president himself had publicly speculated about Soviet-East German measures that would stop the mounting tide of refugees from the GDR.



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# Anti-Americanism: a View From London

Kenneth Minogue

THE LONDON *Times* recently warned that the Star Wars project might well be endangered by "an effective Soviet propaganda machine playing on the latent anti-Americanism of many Europeans." Such a remark suggests that the thing called "anti-Americanism" is a single sentiment, like aggression in tigers, merely awaiting a call to life. In fact, it is immensely complex, and it is worth attempting to untangle how it operates, both in rhetoric and reality.

In this case, rhetoric cannot be dismissed as less important than reality. Making sense of reality is inescapably a kind of rhetorical game, hence we must observe the rhetorical moves before we can seriously consider the reality of anti-Americanism. Rhetorically speaking, to attribute anti-Americanism to someone is to consign what he has to say to the category of the irrational. It is thus an attacking move in any discussion of international affairs, and is (as we shall see) conventionally blocked by a denial whose point is to restore credibility to whatever point the critic of America is making. The idea of anti-Americanism thus often functions in argument as an incapacitating device, just like such charges as "sexism" and "racism." Being irrational sentiments, such things are not, in principle, to be argued with; they are rather to be treated as pathologies.

How do we judge the truth of the matter? It is of course immensely difficult to determine whether an irrational sentiment lies behind a criticism of America. Sometimes hostility will be unmistakable; and sometimes a criticism of, say, American foreign policy, will have such evident cogency that the issue will not arise. But in all the interesting cases of high-level discussion of international affairs, it will be difficult to know whether an argument has its source in some irrational sentiment, or whether a genuine point is being made. Hence, although anti-Americanism is perfectly real even at the most elevated intellectual level, Americans ought to be parsimonious in their recourse to it as an explanation.

Turning now from rhetoric to reality, we face the problem of what *kind* of thing anti-Americanism is. I shall treat it as a form of xenophobia, for the simple reason that it will save me from inventing a cumbersome neologism—xenophobia is cumbersome neologism enough (the O.E.D. dates "xenophobia" from 1919, and no one so far as I know has made much play with "xenophilia"). But doing so requires at least three important points to be borne in mind. The first is that xenophobia refers, strictly speaking, to a dislike of foreigners in general, and this is a different thing from the dislike of a specific class of foreigners. Indeed, in some cases, hostility to one lot of

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foreigners is functionally related to love of some other sort—hatred of America, for example, forming part of a system of thoughts in which love of the Soviet Union is an important element. The second is that the word "phobia" suggests that we should call for the psychotherapist. But there is no necessary reason to think that hatred is a pathological condition; it should merely be taken, like alcohol, in moderation. The third point is that the sentiment of anti-Americanism is so complex that many of its manifestations are only tangentially about America. Some people, for example, detest everything about popular style, from blue jeans and hamburgers to rock music, and dislike America only derivatively, because it notably manifests these forms of life.

In reality, then, anti-Americanism is a complex relationship and it is complex at both ends. "European" anti-Americanism is the summary of many strands of thought; even British anti-Americanism (which primarily concerns me) is made up of a great variety of responses to America (see box), responses made all the more complex by the sympathies which inevitably run parallel to the antipathies. No one, if we get right down to it, is anti-American in quite the same way. Part of the reason for this is that there is such a lot in America one might be hostile to: the state, the people, the culture, and, above all, any associated idea. This situation is rendered all the more interesting by the fact that a great deal of anti-Americanism in Britain is picked up from Americans themselves, for whom the sentiment is the local modification of a long-standing Western tendency towards civilizational guilt and self-dislike.

I have remarked that pro-American sympathies are as likely to be found in Europe as anti-American, but their prominence in national and international politics is not at all the same. The reason is that America stands for a variety of ideas which elicit very different responses. It stands above all for a principle of society in which people are largely left free to manage (and often to mismanage) their own lives. This is the thing we proudly call freedom, but it is also commonly regarded as the apotheosis of triviality and oppression. From the point of view of many people who have read more Marx than is good for them, communist countries might have many things wrong with them, but they have at least taken the first step towards a real society in which people find meaningful lives not in their own individual pursuits but as members of a community. From this point of view, America is a profoundly wild and dangerous country. Now it happens that people with this view also have a considerable propensity for getting out

## Disliking America

On the Left, anti-Americanism arises, of course, from the belief that the United States is a ruthlessly capitalist country, an abominably imperialist country, a country callously indifferent to the sufferings of the third world, and fanatically hostile to the Soviet Union. Many of the Left, however, feel precisely the same about Britain, so that to describe these feelings as "anti-American" is to give them a too restricted definition. Many of them also feel much the same about Western Europe.

Anti-Americanism on the Right is an altogether more innocent phenomenon. It is part of the Tory legend—the "rebellious colonials," the vulgar parvenu society destitute of taste, self-discipline and a proper respect for custom and authority, and all that. But all this is about as serious as the amiable anti-Scottish prejudices which all decent Englishmen have inherited from Samuel Johnson. None of it obscures the deep sense that we and the Americans share a tradition, and that they have saved that tradition in company with us in two world wars. Add to this the mixture of fear and envy with which British businessmen regard their American rivals, and that is about the size of it, i.e., nothing in terms of serious animosity.

*London* Daily Telegraph, *January 16, 1985*



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on the streets carrying banners and shouting slogans. One important brand of anti-Americanism is thus endlessly visible, while what apparently stands as its opposite—pro-Americanism—is silent, indeed usually unformulated, because such people as would incline to it are busy leading their own lives.

XENOPHOBIAS may be distinguished as cultural, doctrinal, or political, even though in practice the three usually run together. Cultural xenophobia is a dislike of a particular people based on generalizations about how they behave. It is diffused like gossip and constitutes a kind of folklore. This is the strand of xenophobia by which the French are arrogant, the British unfriendly, and the Americans boastful and insensitive—views deeply entrenched throughout the world, even though so often belied by experience, at least by my experience. Nonetheless, European perception of Americans as rich and powerful has created what might, parodying the economists, be called an envy-led xenophobia. Wealth makes people capricious; they are, it is felt, able to indulge any whims they feel. This cultural strand of xenophobia slides into politics when it begins to suggest that Americans, with enormous offensive power at their fingertips, may behave in a foolish and irresponsible way. There are thus myriad connections by which simple and homey bits of cultural folklore feed the image of Ronald Reagan as a dangerous warmonger.

The real issues raised by cultural anti-Americanism, however, are much larger, and bear upon the doctrinal question of what America stands for. It is a familiar paradox that hordes of young Europeans chanting "America out!" are likely to be dressed in blue jeans, munching hamburgers and guzzling Coca Cola. This might suggest a cultural capitulation so complete as to have engendered a sense of humiliation that can be assuaged only by reviling the supposed representatives of such a cultural hegemony. It certainly symbolizes the extreme ambivalence with which America is widely regarded.

Western civilization has been transformed in this century by a complex process of cultural diffusion, different aspects of which are picked out by a set of significantly overlapping names, the tone of which registers the emotions we have toward the process itself: commercialization, popularization, democratization, Westernization, vulgarization, and the like. Any Inspector Clouseau, panting along these trails with his magnifying glass, will infallibly trace them to their source: America. The processes themselves, of course, are entirely European, but much of their content has indeed been American. And those who dislike the process will dislike what they take to be its source. All such things are, from the severe vantage point of international politics, relatively trivial, though they can (as in the Iranian cult of Satanic America) get out of hand. And they all can play a part in reinforcing the doctrinal xenophobia by which transatlantic relations are often blighted.

By "doctrinal xenophobia" I mean the dislike of a people and a state because of the ideas with which that state is associated: sometimes religious, sometimes political, sometimes moral. The United States has, from its inception, laid claim to a certain moral superiority over the supposedly corrupt and quarrelsome states of Europe. As a factor in international affairs, this mission became dangerously visible in Wilson's support for self-determination after the First World War. As a form of anti-imperialism, it led to tensions with the British for several decades. President Roosevelt's hostility to the British empire, for example, seems to have rested upon nothing so Machiavellian as an idea of national interest, but rather upon a progressivist belief in the moral iniquity of empire. America's withdrawal of support from Britain and France over Suez in 1956 was perhaps the last in a chapter of incidents arising (at least in part) from this nexus of moral attitudes, and remains a source of resentment in some circles to this day. American anti-imperialism was increasingly overtaken by the imperatives of America's guardianship of the free world against communist intrusions, and from this vantage point outposts of empire were found to be a useful (but diminishing) supplement to



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American global power. Too late, however, since the very same anti-imperialism was now turned against America itself, seen as sustaining its own puppets against liberation movements.

Thus far we may discover in British anti-Americanism strong elements of envy, both of the rich in general, and of a country that has displaced Britain as a great power in particular. Remembrance of things past fuels this feeling. Given that vital British interests would have been lost without American support in both world wars, this might seem a piece of monumental ingratitude; no doubt it is. However, people remember slights longer than they feel the obligations of gratitude. Furthermore, like most intense anti-Americanism in Britain, this form is confined to a relatively small part of the elite. Still, this history serves to illustrate something very important about the common practice of identifying one's national interest with an abstract moral ideal. European powers in the last century, for example, often identified their colonial expansion with the spread of civilization. This made them vulnerable to ridicule by supplying the basis for a contrast between their high ideals and their base behavior. National interests may be selfish but they are not subject to the charge of hypocrisy. When America, by contrast, claims for itself the abstract dignity of "the Free World," which is inevitably an alliance in which some are more free than others, it must face the fact that its enemies will sneeringly modify this to "the so-called Free World." In an ideological age, it is virtually impossible not to make such abstract identifications; but a clearer recognition of their dangers would reduce rhetorical vulnerabilities.

It happens that freedom is, among the available options, a peculiarly dangerous moral ideal with which to identify, above all for a free society. For what freedom means is that individuals may follow their inclinations, subject to the law of the land. Many of these inclinations are cheap, vulgar, and nasty. Further, the more cheap, vulgar, and nasty they are, the more they are of fascinating interest to fellow citizens, and to the rest of the world. Dictatorships are to some extent protected by their inscrutability, but America is the most scrutable society in the world, and from it comes a ceaseless stream of information about the nasty and the dotty. Simple people are likely to compare this disadvantageously with totalitarian countries, all folk dance festivals and uplifting rhetoric—the rest largely silence. More sophisticated people, themselves living in free societies, will, of course, understand these phenomena within a wider context; and fortunately in European countries, they constitute a majority. But at the margins, disreputable truths about America will feed anti-Americanism.[1]

There is a much more fundamental sense in which it is dangerous to identify national interest with the idea of freedom. In a free society, individuals and groups pursue their own *particular* interests, and it is very easy to represent a free society (as Marx did) as being nothing else but a continuous encounter of egoisms. The objects people seek—money, prestige, comfort, self-expression—may be seen as trivial in comparison with such apparently universal objectives as "building a just society" and "satisfying basic human needs." The universality of these latter objectives provides people with an apparently meaningful task which might in principle one day be imagined to bring about a higher condition of humanity, free of poverty, division, and conflict. Freedom is, indeed, a persuasive moral ideal in a context of concentration camps and military conquest; and its universality could be clearly recognized in the war against Nazi Germany. But it is quite false to say, as publicists in Europe and America often have, that all men yearn for freedom; they merely yearn for an end to frustrations, which is a quite different thing. Hence freedom can often be trumped by the utopian argument of a true community in which every aspiration finds its harmonious satisfaction. No doubt such a society could only occur if, at the very least, the aspirations had been brutally diminished, but in propaganda the listener often fails to follow implications through.

[1]And not merely truths, of course. For a vigorous discussion of the wider issues, see Arnold Beichman, *Nine Lies about America* (New York: Library Press, 1972).



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RHETORICAL trumping along these lines is a specialty of the most familiar and recognizable kind of anti-Americanism: that of the left. In all left-wing thinking, the premises and the examples of the argument are freshly inspired by the current headlines, but the conclusion is fixed. It is that America is a hard-nosed, profit-crazed country blinded by a hatred of progressive or left-wing governments, and thus dangerously unpredictable. It is, of course, reliably to be found on the wrong side of any liberation struggle, for the simple reason that "liberation" is part of communist rather than liberal-democratic rhetoric. In this realm of thought, even virtues become vices: America's very technological superiority supplies the image of a country helpless before human problems, which it seeks to solve by technical know-how. Its aim is to entangle the rest of the world in its dangerous and unnecessary confrontation with the USSR. Now when we observe further that Ronald Reagan is currently the synoptic image of this entire line of thought—his background helping to make plausible the ascribed reduction of international relations to the level of a shoot-out—it will immediately be clear that much of this kind of anti-Americanism is an import from America itself. Indeed, the point of departure for anyone who wants to understand anti-Americanism is that it is most intense, and often most ingenious, in America itself. What foreigner could match, for sheer intensity of hatred, the response of many left-wing Americans to the Vietnam war? It is Americans themselves who supply most of the materials of anti-Americanism.

Those materials consist of analyses of the economic situation, leaks about Pentagon contingency planning, utterances of the dimmer kind of religious fundamentalist, the latest rumor about the CIA, accounts of the behavior of American multinationals in the Third World, and so on. The dangerous unpredictability of America is conveyed by an emphasis upon its supposed hysteria. An average hack working himself up about such dangers will produce an assemblage of comments such as the following from Christopher Hitchens on the Lebanon hijack crisis:

> On a television chat show with me, Paul Weyrich lent his authority as a close Reagan adviser to the idea that we should bomb Syria. A senior *Newsweek* correspondent advocates bombing Libya. Someone from the *American Spectator*, for a change of pace, comes out for the bombing of 'Lebanon', whatever that may entail. The *Wall Street Journal* editorialized that the proper and clever course would be to select this moment to invade Nicaragua. And you could probably get a pretty hefty popular consensus for the bombing of the non-Acropolis bits of Athens.

This kind of journalism requires a *pro forma* disclaimer of anti-Americanism—in the instance quoted, the author characterizes himself among "those who like Americans," while the unspeakable John Pilger, writing for a socialist audience, can still remark: "How does one describe Reagan's Americanism without appearing 'anti-American,' whatever that means and which I certainly am not."

In more sophisticated writing, it becomes difficult to know whether one is dealing with anything that may legitimately be called "anti-Americanism" or whether entirely legitimate criticism without ulterior implications is at issue. David Watt in the London *Times* for example, thought that the Lebanon crisis had brought back the Reagan of 1980, "the master of populist paranoia." He argued that hurt national pride, the discovery that some problems can't be solved with money and know-how, and a sense of national isolation had led to a dangerous mood:

> Confronted with this dangerous state of mind, it seems to me that the European rôle ought to be as cool, soothing and supportive as possible . . . we also owe the Americans a wider sympathy and a chance to recover their balance after a bruising national experience.

However well intentioned this line of argument may be, it conforms to the picture of America as a moody, difficult neurotic we all have to live with. It is safe to say that Europeans have been in little danger recently of overestimating American rationality.



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The policy implication of this line of thought is that the sooner Europeans disentangle themselves from the American alliance, the less danger they will face. This happens also to be the policy for Europe favored by the Kremlin. It would be false to conclude that all such opinions are Soviet-inspired, but some of them undoubtedly are. Agents of disinformation forge documents purporting to show America's intent to use Europeans solely for its own purposes.

Such a presentation of American selfishness or madness is all the more effective in a Europe where snobbery and socialism curiously combine in attitudes towards America. The European left has largely been dominated by the upper classes for whom the Ugly American, in all his fabled insensitivity, affronts both class decorum and socialist hopes. Whereas the radicals of the last century regarded America as the model of a defeudalized future, their socialist successors (if successors they are) see America as a society which has dissolved, like a failed mayonnaise, into a curdled individualism for which there is little hope of transition to a socialist community. In Europe, by contrast, the natural rootedness and the hierarchical character of society have until now operated as a vehicle of oppression; but for the very reason that the oppression is more evidently signaled in a class structure, a transition to a genuine community is thought to be far more likely.

IT IS an illustration of the way in which the three kinds of anti-Americanism merge that this dislike of the very concept of America should also appear in the third type of xenophobia, which, as political, arises from a presumed conflict of national interests between America and the nations of Europe. It is more likely to be found in the upper reaches of British political life and is distinguished by an aesthetic and intellectual distaste for American ideological enthusiasms. It arises from a version of the doctrine of realism which suggests that we are often disoriented by religious or ideological passions and thereby led to abandon our true interests and to interfere in the affairs of others. The intervention in Vietnam is taken as an object lesson in the perils of such enthusiasms, while the American attempt to settle affairs in the Middle East, amid a swarm of local quarrels and alliances, is currently the example of how not to handle a problem in foreign policy. But the same principle applies nearer home: weaker European states, carried away by American international moralism, have become frozen (so it is suggested) into a condition of clienthood in which they take upon themselves quarrels which at best are none of their business, and at worst are concerned with illusory issues.

It should be clear that everything involved in the word "communism" is taken to be merely froth upon the waters of international reality. It is a set of slogans used for national purposes by the Russians. It allows them useful postures in their dealings with the Third World, but has no effect upon their central concern, which is the protection and aggrandizement of Russia itself. But that aggrandizement need not threaten Britain, or indeed Western Europe, which would obviously be an indigestible morsel for a power that has troubles enough keeping control of the satellites on its borders.

There is something to be said for this view, and it is possible that at some point in the future Russian ideological evangelism will become vacuous; the Soviet Union might become another Ottoman Empire on the borders of the West, inward-looking and unthreatening. But this can hardly be regarded as the reality of the 20th century. My concern is not, however, with the plausibility of this view but with why one should call it "anti-American." It would obviously be a mistake to take *any* criticism of American policy as an expression of xenophobia. Nevertheless, it seems clear that this form of realism is often entangled with a more generalized, and less realpolitik, hostility to America. The mistake diagnosed is taken to be both typically and exclusively American. "Not for nothing," remarked Enoch Powell reviewing Jimmy Carter's *Blood of Abraham*, "is *The Innocents Abroad* the national epic of the United States," and he went on to berate America for "attempting to play God and determine by direct intervention an outcome which only the balance of countervailing forces can arrive at."



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America was said to believe that the Middle East must fall into the sphere of one of the superpowers; and to America was ascribed "the misconception which credits Russia with unlimited territorial appetite and aggressive ambition." We thus have a form of anti-Americanism[2] in which the realism of those who feel that Americans don't understand global realities confronts the 'idealism' of Americans, impatient with the destructive ambitions of Europeans.

Sometimes, as with Powell, a guiding thread of anti-Americanism may be discerned beneath the argument, but Powell is thinking explicitly in terms of competing national interests. In most high-level discussions of international relations it is the argument, rather than the animus, if any, which matters. Thus Michael Howard, in a March 1985 *Harper's* article, argues that it is the democratic character of America's conduct of foreign policy which accounts for its lack of finesse, because most people (in any country) cannot understand the "attitudes, traditions, and perceptions of foreign cultures." Assembled together, his examples create the familiar contrast between American naiveté and European sophistication. It is a brilliant restatement of a view long current in the elite circles of Europe, and for all the plausibility of each single item in what amounts to an indictment of the American grip on reality, the total effect is not altogether remote from the tendentious diagnostics of America as a neurotic giant. Howard's position is subject to the kind of riposte Owen Harries had earlier made in *Commentary* (December 1983): namely, that European realism is the doctrinal sediment of the experience of defeat, and that all the sophistication of Europeans has not prevented a steady loss not only of their power, but also of their will to control their own destinies.

It is important that America should not lose the will to control its own destiny. But in sustaining that will, America must recognize that merely by being powerful, it will always be a target of hostility. The problem is to avoid the Scylla of being bent to the will of others, and the Charybdis of total insensitivity. The difficulties of making this distinction may be illustrated by the fact that it is perfectly possible to argue, looking back over the last three decades, both that America ought to have ignored the sensitivities of its allies, and that the wiser course would have been to pay more heed. The trick is to know when to heed, and when to ignore. It is a trick that requires a highly sophisticated understanding of the varieties of anti-Americanism.

[2]Powell's anti-Americanism may not always rest at the high level of theory. Soon after the IRA attempt to blow up the British Cabinet at the Grand Hotel, Brighton, in October 1984, he published a piece suggesting that the IRA were merely acting as agents, and as agents for some power pursuing its own national interest. His message was obscure, but T. E. Utley attempted a decoding (*Daily Telegraph* Oct. 29, 1984) in which the CIA lay behind the attempt, the point being to push the British government towards conceding Ulster to the Irish Republic which would then enter NATO.



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# Verification: Reforming a Theology

Carnes Lord

MOST AMERICANS believe that the Soviet Union has violated its arms control commitments and will undoubtedly continue to do so. Yet most also routinely declare themselves in favor of more arms negotiations and agreements with the Soviets. This approach to the problem of arms control verification and compliance might be dismissed as a not unfamiliar oddity of public opinion, were it not for the fact that it seems to have become the official policy of the United States government.

This incoherence is only the most conspicuous aspect of the current crisis in arms control verification. Verification is becoming increasingly difficult in a technical sense, as the relevant weaponry becomes smaller, more mobile and less distinctive (cruise missiles are the obvious case). U.S. intelligence assets that are critical for verification have been lost or compromised by espionage over the course of the last decade. The extent and effectiveness of Soviet concealment and deception efforts are growing (although the encoding of electronic signals from Soviet missile tests continues to be denounced by the United States as one of the clearest violations of the USSR's arms control obligations).

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Yet the crisis in verification policy is more than the sum of these developments. It is at bottom an intellectual crisis, reflecting the persistence of assumptions and habits of thought that are increasingly inadequate to deal with present realities. Most creative thinking about verification was done in the 1960s, when we had had little real experience of arms control. This thinking, since hardened into "theology," (like the strategic nuclear doctrine of the same era), dominates discussion of the subject today and continues to shape national policy. The time has come to rethink the verification problem.

## *What is Verification?*

IN THE EARLY experiments with arms control following World War I, verification played little part. Indeed, the Western powers subscribing to the agreements flowing from the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 were reluctant to insist on arrangements that would appear to call into question the good faith of the other parties. Only since World War II has verification been accepted as an essential feature of arms control.

Several factors are responsible for this. First, it was recognized that the failure of arms control in the interwar period—notably, the Versailles Treaty—resulted in part from a failure to devise effective verification arrangements and policies for response to noncompliance. Second, it was recognized that the ground rules



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of international behavior had undergone a fundamental change with the rise of modern totalitarian regimes. Relations with such regimes could not be managed on the basis of the assumptions of fair play characteristic of 19th-century cabinet diplomacy. Third, it was felt that the character of modern weaponry—above all, the advent of nuclear weapons—greatly facilitated surprise attack and increased the importance of the initial stages of war. This, in turn, created powerful incentives for the development of covert military capabilities.

Soviet rejection of the intrusive verification provisions of the American-conceived Baruch Plan of 1946, which would have established an international authority responsible for overseeing general nuclear disarmament, was an early sign of the fundamental divergence between the Soviets and the West on verification. The relative openness of Western societies in military and intelligence matters, the greater effectiveness of legal and political constraints on Western governments, and the essentially defensive strategic orientation of these governments mean that Western compliance with arms control agreements is very nearly self-verifying. By contrast, the closed nature of Soviet society and the peculiarities of Soviet political culture and national strategy make verification inescapably problematic for the West.

Over the years both partisans and critics of arms control have agreed on the importance of verification in the case of agreements involving the Soviet Union. At the margins, some have argued that verification should be subordinated to the need to create a political climate conducive to Soviet acceptance of arms control. On the other side of the political spectrum questions have occasionally been raised concerning the real importance of strict verification, given the relatively permissive limits of most of the critical arms control agreements concluded to date and the exorbitant price the U.S. has had to pay for the verification provisions it has managed to obtain. In general, though, there has been wide agreement that Soviet intentions in arms control cannot be assumed to be benign, and that the possibility of treaty violations must be taken seriously, both for military and political reasons. In particular, it has generally been recognized that verification performs a critical political function among Western publics by building and maintaining confidence in the viability of particular agreements and, indeed, of the arms control enterprise as a whole.

Most of the early discussions of verification assumed the necessity of on-site inspection—usually by teams operating under an international disarmament organization—to penetrate the veil of Soviet secrecy. By the 1970s, however, a combination of Soviet resistance and rapidly developing intelligence technologies led to the substitution of unilateral intelligence resources (so-called "national technical means") for inspection as the principal instrument of verification. In spite of a renewal of interest in recent years in cooperative methods, verification is still inextricably bound up with technical intelligence collection, and reflects that technology's strengths and limitations. Some discussion of the relationship between verification and intelligence is therefore indispensable.

VERIFICATION presupposes a treaty. Its scope is thus more limited than that of intelligence, which is gathered all the time. In another sense, however, verification imposes requirements that are just as demanding as intelligence—indeed, in certain respects more so. First, verification must attempt to "prove a negative" in a way that intelligence need not—that is, verification must show that certain activities are not taking place or that certain limitations are not being exceeded, whereas intelligence is concerned primarily to keep track of actual weapons and forces.

In addition, verification must concern itself not simply with the fact of violations by the other side, but with the likelihood and imminence of such violations. Like military intelligence itself, verification performs an important warning function, and minor infractions—even if they have no compelling military significance—may provide important clues for understanding an adversary's intentions. An ability to detect and deal with such infractions is also essential for preserving public confidence in the agreement.

Further, arms control agreements bring



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with them enhanced publicity and unique political constraints. Because of the importance and hopes attached to them, it may be more difficult to take action in response to violations than it would be to take the same action in the absence of such agreements. As a result, the evidence has to be stronger—and more convincing to a nonexpert audience—than the intelligence required to support an ordinary military decision.

All of these considerations, it may be added, carry weight in an American or Western context, but have little if any relevance for Soviet decision-makers. We can assume that Soviet officials spend little time worrying about large-scale Western violations of arms control agreements, given the ready availability of information and the small likelihood that an action of questionable legality could long remain concealed in the West. And the Soviets need have little concern over domestic political constraints.

It is not surprising, then, that the Soviets have generally taken the position that verification and intelligence are distinct activities; that verification is or should be limited to matters specifically covered by an agreement; and that its purpose should be to confirm the positive rather than to prove a negative. Soviet views have changed over the years, moving from rejection to qualified acceptance of relying on intelligence-gathering techniques as a verification method. But the Soviets have continued to plead that an open-ended mandate for verification—the characteristically American understanding—is nothing more than a license for espionage.

Particularly since the Soviet position is bound to attract a certain amount of sympathy from those Western observers who regard the Soviet penchant for secrecy as a harmless pathology of Russian culture, it is worthwhile to dwell for a moment on the links that bind verification to military intelligence. On a superficial view (though one that has wide currency), verification is principally a function of satellite-based photographic reconnaissance, which allows the verifying nation to locate and count restricted systems (e.g. missile silos) and assure itself that treaty limitations are not being exceeded. If satellite photography were indeed sufficient for verification, it might make sense to give serious consideration to proposals, made by the French and others, to establish an international agency that would use photoreconnaissance satellites to conduct independent verification of arms control agreements.

The fact is, however, that photographic reconnaissance is rarely able to stand on its own. While some pictures may speak a thousand words, pictures of military facilities generally require expert interpretation in order to yield their full meaning. It is possible to argue that since photo-reconnaissance satellite systems are relatively insensitive to compromise or countermeasures, they need not be wrapped in a secrecy that simultaneously feeds Soviet suspicions as to their intended use and undermines the confidence of Western publics in verification. It is not possible to make this argument about "signals intelligence" or SIGINT, on which photo interpretation is utterly dependent. Collection of SIGINT is a highly sensitive undertaking in every sense of the term. The importance of SIGINT for verification is considerable, and can only be expected to grow as arms control encompasses "qualitative" constraints on technical modernization, in addition to the quantitative limits of the past.

Collecting information is only one step in a process. Given the fragmentary and ambiguous character of much of the information gathered through intelligence channels, its proper evaluation is essential both for verification and for intelligence generally. The methods and assumptions underlying this analysis have a great effect on how governments handle the enforcement of treaties—an effect that has too often operated in unfortunate directions.

Particularly worrisome is the tendency to allow the treaty environment itself to influence the analysis of data. For example, in the wake of growing controversy over apparent Soviet violations of the 150 kiloton limit established by the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Carter administration revised its method of estimating yields. Some experts believe that the methodology then adopted and still in use,



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understates actual Soviet yields by at least a factor of two (although it should be noted that even by this methodology a number of recent Soviet tests have still registered a central value above 150 kilotons). Accurate analysis in this area is critical for our understanding not only of Soviet treaty compliance but of Soviet weapons development practices and nuclear strategy generally.

CAN WE or can't we verify it?: these are the popular terms in which the question is generally posed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to give a satisfactory answer, and the demand that an answer be supplied, while politically understandable, perpetuates serious misunderstanding and carries potential dangers.

Verification is simply not a black and white proposition. It is possible to think of cases in which verification would be extremely easy (an example often given is a ban on large ships in a small ocean area), but this is of little current help. Our ability to monitor most relevant treaty limitations is uncertain. The critical implication is that assessing the effectiveness of verification necessarily involves more than merely technical judgment about how well intelligence assets work against particular targets. Verification also involves understanding the intentions of the other side. Indeed, as our confidence in such technical judgments declines, an understanding of intentions and behavior becomes increasingly important.

The distinction between technical and nontechnical judgment is as fundamental as it is poorly understood. Judgments of technical verifiability match U.S. monitoring capabilities against the systems or activities to be limited, and assess the potential for undetected violations. To make such a judgment, one must take many things into account. One must assess the ability of the party being monitored to evade detection, including possible changes in standard military practices that could facilitate violations, and assuming that attempted violations would be accompanied by a concerted effort at concealment and deception. These assessments must also presuppose a minimum standard of evidence necessary to achieve agreement within the U.S. government (if not beyond it) that a violation has actually occurred. Other factors of importance are timeliness of detection, cost of the verification effort, and flexibility in adapting to technological developments that could complicate verification.

In contrast to judgments of verifiability, which are basically the responsibility of experts in verification intelligence, assessing the overall effectiveness of verification is a policy function. It requires the involvement of high public officials.

In the first instance, it requires a judgment to be rendered on the nature of the United States's principal adversary. Although the Soviet Union has accumulated an impressive historical record of disregard for international legal standards, the question of the broad strategic intentions of the Soviet leadership is controversial, and it is not clear how it can be answered in such a way as to provide guidance for those who must assess the effectiveness of verification. Similarly, the costs and risks of evasion, as the Soviets calculate them, also raise issues about Soviet foreign policy and military strategy that are at once basic and contentious.

We can see the problem clearly by considering the chief arguments that are often used to underscore the effectiveness of verification, even under conditions of less than technically perfect verifiability. The first holds that verification will be effective even if it is capable of detecting only major violations, on the grounds that the other party will be deterred from undertaking minor violations by the military and political consequences of possible detection, which would likely outweigh any marginal gains achieved by them.

While there is certainly an element of truth in this idea, it also has manifold weaknesses. It fails to take account of the warning function of verification—the importance of detecting early and slight indicators of possible major violations, or of an intention to violate a treaty. It also fails to see that a treaty environment may itself create incentives for the pursuit of marginal advantage. And it is too quick to assume that violations that may fall below the threshold of detection will of necessity be insignificant militarily. This idea also overlooks the possible reinforcing effect of violations of different provisions or different treaties, as well as



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the connection between violations and other military activities that skirt the limits of the treaty, or even appear wholly benign or unrelated to its purposes.

A second argument holds that no party has an incentive to violate an agreement, given the fundamental stability of a nuclear balance resting on the threat of mutual assured destruction. What brought the parties to agreement in the first place, in this view, was the belief that a decisive advantage cannot be obtained in the nuclear arms competition, due to the insensitivity of the strategic balance to relative shifts in levels of weapons. The same belief will also cause the parties to abide by the agreement.

It is now widely accepted, however, that the Soviet Union has never shared the doctrinal outlook that has dominated American thinking about nuclear weapons since the mid-1960s. The unprecedented Soviet build-up in strategic weaponry—during a period of prolonged stagnation in American nuclear programs—strongly suggests that the Soviet leadership believes significant military and political advantages can indeed be gained in this way. The Soviet leadership continues to view nuclear conflict from a traditional military or "war-fighting" perspective, and assesses the utility of its nuclear forces against a set of concrete military targeting requirements by no means insensitive to incremental shifts in levels of weaponry.

The fundamental point is that the incentives a nation might have to violate a treaty must be analyzed in terms of its general military doctrine and strategic outlook. One cannot assume that all nations calculate their interests on the basis of a universally shared set of ideas about the value of particular kinds of weaponry or the nature of international conflict. This is particularly true in the case of the Soviet Union, whose military and political traditions are radically alien to those of the United States.

The idea that judgments of verification effectiveness are as much political as they are technical is apt to arouse resistance on the right as well as the left. It may appear to make verification the plaything of policy, inviting the distortion of technical verification analysis by political considerations and drawing verification into the arena of bureaucratic and political struggle. Conservative criticisms of the use or misuse of the term "adequacy" as a standard of verification effectiveness during the Carter administration were an important factor in the political defeat of SALT II; and the potential for politicization or self-politicization of CIA verification analyses remains very much a conservative concern. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to regard such an approach as a device to obstruct progress in arms control by emphasizing asymmetries between potential negotiating partners. In the case of the Soviet Union in particular, liberals are apt to see it as a scheme to dampen Western appetites for arms control by emphasizing the evils of the Soviet system and the unreliability of the USSR as the diplomatic interlocutor. The arms control movement in the United States has, from its inception, held firm to the belief that arms control is essentially a technical enterprise, one that need not depend on the political relations of the parties involved or on the character of their regimes. Verification has been viewed on the one hand as a technical-scientific problem of intelligence collection, and on the other as a legal problem of treaty interpretation and enforcement. It has rarely been seen as a political-strategic instrument in the service of national security.

The Soviet view of verification, inadequate and incoherent as it is in critical respects, nevertheless rests on a certain logic that has been missing on the American side. Just as the Soviets have always looked on arms control not as an end in itself but rather as an instrument in the service of fundamentally political goals, so they have tended to think of verification as an essentially political instrument for building confidence in an arms control regime. For reasons already indicated, the West cannot adopt such a view; but it reflects a truth about the function of verification that needs to be better appreciated.

### *The Soviet Record*

IN 1965, a committed promoter of disarmament uncharacteristically remarked: "If the assumption that the Soviet



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Union will enter a disarmament agreement for the purpose of violating it and thereby achieving a military advantage is valid, it should be sufficient to preclude all disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union, since no inspection system is capable of deterring a nation with a high incentive to cheat." Barely five years later, the Soviets mounted a disinformation campaign intended to encourage the United States to abandon its efforts in the field of biological warfare and agree to a ban on biological weapons, while at the same time not only maintaining but expanding their own programs in this area. This and other examples of Soviet arms control violations, near-violations, exploitation of loopholes, and negotiating deception over the last 20 years have raised the most serious questions about Soviet motives and intentions with respect to arms control, and the U.S.-Soviet relationship in general. Is this history sufficient to preclude further arms control agreements with the Soviet Union?

An examination of the Soviet compliance record is depressing indeed, but cannot provide a simple answer to that question. On the one hand, it has to be recognized that a treaty such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has proven a thoroughly bad bargain. Although the treaty's verifiability was conceded to be slight at the time of its signing and ratification, it was believed that biological weapons made little strategic sense in a world already amply supplied with means of mass destruction, that their operational military utility was highly questionable, and that their morally abhorrent qualities would in any case act as a powerful deterrent against developing them. Soviet behavior has since falsified every one of these assumptions. Still, the reasonableness of the *kind* of calculation on which U.S. adherence to the BWC was based cannot really be faulted. Similar considerations are almost certainly valid in assessing the verifiability of limitations on marginal or theoretical military activities, such as radiological weapons, or on the emplacement of military facilities or weapons in Antarctica, on the ocean bottom, or in outer space.

The true test, of course, is in the vital area of strategic arms limitations. It may be argued that the time has come to consider whether the range of effectively verifiable limitations on these weapons is not much narrower than has generally been assumed. First, the Soviet move toward smaller and more mobile strategic systems—cruise missiles and mobile ICBMs—is already well underway. Second, Soviet incentives to conceal such systems (for operational as well as strategic reasons) must be considered high. The Soviets have resisted all American efforts to curb encryption of telemetry on tests of new Soviet strategic missiles, in spite of the clear conflict with their SALT obligations. And it appears probable that they have covertly deployed a substantial number of SS-16 ICBMs at the Plesetsk missile test center, also in violation of SALT limitations.

In addition, we have much evidence of Soviet interest in rapid reload of ICBM launchers; and we know the Soviets have a strong doctrinal commitment to large reserve forces of all kinds as well as to the employment of strategic deception and surprise. Taken together, these factors cannot but make it doubtful that future limitations on Soviet ICBM forces can be either effectively verifiable or genuinely constraining. The failure of arms control analysts even to consider such issues is testimony to the persisting strength of verification theology.

WHAT PRECISELY constitutes a violation of an arms control agreement? Astonishingly, this is a question that has rarely been addressed or even raised in the vast literature on arms control. Generally speaking, the definition of a violation and the standard of proof for determining it take domestic American legal procedures as their model. Violations are understood as breaches of specific provisions of legally binding documents; the suspected violator is held innocent until proven guilty, and the standard of proof is guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." Unfortunately, there is little real resemblance between the process of determining compliance with an arms control agreement and a prosecution under domestic law. Where actions of another sovereign nation are at issue, the verifying party lacks the power to



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collect supporting evidence, to subpoena witnesses, to take testimony under oath, and to punish for perjury; and no impartial tribunal is available to rule authoritatively on disputed points of law.

The current state of affairs is even more peculiar in that a framework for adjudicating treaty violations actually exists. In 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codified existing international law pertaining to treaty breaches and the remedies available to injured parties. Though the U.S., which has signed this convention, has not ratified it, and though the Soviet Union has neither signed nor ratified it, both nations regard it as the authoritative statement of international law on the subject, applicable to parties and nonparties alike.

Under the Vienna Convention, when a party commits a "material breach" of the terms of a treaty, other parties can suspend participation in, withdraw from, or renounce the treaty, and take appropriate self-help measures to remedy an injury that may have been sustained. A material breach encompasses not only violations of legally binding treaties or agreements, but also breaches of unilateral commitments made by a state and relied on by another state, and evasions or circumventions defeating an essential object or purpose of an agreement but not violating a specific provision. Furthermore, breaches or evasions of a signed but unratified treaty or agreement, or of customary (but not formally codified) international law, are equivalent to material breaches. Under customary international law, nations are obligated to act in good faith. Failure to do so relative to verification of and compliance with arms control agreements—for example, by engaging in deceptive practices during negotiations, by failing to take a clear position toward unilateral declarations made by the other party, or by failing to respond constructively when compliance issues are raised (all of which represent standard Soviet operating procedure)—can have effects as serious as outright violations, and should also be grounds for counteraction.

Contrary to the received idea that minor violations will be deterred by the treaty regime itself, such violations might be undertaken for a variety of reasons. They could be calculated to secure a marginal military advantage below the other state's threshold of response. They could be designed in conjunction with other activities to prepare for a possible treaty "breakout." They could reflect an attempt to test or stretch the boundaries of a treaty, thus establishing precedents for future activities that could provide more substantial gains. They could represent a test of the political will of the other party. Or, they could simply be designed to test its verification capabilities, whether with a view to planning future violations or for unrelated counterintelligence purposes.

Violations undertaken for any of these reasons are more likely to occur than massive violations intended to achieve a decisive military advantage. In this case, the galvanizing effect of discovery on the verifying party (and on other nations that might feel threatened) could well outweigh any advantages gained; and the same results could be achieved by a carefully graduated breakout leading to denunciation of the agreement on some plausible pretext and the rapid and open completion of the program.

Soviet activities in ballistic missile defense over the last decade nicely fit such a scenario. While carefully observing the (easily monitored) numerical limits on deployed ABM interceptor missiles, the Soviets have (arguably) illegally upgraded air defense components to an ABM capability; stockpiled elements of a rapidly deployable ABM system; and continued to build a system of sophisticated radars that would provide essential support to a nationwide ABM system. Only the most recent of these radars, at Krasnoyarsk, constitutes an unambiguous violation of ABM Treaty restrictions. Vocal Soviet concerns over the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative—especially its alleged violation of the ABM Treaty—suggest that the Soviets may be preparing the ground for a unilateral denunciation of the treaty if circumstances make such a step desirable.

THE CURRENT state of Soviet treaty compliance may be summarized briefly. In January 1984, the president determined that the Soviets were "definitely" in violation of their legal or political commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva Pro-



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tocol (banning the use of chemical weapons), the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), and SALT II provisions relating to telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization. In addition, they were "almost certainly" in violation of the ABM Treaty requirements governing siting and orientation of early warning radars; had "probably" violated the SALT II prohibition of deployment of the SS-16 ICBM; and were "likely" to have exceeded in a number of instances the 150 kiloton limitation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

In his report of February 1985, the president reaffirmed these charges (upgrading the Krasnoyarsk early warning radar to the status of a definite violation), and also determined that the Soviets have repeatedly violated a provision of the Limited Test Ban Treaty that prohibits venting radioactive debris from underground nuclear tests. In addition, Soviet activities relating to ballistic missile defense (development of a rapidly deployable ABM system and concurrent testing of ABM and air defense components), while ambiguous from the point of view of treaty requirements or the evidence available, were said to suggest that the Soviets may be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory.

Finally, it should be noted that a report of the president's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control has called attention to Soviet violations of a number of other treaties or obligations that are rarely discussed in this connection—notably, the Montreux Convention of 1936 (by the regular transit, since 1976, of the Turkish Straits by KIEV-class aircraft carriers) and the Conventional Weapons Convention of 1981 (by the use of booby-trap mines and incendiary weapons against civilians in Afghanistan).

This is not the place to undertake a thorough examination of the military significance of these violations. Suffice it to say that the time is past when Soviet transgressions can be plausibly written off as technical lapses or honest misunderstandings of treaty language. Clearly the most worrisome are the various Soviet actions relating to ballistic missile defense. Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty must now be considered a real possibility. The U.S. must also be concerned, however, at the Soviet pursuit of advantages that are only marginal or incremental.

### *Response*

RESPONDING TO evidence of treaty violations is integral to verification, since the most effective detection capabilities are worthless if a nation is unable or unwilling to act on the information available to it. That the entire question of response has attracted little attention in recent years is surprising. Once again, this seems to reflect the impact of domestic legal thinking: The guiding assumption is that the essential step in verification is the determination of noncompliance ("conviction"), which will then be followed in more or less automatic fashion by a predetermined range of responses ("punishment"). But unlike the case of domestic law-breaking, there is no body of well-defined and accepted penalties for violation of arms control agreements; and a complaining nation lacks the weapons of compulsion. Moreover, a response is never based simply on the compliance behavior of the other party taken in isolation; it is an essentially political act which always reflects in some measure the overall relationship between the parties involved, as well as the international political situation as a whole.

It is sometimes asserted or assumed that the burden of response will somehow be borne by "world opinion"—that any significant violation will cause an international storm of protest leading to condemnation and sanctions in the United Nations or other international forums. But "world opinion" is an evanescent entity: Particularly in matters that do not touch them directly, people's memories are short, their attention easily diverted. Moreover, there are many ways a violating state can dampen the international reaction to its behavior. The charges can be denied and the evidence challenged—a surprisingly effective strategy even in the case of relatively open violations. Or the violations can be excused by complaints over behavior of other parties or the fairness of the



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treaty regime, or made to appear moderate by comparison with a threat to withdraw from the treaty. At the level of government, there has never been any noticeable inclination to risk important political interests for the sake of an abstract crusade against treaty violators. The burden of responding to violations rests essentially with the nations most directly affected by them.

Because response is essentially and inescapably a political act, however, it is problematic even for these nations. To judge from much of the literature as well as frequent statements of American officials, any significant treaty violation is apt to be followed swiftly and surely by abrogation of the agreement. Yet the historical record tells quite a different story. One must recall the paralysis of the British and French governments in the face of massive evidence of German violation of the Versailles Treaty and other international agreements of the interwar period. And the United States—in a much more favorable political climate, and with its most conservative administration of the century—has so far failed to take any action in response to acknowledged Soviet violations of binding legal obligations.

The political constraints on effective response are of a domestic as well as of an international character. Dependent as they are on public opinion, democratic governments are reluctant to make prompt and drastic responses without extensive preparation of the public, particularly when a powerful domestic opposition is strongly committed to arms control. They are especially unlikely to undertake such measures when the administration in power itself has negotiated the agreement being violated; admitting that such an agreement has proven worthless is an act of more than normal political courage. Reaching internal agreement, both on the fact of the breach and on response measures, is likely to be a contentious and drawn out process, subject to many political pressures; prompt counteraction is thus almost certain to be heroically difficult at best, and probably impossible under most circumstances. Much is likely to depend on accidental factors such as the (superficial) persuasiveness and shock value of the evidence of violations, domestic political linkages of various sorts (is the government merely trying to increase support for this year's defense budget?), and the government's general credibility at the time.

Internationally, many things work against an effective response. To begin with, a direct relationship between violation and response is all but out of the question in the case of multilateral treaties. Even in the case of bilateral treaties, the interests and sensibilities of allies can weigh heavily against taking effective measures. Allies or clients may be more concerned about the political effects of responding than about the incremental military advantage gained by the opposing power.

Perhaps most worrisome, however, is the relationship between violator and principal victim. The assumption is that the reciprocal fear of an arms race will be a powerful deterrent against violations. Yet this very fear may also deter a strong response to noncompliance. If a nation is uncertain of its own domestic support for a response that may be interpreted as a further increase in the arms race, it may well fail to act.

IN DECIDING how to respond to evidence of possible violations, three considerations are central: the political-military significance of the activity, its precise legal status, and the nature of the evidence for it. It must first be asked what kind of threat the violation may pose to the nation's security. Second, what the legal status of the activity is and how forcefully to respond. And third, whether evidence for the violation may be so ambiguous or so sensitive that it does not provide a good basis for any effective response. Of particular importance is the problem of ambiguous evidence. In the past, even marginal ambiguities have proven paralyzing in the face of demands for "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."

The range of possible responses to evidence of noncompliance is bracketed by, at one extreme, doing nothing, and at the other, by withdrawal from the treaty and the resumption of activities prohibited by it. Though the withdrawal option is frequently invoked as a sufficient deterrent to noncompliance, it is in prac-



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tice difficult to resort to under normal peacetime circumstances. It is politically supportable only in cases where the evidence for noncompliance is undisputed, where there are no significant ambiguities in the treaty itself, and where other remedies are seen to have failed. Even then, such a move will be widely interpreted as a mere cover for resuming military activities prohibited by the treaty, and hence may prove counterproductive in its international impact. Moreover, it will be argued that a state should comply with a treaty even if other parties are violating it, in order to maintain leverage in criticizing the violator and in obtaining improvements in verification procedures and compliance behavior. Although such an argument may strike some as tantamount to appeasement, its appeal should not be underestimated. This is not to say that withdrawal should not be taken seriously as an option, only that it is not *the* solution to the problem of response. If policymakers are faced with a choice between withdrawal and doing nothing, they will very likely do nothing.

Less extreme than withdrawal is the option of temporary or limited noncompliance. One possible variant of this approach is for observance of the treaty to be suspended until the verifying party is satisfied that another party is fully in compliance with it. This option has the great merit of shifting the burden of proof from the verifying state to the suspected violator, especially in cases where the evidence for violations is less than conclusive. There could also be a suspension of compliance with the particular articles or clauses that the other party appears to be violating, or with different parts of the treaty that are more constraining to the verifying state. In the case of multilateral treaties, there could be a suspension of obligations only toward the violator.

It is important to distinguish carefully between the legal-political response, which is essentially a matter of declaratory policy toward a particular treaty, and the military response that a suspension of treaty obligations would make possible. There might well be cases (the BWC immediately comes to mind) where withdrawal from the treaty would be an appropriate response regardless of whether a nation intended to activate its own program in the prohibited area. The principle that a nation will not be bound by treaty obligations that do not impose reciprocal constraints on others is essential to a sound arms control policy.

BY THE SAME token, a nation might not have incentives to match a military program being undertaken by another state in contravention of particular treaty provisions (for example, the U.S. has little interest in an early warning radar with the characteristics of the radar at Krasnoyarsk). It might make sense to respond militarily only in token fashion, or to undertake a response in relation to other treaty provisions or indeed to activities not limited by the treaty. An appropriate U.S. response to Soviet ABM-related activities, for example, might involve disregarding the treaty prohibition against giving ABM capabilities to U.S. air defense systems currently under development.

An additional response option is to establish linkages between treaty behavior and nonmilitary areas of national policy. The most cogent linkages are those with arms control negotiations. Progress in negotiations on chemical weapons, for example, could be made contingent on cessation of Soviet and Soviet proxy use of lethal chemical and biological agents. This kind of action runs the risk of appearing to throw arbitrary roadblocks in the way of further progress in arms control, but the reasonableness of such a linkage is difficult to dispute.

Publicizing or threatening to publicize violations is implicit in a variety of diplomatic and political remedies, but it deserves to be considered as a separate response option. A government should be able to devise special publicity campaigns to ensure that violations are exposed to the population of the offending nation, as well as to important international audiences. Such campaigns would serve, in some measure to deter noncompliance, or to provide an incentive to return to compliance. It can be argued, for example, that the publicity surrounding Soviet use of "yellow rain" and other chemical/biological agents has contributed sig-



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nificantly to the apparent tapering off of Soviet activity in this area over the last year or so.

Many discussions of the problem of response assume that the most important remedy available to the United States in resolving compliance issues is bilateral adjudication. This is a misconception. Properly speaking, bilateral adjudication—as represented, for example, by the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which was created in 1972 to deal with questions connected with the original strategic arms agreements—is not a response option at all. Rather, it is simply a preliminary step in determining the status of a compliance matter and the attitude of the Soviets toward it. The SCC has no independent authority to resolve disputes or any power to enforce solutions, but is simply a convenient mechanism for exchanging views and working out agreements of an essentially technical nature. Any such bilateral mechanism is apt to be effective only to the extent that the verifying party takes concrete measures to create incentives for good behavior.

The U.S. has never imposed a penalty on the Soviets for a treaty violation, or freed itself from a treaty or a treaty provision they are violating. The Soviets have never agreed to any cooperative procedure to resolve a compliance concern. In cases where there have been changes in Soviet behavior, they were arguably unrelated to U.S. efforts, and the problems have often resumed or become worse. There is little hope for any fundamental improvement in Soviet behavior—and every reason to expect a worsening of it—unless and until the United States demonstrates, by deed, that its arms control business will no longer be conducted as usual.



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# Negotiating with Moscow: the Case of Austria

Kenneth L. Adelman & Charles A. Sorrels

HOW TO NEGOTIATE with the Soviets? We have all heard the oft-repeated rules for doing so successfully: negotiating from strength, specifying U.S. negotiating goals, garnering bipartisan support within Congress, and working closely with our allies. But along with these general rules, there are a host of lessons to be learned from one of the most successful negotiations ever conducted with the Soviet Union. The negotiations culminated in the Austrian State Treaty, whose 30th anniversary was celebrated in 1985.

Celebrations were surely in order. The Treaty signed on May 15, 1955, by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union was an enormous success. Measured by our fundamental values of assuring freedom and democracy, the Treaty stands as a monument to post-war Western diplomacy. Except for northern Iran, it was the sole instance in which the Red Army withdrew major occupation troops after the war. (Of course, they remain deployed across nearly all Eastern Europe to this day.) Moreover, the treaty restored to Austria its sovereignty, which it lost in March 1938 with Hitler's *Anschluss*.

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Though Austria was "liberated" by Allied forces in the spring of 1945—when the Soviet troop commander proclaimed that the Red Army was a "liberating not a conquering army"—it took 10 years to get the Soviets to grant real liberation. Had the United States and its Allies lost heart during those ten frustrating years and accepted an agreement for an agreement's sake, not only Austria but also our highest principles would have been the losers. Today's seven plus million Austrians might not be free. Austria might not be the source of stability that it is, but rather would be a source of tension in central Europe. This is the grand lesson from the look-back, but that runs ahead of our story.

THE TALE begins in Moscow, October 1943, with the American, British, and Soviet foreign ministers declaring Austria's 1938 annexation by Nazi Germany null and void. They pledged the intention "to see re-established a free and independent Austria." There the matter stood until the Potsdam summit in August 1945, when another declaration was issued stipulating that "reparations should not be exacted from Austria." But on the summit's final day, Stalin rather offhandedly proposed including "German assets" in Austria as part of German reparations due the Soviet Union. The Americans, ever anxious to end the summit, and the British agreed—without getting a definition of "German assets in eastern



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Austria." This was most unfortunate. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later noted: it "illustrates how terribly dangerous it is to make agreements that are hastily made in loose terms."

Soon after the Potsdam declaration, the Soviets began plundering the Austrian economy most rapaciously, even brutally, just as they did those in Eastern Europe. What could not be moved out of Austria they seized as "German assets." These included such large and key segments of the Austrian economy as two-thirds of the Austrian oil industry and virtually all the Danube shipping facilities. By 1955, Soviet economic exploitation had inflicted on Austria losses amounting to roughly $1 billion, excluding occupation costs.

The United States and the United Kingdom protested that the Soviet actions violated the Potsdam agreement. The Soviet Union rebuffed the protests. We and the British responded, that spring of 1946, by striving to place the Austrian State Treaty on the Council of Foreign Ministers' agenda. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov flatly refused.

Thereafter, the diplomatic battle opened, to run nearly a decade before yielding not only success for the West but also six critical lessons for today.

LESSON ONE: Major negotiations with the Soviets require great patience to meet the Soviets' constant testing of the political resolve and cohesion of the West.

The Soviets are tough and wily negotiators. The first of four secretaries of state to negotiate the Austrian Treaty, James Byrnes, later wrote about Americans thinking, falsely: "Because a thing is right . . . [they] cannot understand why Mr. Molotov does not agree to it." Proposing new fixes, the Americans felt "it was utterly impossible . . . for Mr. Molotov to object to this new approach—but he would." The third and most perceptive secretary involved, Dean Acheson, wrote: "What one may learn from these experiences is that Soviet authorities are not moved to agreement by negotiation—that is, by a series of mutual concessions . . . Theirs is a more primitive form of political method. They cling stubbornly to a position, hoping to force an opponent to accept it." When the opponent doesn't, "they hastily abandon it—after asking and having been refused an unwarranted price—and hastily take up a new position, which may or may not represent a move toward greater mutual stability." The last secretary involved in the negotiations, John Foster Dulles, described them as "tortuous" and likened them to the myth of Sisyphus, who endlessly pushed a heavy stone up a mountain only to have it roll back down when nearing the peak.

The push up the mountain really began in January 1947. Special deputies to the four foreign ministers (France having been added after the war) held their first meeting to draft and negotiate the Treaty. These talks broke down in 1948 but were renewed the following year, in mid-1949. By then, Stalin may have had to readjust his foreign policy in response to the West's resolve, exemplified by the heroic Berlin airlift. Stalin seemed to switch tactics and adopt his own version of a "peace offensive." This was designed to give the appearance (though maybe not the reality) of a thaw in the cold war, which had been frosted by the Berlin blockade.

For the eight years between 1947 and 1955, the four powers held a staggering 400 meetings on the Austrian Treaty, at various levels from the foreign ministers on down to the Austrian Treaty Commission members. In the bulk of those meetings—no matter at what level—little or no progress was made.

At some junctures the gap actually widened. Seemingly significant progress would evaporate—once even within a few hours. On June 20, 1949, in Paris, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky did a swift reversal. Acheson writes how "Bevin [the British foreign minister] congratulated him on a new record. Soviet agreements were fragile things but today's was the frailest yet. It had not even survived the day." The rock kept tumbling down, but the Sisyphuses of the West kept pushing.

*Lesson Two:* Major concessions by Americans, particularly in offering a "package deal," can quickly be pocketed by the Soviets in exchange for nothing.



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A big stumbling block for years, as mentioned, was over reparations. The Soviets agreed at Potsdam not to exact them from Austria, yet demanded them thereafter; the West adamantly refused to grant them, yet relinquished them thereafter.

Moscow had its eye most keenly on all future Austrian oil production. Western foreign ministers thought they had settled this issue during the May 1949 Paris meeting, when the Soviets agreed that Moscow's claims to oil assets would give it rights over 60 percent of oil exploration lands in eastern Austria. Two months later, however, the Soviets "reinterpreted" the Paris agreement to claim once again a monopoly on virtually *all* future Austrian oil production. They sought not only to bleed a prostrate Austria but also to establish a permanent economic hold over it.

During the September 1949 foreign ministers' meeting in New York, Mr. Vyshinsky outlined the makings of a grand deal: all remaining unagreed articles would present "no difficulties" to Moscow *if* this matter of so-called German assets,—i.e., reparations from Austria—"went the Soviets' way." The U.S. countered with a slight modification: the West would accept *most* of the Soviet demands on this main issue in exchange for Soviet agreement to the Western position on *all* other remaining and relatively subordinate issues. This fell short for the Soviets.

The special Soviet deputy then responded, according to the State Department's historical record, with "one of the most abrupt statements in the record of postwar negotiations." He stated that the "German assets" article "must be worded *exactly* as the Soviet Union wished before any settlement could be reached on the other issues" (emphasis added). When agreeing to this proposal a few days later, the West made clear that it signed onto the exact Soviet wording in order to secure the earliest possible conclusion of the whole Treaty.

The historical record tells what happened next: "The Soviet Union readily accepted this offer, but then refused to give anything in return. Vyshinsky's statement of a month before was in effect withdrawn once the Western Powers had made the desired concession." What became theirs, remained theirs; what was to be ours, remained negotiable.

Later that year, 1949, the Soviets threw in a new issue—the "dried peas debt"—to obstruct the proceedings. As part of the post-war relief owed them, they demanded Austrian repayment for dried peas supplied to the starving Austrian population by Soviet troops, but in fact taken from German *Wehrmacht* stores in Vienna. When Austria asked how much Moscow wanted for these dried peas, no reply was forthcoming. The rock rolled back down.

*Lesson Three:* At times the Soviets simply "refuse to take yes for an answer."

From 1949 until early 1954, nearly a year after Stalin's death, progress was imperceptible. Then, the three Western powers, along with Austria, made a stab to finish the Treaty. They yielded, offering to accept the Soviet version of *all* five remaining articles.

In an amazing feat of diplomatic chicanery, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov refused even this. No, he could not accept his own version of all outstanding articles. Rather he added as a kicker the new demand that Soviet military occupation of Austria continue indefinitely. (In April 1946, Molotov had told Byrnes: "It might be necessary to leave troops in Austria for another year," i.e. until early 1947.) Secretary Dulles later told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee how "these new Soviet conditions made a mockery of the treaty." They were turned down flat by Austria and the West. When the Soviets are not prepared to advance negotiations, no amount of Western pleading or even concessions can bring results.

*Lesson Four:* The bargaining doesn't end until the treaty is finally signed.

The last phase of any negotiating process is always the most intense, and generally the most important. The Soviets realize this well, and commonly lay on heavy demands in the final hours. As Dulles put it later: "They astutely take into account any weaknesses of their opponent, such as impatience to get the negotiation over or willingness to treat any 'agreement' as a success, without regard to the contents or dependability." The only way to counter is to



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hang tough, to wait for another window of opportunity to open.

In April 1955, this happened. The Soviet government suddenly invited representatives of the Austrian government to Moscow. The Soviets' renewed willingness to bargain was probably related to events then going on beyond the Austrian Treaty, including the granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, the creation of the Western European Union and, most important, the entry of West Germany into NATO.

Regardless of the cause, the consequence was that Moscow was willing to move. They appeared ready to agree to pull back all Soviet forces from Austria. The diplomatic action then moved to Vienna. It quickened during the first half of May 1955 and culminated in a Treaty on May 15. No mention was made of dried peas.

The main stumbling block was the age-old one, reparations. The Soviet Union still wanted to retain, for up to 30 years, most of the valuable Austrian oil properties, and it wanted to own *in perpetuity* the Austrian Danube shipping, including its docks. At Moscow in April the Soviets reached an economic accord with Austria that included Austrian payment of 10 million tons of oil to Moscow over 10 years, $2 million for Danube assets, and $150 million in return for other "German assets" in Austria. Everything seemed set.

But then again, it was not. At the last minute, the Soviet representative in Vienna refused to modify the text of the Treaty to reflect that Austrian-Soviet accord reached the month before. In effect, the Soviets wanted to be free to reoccupy Austria, under the guise of asserting remaining legal rights to economic assets there. Such a clause in the Treaty would have left Austria in a precarious position indeed.

On May 10, 1955—a mere *five days* before the scheduled signing ceremonies—Secretary Dulles took a valiant decision: no way. He would not come to Vienna and the United States would not sign the Treaty unless it was modified to incorporate the Moscow economic accord of April. At the last, last moment, the Soviets consented.

*Lesson Five:* No treaty is perfect, and certainly none is controversy-free. In the end Austria did, in effect, pay reparations to the Soviet Union—contrary to the basic policy of the United States and Great Britain, and contrary to what the Soviets had formally agreed at Potsdam in August 1945.

Not unexpectedly, this became a bone of contention in the ensuing Senate hearings. Senator Mike Mansfield told Dulles, "I am going to vote for this treaty, Mr. Secretary, but it seems to me that it is an extremely high price for a friendly, democratic country such as Austria to pay." Senator Hubert Humphrey made a similar point: "My concern, Sir, is registered because of the drain of a certain amount of commodities to the Soviets in the form of what you may call payments or reparations."

Again, Secretary Dulles faced the issue squarely. "It is not perfect in that respect. We would, of course, have been much happier and the Austrians would have been much happier if the payments could have been totally discontinued." But, of course, the West whittled the amount down considerably and, most important, completely got rid of Soviet legal rights over Austrian assets and Soviet occupation forces from Austria. These were the large entries on the assets side of the ledger, to balance the reparations amounts on the debit side. Realizing this, all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee supported the Treaty.

*Lesson Six:* Soviet motives in agreeing to a treaty may be neither benign nor evident.

The dramatic shift in Soviet policy in April and May of 1955 came as a surprise to the West. Just a year earlier at the foreign ministers' meeting in Berlin, the Soviets had hardened their position to the point of refusing their own provisions. The Soviets settle up only when they decide to settle up, for reasons of their own.

WHAT WERE the reasons? We know little better today than we did then. Perhaps the Soviet leadership had, by then, calmed down from its Stalinist era. Perhaps the Soviets wanted to keep the Western zones in Austria from entering NATO. Perhaps



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it was in part to assure that Austria would become truly a neutral nation wedged between West Germany and Italy. Perhaps it was the opening gambit of Nikita Khrushchev in his own "peace offensive."

More important, the Soviets wanted to undermine NATO and Western public support for increasing defenses by offering Europeans peaceful, united Austria as an appealing neutral alternative to militarized alliance with the United States. They also sought to discourage West German rearmament—a constant, and at that time particularly poignant, Soviet fear—as a critical component of NATO's forward defense.

Regardless, the Soviets moved and we were wise enough to strike a good, even if not perfect, deal. Thirty years later, it still stands the test of time as a good deal. That is no mean feat, especially in the post-war history of negotiating with the Soviets.

If our 30-year-old success in Austria has taught us anything, it is that reaching effective agreements with the Soviet Union is a long, hard road. Worthwhile results do not happen overnight. George Bernard Shaw once wrote, "Peace is not only better than war, but infinitely more arduous." Our experience in negotiating Austria's freedom makes this clear. Today, we find ourselves pursuing an even more arduous task—ridding our world of the nuclear threat and ushering in a *new* era of peace and stability. If we heed the lessons learned in the years leading to 1955, our efforts can be even more promising.



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# The ABM-SDI Debate: the White House Wins All Draws

Andrew Goldman

BY COMMON CONSENT, the ABM Treaty is one of the most significant and detailed agreements to issue from SALT I. The recognized purpose of the Treaty[1] is to assure the continuing mutual vulnerability of its signatories, the U.S. and the USSR, to nuclear attack. Echoing a conviction that held sway in the arms-control community at the time and still has much currency today, Secretary of State William P. Rogers reported in his official statement (June 10, 1972) to President Nixon that "I am convinced beyond doubt that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this Treaty."

The reasons for such confidence originate from the Treaty's seemingly precise quantitative, qualitative, and geographic constraints on the construction of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. As John B. Rhinelander, former legal adviser to the SALT I delegation, has noted, "in the view of most observers, the ABM Treaty should eliminate fears on either side of a first strike as a rational policy option." The Treaty thus codified the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" and foresaw an eventual reduction in offensive forces on both sides.

It was precisely to transcend the doctrine embodied in the ABM Treaty that President Reagan proposed in March 1983, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Beginning as a research program, SDI, if successful, points toward an eventual and wholesale overturning of the strategic assumptions incorporated in the ABM Treaty. In the meantime, however, as long as it consists merely of a collection of research projects, SDI would seem to pose few problems, theoretical or legal, to the Treaty, which allows *research* on all types of ABM systems and components. Thus, while it was predictable that SDI would one day force a debate about the ABM Treaty, it is worth exploring why heated debate should have emerged already, over the past year. What compels closest attention, however, is that the dispute has focused not on the merits of renegotiating the ABM Treaty to allow for arising SDI technologies; rather, it has turned on whether the Treaty is so ambiguously constructed that, even as it stands and without revision, it permits advanced development, testing, and deployment of certain types of ABM systems and their components (i.e., the individual projects under the SDI umbrella).

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[1]Considered here as consisting of a Preamble, 16 Articles, seven Agreed Statements with the same legal status as the Treaty, five Common Understandings identified by the Nixon administration although not formally adopted by the two SALT delegations, confidential Protocols adopted in 1974 and 1976, and a confidential Agreed Statement in 1978.



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The urgency of this debate stems from the Reagan administration's sudden decision last spring, as explained by the State Department's legal adviser Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, "to consider more thoroughly than ever before the appropriate interpretation of the ABM Treaty as it relates to the future of 'exotic' systems." Interest is heightened by the fact that among those opposing the administration's interpretation with their own authoritative opinions are the very negotiators of the original Treaty.

Briefly stated, the administration argues that the Treaty's ban on developing, testing, or deploying "ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based" (Article V, section 1) applies only to technologies current in 1972, when the Treaty was negotiated. Critics of the administration argue that this ban covers as well all technologies that might be (or have been) discovered subsequently. This three-part ban—on development, testing, and deployment—would, then, restrict SDI to the laboratory. Significantly, however, the Treaty contains in another provision (Agreed Statement D) a ban on the deployment of ABM systems "based on other physical principles." This provision, insists the administration, is the Treaty's only application to such newly-emerging technologies as those envisioned by SDI, and furthermore, it is a ban only on deployment; testing and development of SDI projects may proceed apace, unencumbered by Treaty restrictions.

Although there are powerful arguments against such an interpretation, the administration reasons that, by virtue of the canons of treaty construction, all it need establish is ambiguity within the competing interpretations. Like the dealer in a game of blackjack, the administration wins all ties; for its purposes, it is sufficient that its critics' interpretation not be airtight. If this point can be shown, international law holds that the resolution of the problem is sought in the negotiating record. Although such supporters of the ABM Treaty as John Rhinelander and Gerard Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator of the Treaty, deny the need for this type of review, lawyers for State and Defense proceeded nonetheless, concluding from the negotiating record that the American team failed to gain Soviet acceptance of a ban on development, testing, and maybe even deployment of ABM systems and components that are based on other physical principles.

TO UNDERSTAND the origins of the dispute between the Reagan administration and the architects of the ABM Treaty requires a close look at the several sources of pressure for reinterpreting the Treaty. These can be said, roughly, to have converged from three directions: from those in charge of running the SDI program; from politicians, domestic and foreign, whose support is needed if SDI is to continue; and from the Reagan administration's realization that the Treaty is doing little to hinder an ongoing Soviet build-up of strategic defenses.

In April 1985, approximately a month before Defense began its first review of the ABM Treaty, the Pentagon stated in its "Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative" that SDI is "a broad *research* program" and "is being conducted in a manner fully consistent with all U.S. Treaty obligations" (emphasis added). But as one reads the report's appendix on "The Strategic Defense Initiative and the ABM Treaty" it is clear that Treaty compliance issues were destined to become a major problem. The difficulty related not to the years 1985–1988, when research and early development were expected to be too rudimentary to raise compliance questions, but to the second time period of the SDI program (1988–1993), when the field testing of many components would be due. The crucial point emerges from Gerard Smith's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972:

> The SALT negotiating history clearly supports the following interpretation. The obligation not to develop such systems, devices, or warheads would be applicable only to that stage of development which follows laboratory development and testing. . . . It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on 'development' applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed.



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Accordingly, the April 1985 report to Congress says, "The SDI research program can be conducted in a full compliant manner to reach a decision point in the early 1990s on whether to proceed to development and deployment of an SDI related system." The obvious conclusion, as the report acknowledges, is that, "Development and deployment, given a decision to proceed, would almost certainly require modifications to the ABM Treaty." Or as Lt. Gen. Abrahamson, director of the SDI program, said before a Senate Armed Services subcommittee on October 30, 1985, "There clearly will come a time [in the 1990s] when we enter the development phase and . . . require much more direct testing [of components of a defensive system] that we will have to have a modified [ABM] Treaty in some way in order to proceed."

The Reagan administration, however, began running into some preliminary compliance questions much earlier than expected. For example, the program originally called the Airborne Optical System (AOS), which had been under development for several years and whose purpose was to provide initial target tracking data, was redirected to fall under SDI's umbrella and rechristened the Airborne Optical Adjunct (AOA) experiment. The difference in terminology is more than semantic. In its "Report to Congress," the administration argued that AOA—whose stated purpose is to "demonstrate the technical feasibility of using optical sensors on an airborne platform"—cannot perform sufficient sensor and battle management functions and thus "will not be capable of substituting for an ABM component." AOA is then merely an "adjunct" to the existing Terminal Imaging Radar. And since no precise distinction was ever detailed in the Treaty between a "component" and an "adjunct," the administration would face none of the problems to which Smith referred in the testimony cited above: If progress allowed, the AOA could go right from laboratory development to field testing without technically violating any Treaty provisions.

But AOA is not an isolated example. It is the sort of problem that will occur with ever greater frequency as SDI proceeds. And while other compliance questions could be dealt with in similar fashion, one at a time, obviously they would be much easier to manage if the administration could dispose of objections once and for all, by claiming that the ABM Treaty did not limit any development or testing of ABM systems or components based on "other physical principles."

Just how uncomfortable Defense found its position to be is seen in the SDI Report: On the one hand it stresses how all currently planned tests and any "follow-on experiments" will always "be reviewed to ensure that they are in compliance [with the Treaty]"; on the other hand, it contains a sprinkling of one-sentence declarations that at some point the development process of certain programs "would almost certainly require modifications to the ABM Treaty." The only conclusion one can draw is that the ABM Treaty was forcing the SDI program directors to rein in their ambitions and discover technically legal ways to conduct experiments that are not self-evidently forbidden by Treaty provisions. The result was the administration's walking a political tightrope as it zealously tried to convince all that its SDI program is in accord with the Treaty while also ensuring that Abrahamson's office did not suffer because of a treaty that, properly interpreted, might permit the exact type of action being attempted on the margins.

By the summer of 1985, then, there was Lt. Gen. Abrahamson's insistence that sooner or later, his programs would require modification of the Treaty; since he told a generally skeptical Congress that the Treaty would stymie his office's progress, he must have been playing the same song on yet a louder note to a receptive Reagan. Most likely Abrahamson made it abundantly clear to SDI's most powerful supporter that the ABM Treaty could pose innumerable and possibly insurmountable barriers to the realization of the latter's vision of a nationwide defense.

A SECOND source of pressure at this time for a reinterpretation of the Treaty came from those SDI supporters in



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Defense who advanced what one might call the "where's the beef?" thesis. That is, talk about SDI's declaratory purpose being a limited research program was fine for placating domestic critics and European allies anxious about anti-SDI pressure in their respective countries; but to sell the program to Congress and the allies, one needed some multimillion dollar contracts available that would not one day be cancelled owing to an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that prohibited any testing or development beyond basic laboratory research. With some assurance that Treaty compliance would not force a premature scaling-back of SDI, congressmen uneasy about voting yes on SDI funding could at least assume that the large sums required in the early stages of research and development would not be wasted on a system that was ultimately undeployable; also important for them was the added incentive of being able to boast to their constituents about how many jobs a certain program could guarantee for several years.[2]

The allies, meanwhile, needed their own cushion to land on if they were to go the distance with Reagan on SDI. If it was important for congressional supporters that SDI not be seen as riding roughshod over the Treaty, it was even more of a sticking point for the allies, who generally had more reservations (mostly domestic ones) about tampering with the Treaty. As with Congress, the Reagan administration could reckon that allied support for SDI would be more willingly forthcoming if there were some assurance that SDI-related business would create jobs abroad as the program proceeded, thus providing allied governments with some ammunition to counter domestic opposition to participation in the program. Also critical for the allies was the knowledge that they would be signing onto a program that meant technology-sharing with the U.S., which could translate into tremendous commercial spin-offs.

Two tasks were thus set before the administration with regard to this second source of pressure, tasks that it could not postpone: first, finding a way of not scaring off marginal congressional support and not sending the allies into fits of apoplexy with talk of scuttling the Treaty; and second, ensuring that the strategic and economic promise of SDI would not hang on the thread of a legal challenge, under a too-restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty that Reagan had done nothing to counter.

A third source of pressure pushing the administration toward a reinterpretation of the Treaty was the continual evidence of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and strenuous efforts to create conditions that would provide them with a first-strike option. Even staunch arms control advocates like Smith and Rhinelander had to admit that the Krasnoyarsk phased array radar constitutes a clear violation of the Treaty, because it is located not on the periphery but inland where it can track incoming ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the Pentagon was understandably alarmed by the unprecedented build-up of Soviet strategic and tactical air defenses. For instance, in addition to their standard surface-to-air missile (SAM), the SA-12, the Soviets are flight testing another, the mobile SA-X-12, which, according to Defense, could possibly take out the Pershing I and Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe. Their 1,200 all-weather interceptors assigned to strategic defense constitute a staggering array of forces: the supersonic MiG-31/Foxhound has true look-down/shoot-down capability which alleviates low-level air defense problems associated with ground surveillance and tracking radars; and both the MiG-29/Fulcrum and the Su-27/Flanker not only have this same capacity but also are equipped

[2]The importance of this incentive in insuring support for SDI among congressmen is difficult to overestimate. Consider, for example, the uproar among SDI supporters in Congress immediately following Reagan's so-called "imprecision" about SDI: to wit, that America would not see any type of development of SDI programs until *after* nuclear weapons had been eliminated (i.e., farther into the future than anyone could see). One infuriated aide of Representative Jack Kemp at a roundtable of SDI supporters the day after this gaffe went so far as to say that Reagan may have killed the program because of his remark.



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with two new air-to-air missiles, the AA-9 for the Foxhound (a long range missile for use against low-flying targets) and the AA-10 for the Flanker (a medium range missile with similar capabilities). Perhaps most indicative of Soviet efforts in this direction are their passive defenses. As Defense reports, more than 175,000 key Soviet personnel are provided 1,500 hardened alternate command posts with special communications, located far away from urban centers.

Perhaps if the president (at whom all three of these sources of pressure for a reinterpretation were directed in one form or another) were not exactly the person he is, the imperative for an ABM reinterpretation might not have materialized. But Reagan is keenly sensitive to the implication of these matters for SDI. He realizes his paramount role in this whole affair: that without his full-hearted commitment the program must fail. No doubt, SDI supporters in his administration continually remind him that, in Henry Kissinger's words, "A formal distinction between research and deployment abandons the defensive option, particularly since it will be President Reagan's successor rather than the author of SDI who will have to make the decision to deploy." Thus if the accepted interpretation of the ABM Treaty is a factor that would make this "distinction" a clear cut one, then the Treaty should be reexamined with an eye towards breaking it down. The import of these messages for the administration was and still is that: a) a Reagan successor, with a commitment only to research, could stifle any further progress, effectively killing off the program; b) this possibility should be avoided by committing the country, under Reagan, to a full-fledged SDI program; and c) if this necessitates a reexamination of the ABM Treaty, this too is a move that in all likelihood only a Reagan presidency can accomplish, so it's best to get on with it as quickly as possible.

## *The Administration's Case*

THESE CONCLUSIONS drove both State and Defense to embrace similar views of their task. The common element in these departments' reinterpretations was the search for rhetorical ambiguities within the Treaty and its negotiating record. To get there, they had adopted the following argument: To establish that your reading of the Treaty has at least as much validity as your opponent's requires the adoption of a two-part procedure. First, you show the inherent confusion within the opposing interpretation; then you explain how yours would avoid such problems and thereby restore an overall coherency to the Treaty.

The administration's argument for reinterpretation begins by citing its critics' reading of Article II (1) (see box). According to this reading, the wording "currently consisting of" is meant to stand only as an *example* of ABM technology. The three listed components (launchers, radars, and missiles) are only examples whose sole purpose is functional. Therefore *any* component, past, present, or future, that serves these functions is covered by this article. Now comes the tie-in with Article V (1). This provision must prohibit the testing, development, and deployment of any ABM systems or their components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. If they are fixed land-based, then testing and development could proceed, but Article III (which puts a ban on all deployment except in the two allowed cases) would prohibit any deployment.

The problem with this restrictive interpretation arises when one tries to fit Agreed Statement D into the picture.[3] According to the restrictive reading of the administration's critics, it must only apply to fixed land-based ABM systems or their components (by allowing them to be tested and developed, but not deployed) because Article V has explicitly ruled out all other types of systems. But if this is the case, its function is superfluous. For did not Article V (1) and Article III (1) take care of this precise matter? To answer that its purpose is to articulate the parties' right to consider amendments

[3]Under agreed principles of international law, since this statement was formally agreed to and annexed to the Treaty it holds a legal status basically equal to the main part of the Treaty.



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## ABM Treaty: Key Provisions

### Article II:

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles . . .
(b) ABM launchers . . .
(c) ABM radars . . .

### Article III:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area . . . centered on the Party's national capital . . .
(b) within one ABM system deployment area . . . containing one ICBM silo launcher . . .
(As amended in 1974, the Treaty allows only one ABM site in each country.)

### Article V:

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

### Agreed Statement D:

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

allowing for the *deployment* of such systems or their components, which are otherwise prohibited by Article III (1), does nothing to remove this charge of superfluousness. Article XIV (1) accomplishes exactly this role in a broader sense by saying, "Each party may propose amendments to this Treaty." Putting a final nail in the coffin of this case, State and Defense hold that the negotiating record yields no evidence of anyone wanting to insert redundancies into the Treaty.

With this inherent violation of construction made evident, State and Defense move on to the next part of their task, to show how their interpretation could avoid such a pitfall. The first premise here is that the phrase "ABM systems and their components" in Article II (1) refers only to those *specific* functions listed, which are based on then current or known technology. Applying a bit of hermeneutics to the task, Judge Abraham Sofaer indicated during congressional testimony that a functional definition (i.e., a restrictive interpretation) necessitates a period after the word "trajectory" in Article II (1) and a deletion of the remainder of the sentence. That a comma appears (which he says is to be read as "and") and that the words "currently consisting of" follow (with the listing of three specific ABM components: interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars) can only mean that the Article's intent is solely to cover known technology. To bolster his case, Sofaer cites other Articles which either mention the three listed components or refer to them: "thereby indicating that the definition in Article II (1) was not merely illustrative, but was intended to describe the actual components covered by the Treaty."[4]

THE ONLY PLACE in the Treaty where sytems and components based on future technology are discussed, Sofaer maintains, is in Agreed Statement D. For the first and only time the parties felt the

[4]Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee on November 21, 1985. Sofaer's identical prepared statement



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need to qualify the term systems and components with the words "based on other physical principles." Why, ask State and Defense, would the parties suddenly feel the need to use this description if the implication throughout the treaty were that current *and* future technology were being discussed? Agreed Statement D, by this logic, can only be understood as prohibiting the deployment (i.e., not development and testing) of all kinds of ABM systems and their components "based on other physical principles" until after specific deployment limitations have been mutually reached and agreed upon. Coherency is thus restored to the Treaty by reading Articles II (1) and V (1) as pertaining only to ABM systems, or their components, based on then known technology.

The case made for this broader interpretation is simply too compelling to be dismissed as sheer sophistry. Perhaps putting a comma under a microscope appears too precious, but a solid and clear treaty should stand up to such scrutiny. Although believing that the broader view is more convincing, Sofaer is not, as he himself writes, "contending that it is definitive"; he knows that he need not go that far. There has yet to be a way to deny that, at the very least, there is ambiguity in the external record.

The only effective attack on this position that critics have mounted—one that shows that there is ambiguity within Sofaer's own position—has the paradoxical effect of actually supporting Sofaer's case. After all, the purpose of that case was essentially to establish ambiguity. For if we read the term "ABM systems or their components" the way Sofaer wants us to, then there is a disjunction within Agreed Statement D. The first part of it (i.e., up to "of the Treaty, . . .") deals only with the parties' agreement not to deploy any current ABM's save those allowed under Article III (1). Thus the deployment ban is referring only to current technology. The problem is with the remainder of the provision which is set in a completely different context since it refers to futuristics. And the only ceiling here is the vague one of a "specific limitation" once these new systems or components have been created. The result is that one could reasonably argue there is no advance ban even on deployment of futuristics. In fact, this interpretation is virtually identical to that of Defense's separate review which reads: ". . . the fact that the Treaty needs to be amended to include 'specific limitations' of these future systems means that the Treaty as it stands does not contain such limitations."

THE ADMINISTRATION finally agreed upon an official reinterpretation that would give something to everyone. Reagan announced that while in principle the U.S. policy was in agreement with the new and more broad legal interpretation, in practice the U.S. would carry forward the SDI program under greater restrictions—but solely as a matter of self-restraint. The Defense Department now had a commitment to testing and development in principle and, just as important, a stalemate on all future decisions. Stressing the temporary aspect of this more restrictive interpretation, Richard Perle, Defense's top man on arms control, noted that "with respect to the future it remains to be seen" what America will do about unrestrained testing and development. The message was clear: We'll be back knocking when the time is right. The State Department, meanwhile, could wave in front of our nervous allies the U.S. commitment to structuring the SDI program in accordance with the more restrictive interpretation. And to further reassure the allies, Secretary of State Shultz announced to them at a meeting of NATO legislators in October 1985 that, "any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultation with our Allies."

Once the administration accepted this combination position (i.e., that of maintaining a broader interpretation to be fully justified, while agreeing to conduct SDI programs in accordance with a restrictive interpretation), State and Defense mobilized themselves to face a new round of battle. This time their case would focus on one of the most frequently made charges against the ABM reinterpretation: that a

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before a subcommittee of the House is reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1985.



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13-year tradition—dating from the 1972 Treaty—had been destroyed in one blow. Taking the offensive on this, in November 1985, Judge Sofaer presented to Congress a 13-page "Analysis of U.S. Post-Negotiation Public Statements Interpreting the ABM Treaty's Application to Future Systems." By considering three time periods (between signature and ratification, during the ratification process, and post-ratification), Sofaer found that the earlier statements support the broad interpretation and the later ones tend to support a more restrictive one. Sofaer sided with the former, giving as his reason that, "Attaching greater weight to these earlier statements is justified by standard principles of interpretation. Those statements are more nearly contemporaneous with the drafting, signature and ratification of the Treaty than are later statements." Once again, as was the case for determining ambiguity within the Treaty proper, Sofaer was in the strong position of not needing to make an incontrovertible case for a broad interpretation. Given the rules of treaty construction, it was enough for him to establish that the critics of SDI were wrong in claiming that there has been "one, uniform or unvarying interpretation of the Treaty," and, "that the USG [United States Government] has suddenly changed a view of the Treaty consistently advanced since 1972."

Much of the evidence that Sofaer uses in the memorandum is of the "dog that didn't bark" type. Thus, the testimony of, say, Gerard Smith or then Secretary of State William P. Rogers is cited, to show that, while it mentions a ban on futuristics' deployment, there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of testing and development. A standard comment from Sofaer on such evidence reads: "It is unlikely that Ambassador Smith, the negotiatior of the Treaty, would have referred to only a ban on deployment if he had meant testing and development were banned as well." But Gerard Smith and John Rhinelander have said flatly that this is "nonsense" and "patently absurd." They argue that extracting statements from the negotiating record is an illegitimate and distorting tactic. As Smith writes, "it was not our intention [the U.S. delegation to SALT I] that any type of technology for space-based ABM systems could be developed or tested under the treaty." But for Judge Sofaer the intentions of the U.S. delegation team are not the issue. No one doubts that the U.S. negotiatiors valiantly tried to reach agreement on a ban on testing, development, and deployment of all futuristics. The question is: What were the Soviets willing to accept? Interestingly enough, Smith speaks directly to this point in his book on the SALT negotiations *(Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)* when he details how committed the U.S. team was to such a position, while the Soviets consistently resisted it:

> The Soviets argued that including unknown matters (like future ABM technology) in a treaty would create endless arguments and suspicions. (p. 343)
>
> . . . they [the Soviets] considered the proposed futuristics provision not suitable for inclusion in the treaty. (p. 344)
>
> We were proposing to limit systems not known to anyone. They said this was not a correct approach. (p. 265)
>
> The sides could not discuss questions not known to anyone [the Soviets maintained]. Our task was to limit deployment of known ABM components. (p. 343).

And then without any explanation or reason (save for "It was in the interests of both countries to outlaw future ABM systems before they were deployed."), Smith announces that all parties considered Agreed Statement D and Article III to mean that futuristics were banned. For an author who provides an exacting look at the circuitous and arcane channels of the negotiations, Smith is surprisingly silent on why, how, and when the Soviets completely abandoned their previous recalcitrant position and embraced America's. Although this is more of the "dog that didn't bark" analysis, the questions it raises are serious enough to cause one to look askance on Smith's interpretation of the Treaty negotiations.

THE VEXING PROBLEM is the lack of convincing public evidence. The only source that could resolve this issue of



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interpretation, the massive treaty negotiating record, is still classified. Judge Sofaer's method of combing through the public record, therefore, is the only practicable one. Only recently has Congress addressed itself to examining the relevant oral testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee during ratification, House and Senate committee reports, floor debates, and post-ratification statements. By extracting selected exchanges from hearings, Sofaer has shown convincingly that, in the oral testimony, administration witnesses made statements whose import was to confirm the fact that future systems are regulated exclusively by Agreed Statement D. The committee reports fail to provide any new substantial information; the Senate report only reprints Secretary Rogers's report on the Treaty; and the House Foreign Affairs Committee report is yet another instance of non-barking dogs. The floor debates consisted mostly of tendentious political speeches. And the post-ratification statements seem only to add to the confusion. On the one hand, one could cite the successive Arms Control Impact Statements for Fiscal 1979 to Fiscal 1986 as direct confirmation of the restrictive view; on the other hand, one could cite every edition of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's periodic compilation of arms control agreements since SALT I in support of the broad view.

Opponents of SDI have taken umbrage against not only the tactic of scanning the record for corroborating evidence, but also against the conclusions that Sofaer drew from these extracts. For example, Sofaer suffered harsh criticism during a recent hearing for allegedly misrepresenting the late Senator Henry Jackson's view during Senate hearings, by concluding that, "it could be read to have no bearing on Agreed Statement D's treatment of future systems." Senators contested his interpretation and countered with their own selective quotations from Jackson's comments. But as with the earlier attempt at establishing ambiguity in Sofaer's case on the Treaty proper, critics could now, at best, only deflate Sofaer's example to one of a "mixed interpretation" rather than one lending firm support to a broad interpretation. Yet, and here is the crux of the matter, Sofaer was not required to establish the broad interpretations as incontestable; rather, he needed only to show that, as he put it, "the record clearly refutes the proposition, advanced by opponents of SDI development and testing, that the [U.S. government] has suddenly changed a view of the Treaty *consistently* advanced since 1972" (emphasis added). And this he most certainly did.

Until the secret record is opened to congressional scrutiny, the Reagan administration's version clearly holds as the most convincing explanation. On the available evidence one must conclude that the Soviet negotiators never relinquished the position that Smith repeatedly attributes to them in his book (i.e., their unwillingness to ban future ABM systems). The American negotiating team finally agreed to remove from the main body of the Treaty (particularly from Article V) any specific limitations on futuristics and attach a much less ambitious version of it in the form of Agreed Statement D. Why officials like Smith and Rhinelander thoroughly resist this interpretation is a difficult question. Part of the answer probably has to do with their unwillingness to admit their inability to secure the Soviets' agreement on such a crucial item. They surely are not purposefully distorting the truth. Something else is at work. And this most likely goes also for the more scrupulous of the other critics who embrace the Smith-Rhinelander position. Thirteen years after the negotiations, it is hard to recall precise detail—especially when one need remember exact conversations. And when viewing the vestiges of one's memory through political lenses, such fragments can look quite different than they did at the time. In this case, the lenses are the ones that saw the the ABM Treaty as a bold attempt to maintain deterrence by ensuring that neither side believed it could benefit militarily by striking first because neither side could safeguard its homeland against retaliation.

But now along comes the Reagan administration whose SDI program explicitly rejects such a formulation. How could lifelong supporters of MAD not react furiously at such an attempt to overturn their gospel? If a refutation



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of MAD were not sufficiently infuriating, the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty most certainly is. Surely, they say, *our* ABM Treaty could never have allowed a program with the implications of SDI to proceed. Suddenly in the face of the Reagan offensive on this issue, the blurry vestiges of memory come into sharp, full-bodied focus.

And so the battle continues. No doubt it will maintain its acrimonious style for at least as long as one of the key documents—the secret Treaty negotiating record—remains classified. One point, however, should be emphasized regarding any ultimate decision on this issue. Even if the record is opened to congressional scrutiny, it is highly questionable whether that certain piece of "missing" evidence will be found which suddenly solves the puzzle. From all that we know so far, it appears unlikely that either side will be able to muster an open and shut case. Yet this prospect affords much more support to the Reagan administration than to its critics.



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# Arms and the Statesman

Sherman Garnett, Jr.

WE TURN to the interwar debate over arms limitation and disarmament not out of nostalgia for a simpler past, but rather to understand the original outlines of the debate over the wisdom and scope of negotiated arms reduction. And we turn, in particular, to Winston Churchill's critique of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference in order to understand how a great statesman, certainly the greatest statesman of this century, fashioned an answer to those who believed that arms limitation could bring about a peaceful Europe.

Churchill's speeches provide a critical examination, not only of the proposals engendered by the Conference, such as the plans to classify weapons as offensive or defensive, but also of the assumptions on which these proposals were based. Indeed, his speeches go further: They examine the critical link between arms reduction and international security, as well as the impact of public opinion on the conduct of negotiations.

Many supporters of the Conference argued that armaments were responsible for the insecurity in Europe. Arms limitation could, therefore, be abstracted from political concerns, such as the fundamental differences between regimes. Churchill argued, however, that such notions mistook the effect for the cause. In thinking about security, statesmen should take their bearings from "the political and economic causes which lie behind the maintenance of armies and navies," rather than from the quantity or quality of the armies and navies themselves.

The existence of nuclear weapons imparts a new sense of urgency to arms reduction; however, this sense of urgency should not be allowed to break our continuity with the past. Although the consequences of modern war have changed radically, the causes of war have not. Those who insist that we live in an entirely new age overlook a fact crucial for our continued survival: Despite our newfound power, we are still subject to the forces that have always shaped history.

IN HIS July 1934 speech to the House of Commons, Winston Churchill singled out the League of Nations-sponsored Disarmament Conference for especial scorn:

> I am also very glad that the Disarmament Conference is passing out of life into history. One of the greatest mistakes that can be made is to point to the failure of the Disarmament Conference as if it were really a failure of the League of Nations, and to mix up disarmament with peace.

Churchill later described this same conference as "a solemn and prolonged farce."

Yet no historian of the interwar period could fail to note the persistence of the very notion Churchill rejected: that disarmament meant peace. For many, it was neither the Kaiser nor German militarism that brought untold suffering into the life of Europe, but

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impersonal, structural deficiencies in the international system, chief among which was the unchecked accumulation of armaments. Lord Grey in his memoirs reflected on the difficulty of distinguishing between preparations for war and precautions against attack and concluded: "The moral is obvious: it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war."

Lessons such as these drawn from the Great War became policy prescriptions for the interwar decades. In the minds of many, disarmament, imposed on the vanquished Germany as a treaty obligation, became a moral obligation for the victors. Popular support for disarmament was strong, particularly in England, and much of that popular support attached itself to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The Conference received private petitions with over 5 million signatures, more than 2 million from the United Kingdom alone. The public looked with suspicion on proposals for defense spending of any sort. New armaments would only derail efforts to achieve a settlement, and a settlement was necessary to avert another war. A small but influential elite rejected any call for new British armaments, but looked favorably on German requests, believing somehow that a rearmed Germany would give other nations an incentive to disarm.

His Majesty's Government responded to this public mood. On March 14, 1933, Sir Phillip Sassoon, undersecretary of state for air, described the reduction requested in the air estimates as one of the "risks" that had to be run for the sake of disarmament. Sassoon called the reductions "proof of the whole hearted desire of His Majesty's Government to promote a successful issue of the deliberations at the Disarmament Conference." Even after Germany's withdrawal from the Conference in October 1933, the cabinet decided to accept a lower air estimate than previously determined because "the fate of the Disarmament Conference [was] still undecided." The pacifist election victory at East Fulham, the League of Nations Union peace ballot, the debate at the Oxford Union—all were signs of these times. Stanley Baldwin summed up British policy as having been one of "unilateral disarmament" since 1929.

Yet Baldwin defended his government's defense policy (with what Churchill described as "appalling frankness") in a speech of November 1936:

> Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming, and that we must rearm, does anyone think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain.

It appears that those who did not respect the passion for disarmament out of any intellectual or moral conviction were taught to do so by political instinct.

The League of Nations Disarmament Conference opened in January 1932 and continued to meet until 1937 (although it in fact ceased to function when Germany withdrew in October 1933). The Conference established working groups to discuss quantitative, qualitative, and even moral disarmament. The British government played an active role in these proceedings and presented a comprehensive program for disarmament in March 1933. Sir Anthony Eden, who for a time directed British diplomatic efforts in Geneva, wrote, "At the end of 1932 I still had hope that good might come from the Geneva discussions."

Churchill's speeches from this period, by contrast, were unrelentingly pessimistic in their assessment of the possibilities of this or any disarmament conference. The causes of war arise out of more than what we would today call the arms race. Churchill considered the accumulation of armaments a symptom of international tension and urged his listeners to look to "the political and economic causes which lie behind the maintenance of armies and navies."

Churchill's words are harsh. He described the endless series of conferences and meetings on disarmament matters as "a positive cause of friction and ill-will." And he predicted "that these Disarmament Conferences would not succeed in removing the danger of war" or the "burden of armaments." Europe should have recognized the time for what it was: "a breathing space" in which to construct a lasting *polit-*



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*ical* solution to the problems of European security. The Disarmament Conference distracted nations from work on this solution. "We shall never do that merely by haggling about cannons, tanks, aeroplanes and submarines. . . . The removal of the just grievances of the vanquished ought to precede the disarmament of the victors."

IN CHURCHILL's view, the work of the Disarmament Conference was based upon faulty premises, and his speeches offered a detailed critique of the way of thinking about international security fostered by these premises. The Disarmament Conference, in answering the public's call for the need to halt "the accumulation of armaments," had become a public spectacle. The very public nature of these conferences encouraged a form of public stimulus and governmental response that ultimately proved incompatible with serious disarmament measures. As an example of "open diplomacy," the Conference generated a particularly debased form of public discourse and behavior on the part of the participants that concealed the truth about diplomatic intercourse as effectively as old-fashioned secrecy.

While the aim of the Conference was readily understood by all, the technical and political realities that continued to divide the interlocutors were not. The public unwittingly supplied through its fervent but uninformed advocacy of disarmament a stimulus for humbug. Churchill sympathized with "the well-meaning, loyal-hearted people who make up the League of Nations Union in this Country," but he was most impressed by:

> . . . their long suffering and inexhaustible gullibility. Any scheme of any kind for disarmament put forward by any country, so long as it is surrounded by suitable phraseology, is hailed by them, and the speeches are cheered, and those who speak gain the mead of their applause."

The strength of this public mood encouraged nations to sponsor disarmament proposals that placed them in "a satisfactory light and cost them so little in convenience." The French learned the reverse of this art: They knew how to turn down disarmament plans without offending members of pacifist organizations.

Churchill, however, reserved his bitterest comments not for the people who mistakenly saw in each new disarmament scheme a cause for rejoicing, but for the leaders who indulged this popular mood rather than attempting to elevate or educate it. Recalling the government's "responsibility to the Crown and Parliament for the safety and security of the country," he urged Baldwin to begin rearmament without waiting for public opinion to support it. He reminded the government of their overwhelming majority. Whatever they asked would be given them. Their reluctance to do so betrayed "so poor a view of the patriotic support which this nation gives to those who it feels are doing their duty by it."

In *The Gathering Storm*, Churchill described a contrasting view. He told his constituents at Epping: "I take it from your vote . . . that you desire me to exercise my independent judgment." The Baldwin government acted merely as the reflection of popular sentiment; and while this is one of the duties of leadership in a democracy, it is not the only one:

> It would be wrong in judging the policy of the British Government not to remember the passionate desire for peace which animated the uninformed, misinformed majority of the British people, and seemed to threaten with political extinction any party or politician who dared to take any other line. This, of course, is no excuse for political leaders who fall short of their duty.

Churchill's speeches attacked both the arguments given in favor of the regulation of armaments by treaty and the schemes for such regulation. Proponents argued that the Disarmament Conference was a public conference, as opposed to the secret diplomacy conducted to so much ill effect before the Great War, and they promised a reduction in military budgets as a result of disarmament agreements. The Conference itself hoped to realize its purpose by classifying weapons as "offensive" and "defensive" and, in some cases, by granting Germany



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"equality of status," a term that in practice meant an equality of armaments in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles.

Churchill preferred controlling the military competition through ad-hoc, private agreements rather than attempting to do so once and for all through the public spectacle of a disarmament conference. Even though secret diplomacy was widely considered one of the prime causes of the Great War, and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points spoke of the need for "open covenants, openly arrived at," Churchill argued that behind-the-scenes discussions allowed states to moderate the armaments competition without loss of face or the temptation to press a more ambitious, but unacceptable, agenda in public. Such an arrangement aimed at much less than a comprehensive settlement of the problems of an armaments race; however, it also was in keeping with Churchill's pessimistic assessment of the likelihood of attaining such a comprehensive settlement.

In *The World Crisis*, Churchill described how, as First Lord of the Admiralty, he attempted just such a private arrangement with Germany regarding the naval competition. In response to the promulgation by Germany of its Naval Law for 1912, he suggested that Germany's avowed plan of increasing its naval construction might be moderated or turned back altogether by "friendly, sincere and intimate conversation to avert this perilous development." The government's words, however, would not be enough: They must be prepared to remain with their old policy of building two capital ships to Germany's one, even with the increased rate of shipbuilding Germany hoped to maintain. The government could then offer privately to slow its rate of construction if Germany did the same. Churchill saw the combination of superiority and benevolence as the key to restraining a dangerous adversary, and he advocated this combination again in discussing German discontent with the Versailles Treaty:

> The responsibility . . . of enforcing a continual state of military disarmament upon a beaten foe rests upon the victors. For this purpose they must pursue a twofold policy. First, while remaining sufficiently armed themselves, they must enforce with tireless vigiliance and authority the clauses of the treaty which forbid the revival of their late antagonist's military power. Secondly, they should do all that is possible to reconcile the defeated nation to its lot by acts of benevolence. . . ."

Churchill also raised doubts about one of the most common claims of those who advocate disarmament agreements: that they will reduce defense expenditures. Turning to the example of treaties on naval disarmament, he pointed out: ". . . there has been no diminution of naval expense through any of the agreements which have been made since, possibly, the First Treaty of Washington." These same treaties—the Treaty of Washington and its successor, the Treaty of London—robbed Britain of its qualitative superiority in precisely that branch of the military essential to its security. Through these treaties Great Britain "parted with [its] freedom of design." The peace and security of the world would have been better served had England and the United States maintained their naval superiority instead of limiting their navies through treaty. What the treaties succeeded in doing, in Churchill's view, was to constrain the leading—and most peaceful—naval powers while permitting nations like Japan to build to the limit of their capacity, a mistake Britain repeated in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.

Of these two earlier treaties, Churchill wrote: "I still hold that it would have been far better for us to have said to the United States, 'Build whatever you will; your Navy is absolutely ruled out of our calculations except as a potential friend.' " The armaments race, far from being an abstract and senseless competition between all nations, is in fact a reflection of the tension dividing friends and enemies. Between nations of common interests and principles, like the United States and Great Britain, there could be no arms race in any meaningful sense of the term. An arms race requires adversaries. Yet an arms race that owes its origins to political differences among enemies is no longer the soulless mechanism that many



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believed had plunged Europe unthinkingly into World War I.

THREE COMMISSIONS of the Disarmament Conference spent many weeks "in the vain endeavor to classify armaments as 'offensive' and 'defensive.' " Churchill found such a classification impossible:

> [A]lmost every conceivable weapon may be used either in defense or offense; it all depends upon the circumstances; and every weapon, whether offensive or defensive, may be used either by an aggressor or by the innocent victim of his assault.

Churchill pointed out that weapons many nations at the Disarmament Conference sought to classify as offensive or aggressive—such as heavy guns or tanks—were not employed by the Germans in their attack upon France in 1914. And the tank later played an important role in defeating Germany and liberating French soil. A much truer line for the Conference would have been to ban weapons "which tend to be indiscriminate in their action and whose use entails death and wounds, not merely to the combatants in the fighting zones, but to the civilian population. . . ."

As predicted, the Conference could not agree upon which weapons were "aggressive" and which "defensive." Each state based its definitions of "defensive" weapons on its own particular arsenal and interests, and of "aggressive" weapons on the arsenal of its enemy. Britain's moral outrage against the submarine was counterbalanced by the outrage against large battleships expressed by those nations for which the submarine provided a cheap and reliable defense against large surface fleets.

Churchill, in surveying the weapons of his time—including poison gas—found that none possessed such an "aggressive" character to justify abstracting judgments about their use from the circumstances of their employment and the intention of those who used them. He nonetheless stressed the need to make judgments about the effects of weapons, regardless of intentions, upon non-combatants, and thus to strengthen existing international conventions limiting the way nations conduct war.

The German delegation to the Disarmament Conference pressed for recognition of its "equality of status" as a major power, regardless of its obligations under Versailles. Churchill saw this as a German attempt to evade clear treaty obligations and thereby to obtain a de facto revision of the Treaty of Versailles. In addition, many believed that "equality of status" in practice required giving Germany "equality of armaments" with France. Churchill found it "surprising . . . that anyone in his senses should have imagined that peace could be built on such foundations." His surprise notwithstanding, many of his countrymen offered a counterinterpretation of the causes of the Great War that portrayed Germany as a victim and her claim to "equality of armaments" as a just one.

The German government, both before and after January 1933, argued that Allied powers had the legal obligation to disarm under the Treaty of Versailles. If the Allies did not comply with this obligation, Germany claimed the moral and, more importantly, the legal right to rearm on the basis of its "equal status" with its neighbors. The German representative to the Disarmament Conference said on July 22, 1932, that Germany would continue to work in the Conference "only if subsequent work on the convention is based upon a clear and definite recognition of equality of rights between nations. Germany pointed out that equality of status could be obtained quite easily if other nations would disarm to its level. Such a policy of favoring radical disarmament as a means to equality of status also allowed any subsequent German rearmament to seem like a just and measured response to the intransigence of others.

The French rejected this interpretation of the treaty many times, most notably in a memorandum of July 21, 1931. The French disarmament plans provided substitutes for the forces it would be surrendering through disarmament, either by creation of international military forces, obligatory security commitments from other member states, or effective verification and compliance mechanisms. Other



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plans, including the British plan, would have reduced the French Army to 200,000 and permitted the German Army to be built up to this same level.

Churchill rejected the notion of equality of status, especially when understood as granting "equality of armaments," as a dangerous abstraction: "To bring about anything like equality of armaments . . . would be to appoint the day for another European war." And he warned the House of Commons: "There is no greater danger than equal forces."

Versailles was not a "Carthaginian peace." The Germans imposed much harsher terms on those they conquered, most notably in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. What was necessary, according to Churchill, was a greater respect for treaties, not a conspiracy to allow Germany to rearm in defiance of its legal obligations. If the Versailles Treaty was flawed, then nations should proceed to change it through negotiation among the parties, not by looking the other way at German violations of the disarmament provisions. "The more you wish to remove anomalies and grievances, the more you should emphasize respect for treaties."

THE PROBLEM with abstractions such as the classification of weapons as "offensive" and "defensive" or granting to Germany "equality of status" was that these notions distracted from the genuine problems that threatened European security. The search for peace through disarmament was plagued, not by the superiority of the French, but by the intentions of the Germans; not by the insistence on compliance with an "outmoded treaty," but by the one-sided pattern of violations of that treaty; and, ultimately, not by the numbers as they currently stood, but by the intentions of those who would alter those numbers and create a second world war.

Churchill urged his listeners to "study the position of Europe today," for such a study would reveal the folly, not only of abstractions like "equality of armaments" or the "legal right of Germany to rearm," but of the very notion that the tensions between France and Germany could be settled by the regulation of armaments. German and French equality of armaments would lead to war and thereby highlight the fundamental differences between these two regimes that determined their armaments policy in the first place.

For Churchill, it was inconceivable to equate France with Germany, and any way of analyzing European politics that did so was seriously flawed. The numbers did not tell the whole story. France had special alliance responsibilities in Europe. The new nations created by the Great War, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and others, looked "to France and the French Army, as giving them a kind of central support."

The distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" applied to states and regimes, not to weapons. Although France was the keystone of an alliance system of smaller states throughout Central Europe, there was no truth to the "exaggerated talk of what is called French ascendancy." The French system gave stability to Europe, primarily because, "[a]s Lord Grey has recently reminded us, France, though armed to the teeth, is pacifist to the core."

The Disarmament Conference's treatment of France and Germany as great powers of equal status ignored the political distinction that had to be made between the two regimes, regardless of the military balance. Those who sought to tinker with the military balance alone as a means of achieving peace ignored the potent force of political and national antagonisms, as well as the tenacity of evil; they forgot that security is a political, and not simply a mathematical, problem. Those who sought a redefinition of European security on the basis of any solution proposed by the Disarmament Conference neglected the most basic fact: that European security is not threatened by a large French army. "I would rather see another ten or twenty years of one-sided armed peace than see a war between equally well-matched powers."

Germany, however, sought much more than justice in demanding equality of armaments:

> Do not delude yourselves . . . that all that Germany is asking for is equal status. . . . That



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is not what Germany is seeking. All these bands of sturdy Teutonic youths, marching through the streets and roads of Germany, with the light of desire in their eyes to suffer for their Fatherland, are not looking for status. They are looking for weapons.

Germany's population of military-age youth was nearly double that of France. It had a genius for science and invention, as well as for making war. Most crucial, for Churchill, was that France was democratic, whereas in Germany "the Parliamentary system and the safeguards of the Parliamentary system . . . are in abeyance." He reminded his listeners that this parliamentary system was regarded by the architects of the Versailles Treaty as one of the important safeguards against the re-emergence of German militarism. By the early 1930s, the military had concentrated state power in their hands, and the shadow of Hitler loomed large on the German political scene. Churchill wrote:

> Germany is ruled by a handful of autocrats who are the absolute masters of that gifted nation. They are men who have neither the long interests of a dynasty to consider, nor those important restraints which a democratic Parliament and constitutional system impose upon any executive Government. Nor have they the restraint of public opinion, which public opinion, indeed, they control by every means which modern apparatus renders possible.

Hitler's persecution of the Jews, the rise of militarism in public institutions and the "martial or pugnacious manifestations" common in German cities were important domestic indicators of Germany's foreign policy. A regime's reliance on force and illegality against its own citizens should serve as a warning for those who would constrain this same regime through international law and agreements. Churchill gave eloquent warning of German intentions:

> When I read what is going on in Germany . . . I cannot help rejoicing that the Germans have not got the heavy cannon, the thousands of military aeroplanes and the tanks of various sizes for which they have been pressing in order that their status may be equal to that of other countries.

England, as a Great Power, faced a choice. For Churchill that choice was between the traditional policy of benevolent neutrality and the assumption of greater responsibility for continental affairs through advocacy of general disarmament. Great Britain had traditionally remained aloof from permanent alliances, allowing it to bring its weight to bear against any power seeking to dominate the European continent. Churchill recalled that critics of the Locarno pacts voiced the worry that by signing these pacts England would lose her ancient freedom of alignment and thereby her ability to avoid entanglement in a continental war. He argued that the policy of disarmament brought the country greater commitments than Locarno.

In Churchill's view, Great Britain could not advocate the policy of disarmament without a commitment of aid to its disarmed friends, and the French proposals submitted to the Disarmament Conference vindicated his insight. He wrote: "The first road of pressing for disarmament . . . only leads us deeper and deeper into the European situation. In asking France to disarm, after our example, they will surely ask us to help in defense once arms are reduced." Great Britain would accrue greater power and run less risk by pressing for a redress of grievances than by pursuing the policy of disarmament. The nation should "be strong enough to defend [its] neutrality . . . to make sure that we are still judges of our own fortunes, our own destinies, our own action."

Churchill's speeches revealed the political difficulties that stood in the way of the work of the Disarmament Conference, difficulties that would continue to be reflected in technical documents on the limitations of cannons, airplanes, or battleships. In arguing that disarmament should not be confused with peace, Churchill strongly advocated that peace would bring about disarmament. "A long peace . . . as was the case after the conclusion of the great Napoleonic wars" would best contribute to the "gradual, progressive neglect of armaments." The accumulation of armaments, rather than being the cause of international friction, was in his view a response to deeper political and



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economic tensions, the assuagement of which is the first duty of national policy.

CHURCHILL plainly regarded the work of the Disarmament Conference as unworthy of the statesman's sustained attention; in contrast, a respectable number of our fellow citizens argue that this work in its contemporary form should be the statesman's first and foremost preoccupation. They suggest that our political situation is quite different from Churchill's, primarily because nuclear weapons by their very nature change the calculation of the value and even of the necessity of disarmament agreements.

Whatever might ultimately be said of Churchill's views, they anticipate to an extraordinary degree the objection that they ignore the destructive power of modern war. Indeed, in a remarkable series of essays written in the 1920s, Churchill explored the impact of modern technology on war and discussed the possibility of explosives of a destructive force so powerful that wars of the future might threaten the very existence of civilization. His critique of the Disarmament Conference should be read against the backdrop of these essays.

Churchill argued that the Disarmament Conference wrongly took its bearings from the instrumentalities of war and ignored its fundamental causes. War arises, not out of mechanistic or impersonal processes, but out of the actions of governments and men. These actions are shaped by national and religious antagonisms, traditional rivalries for territory or trade, ideological differences, the love of glory and the tyrant's lust for conquest. These sources of conflict remain, despite changes in the character and consequences of modern war.

By concentrating, not on the problem of war, but on the problem of armaments, the Disarmament Conference engendered complex technical proposals for the maintenance of security. These proposals, which sought to create an equal or nearly equal distribution of military power, had the effect of suggesting that parties bear an equal responsibility for any threat to international stability, or that parties are equally victims of an impersonal "arms race." This approach freed men from making the necessary moral judgments about political things. Perhaps this is one of the explanations for its enduring popularity.

Moral judgments in international relations are frustrated by any distribution of power not in accordance with those judgments. Yet such a distribution is a fact of diplomatic life. The aggressor, unlike the domestic criminal, faces no established constabulary or courts; while countries wishing only to live in peace and justice find these wishes insufficient without the force to deter the contrary ambitions of their neighbors. As Churchill wrote of the post-war world: "Except insofar as force is concerned, there is no equality between right and wrong." The equality of force is a reality that may limit freedom of action, but should not invalidate the moral judgment that recommends action.

One does not need to advocate a simple-minded identity between Nazism and Communism, or between Hitler's Germany and Soviet Russia, to recognize that both are inimical to the democratic way of life, and that both have complicated the search in our century for peace and stability. These are fundamental facts that shape our time. Like Churchill's generation, we have squandered the years when the combination of superior force and benevolence was ours to wield.

Churchill's speeches cannot be used as if they were delivered as a denunciation of current arms control measures; one can, however, look to these speeches as providing a way of thinking about the role of the regulation of armaments in the overall context of the search for international security.



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# The Bulgarian Nexus

Juliana Geran Pilon

POPE JOHN PAUL II was shot by Turkish nationalist Mehmet Ali Agca while welcoming pilgrims in St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981. Oral Celik, who was supposed to help Agca escape, was reportedly spirited out of Italy in a sealed truck. The truck, which belonged to the Bulgarian Embassy, was officially exempted from customs inspection under the UN Customs Convention of 1976. Two Bulgarians employed by the embassy, as well as a Bulgarian airline official, were charged with complicity in the assassination attempt. Though the trial, held in the spring of last year, failed to prove the culpability of the Bulgarians, it did provide valuable information about Bulgaria's role in "narco-terrorism"—information the Bulgarians have been at great pains to deny.[1]

One year after the shooting of the pope, a Syrian, Sallah Wakkas, was arrested while en route from Sofia to Beirut. He had brokered an estimated $4 million worth of morphine base, and purchased $52 million worth of Soviet anti-aircraft guns and ammunition from KINTEX, the official import-export agency of the Bulgarian government. Upon the conclusion of his investigation into the Bulgarian connection, Nathan Adams testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 24, 1984:

> What emerged was a sharply focused image of a plan conceived in Moscow by KGB planners and carried out by Bulgaria to utilize the rapidly growing barter trade of military weapons and narcotics as a vehicle to destabilize critical Middle Eastern nations as well as Western nations—notably the U.S.

Chosen to carry out the plan was KINTEX, which was given virtual command of other state agencies including SOMAT, Bulgaria's international trucking firm. Weapons and narcotics brokers, said Adams, then started flocking to Sofia where they were provided free housing, false papers, and guaranteed transshipment of narcotics.

For the past 14 years, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has received statements from many sources detailing Bulgaria's involvement in drug trafficking.[2] In 1969, West German authorities seized 200 kilograms of morphine base at Frankfurt; it had been produced in Sofia. Since then, traffickers linked to

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[1]Soviet-inspired disinformation seeks to link Agca's activities exclusively to non-communist "right-wing" groups, even to the CIA. Notable among these efforts: former CIA agent Philip Agee's *Covert Action Information Bulletin* (Spring 1985); the books *Weapons Smuggling and Terror* and *Papa, Agca, Mafya* by Ugur Mumcu (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1981 and 1984, respectively); and even forgeries of U.S. State Department cables.

[2]Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration Special Report, "The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking," Unclassified, May 1984.



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KINTEX have included Turkish nationals Abuzer Ugurlu and Bekir Celenk (papal assassination co-conspirators), Mustafa Kisacik, Syrian nationals Henri Arsan and Sallah Wakkas, and the Armenian Noubar Soufoyon, a narcotics supplier and terrorist bankroller now believed to be hiding in Lebanon. Of these, Abuzer Ugurlu is a key figure— the overlord of drug- and arms-smuggling operations extending from the Middle East and South Asia to Western Europe and the U.S. through Bulgaria.[3] After his arrest in 1981, information concerning his associates' activities in Turkey revealed the existence of a multibillion-dollar operation with all the strands merging in Bulgaria.

One of the original motives for narcotics trafficking was subversion. According to defector Stefan Sverdlev, formerly a colonel in the Bulgarian Committee for State Security (KDS), the heads of the Warsaw Pact security services met in Moscow in 1967 and set the operation in motion. A result of this was KDS Directive M-120/00-0050, dated July 16, 1970, which detailed the plan to exploit and hasten the inherent "corruption" of Western society. Another defector, General Jan Sejna, a former high-ranking Czech official, stated on June 21, 1985, that the Soviet decision to increase involvement in the international narcotics trade dates back to 1963. The USSR decided then to give Bulgaria a leading role in the operation because of its proximity to Turkey. Sejna reports that the Soviets emphasized the potential for demoralizing people—troops in particular—through the use of drugs. John Lawn, acting deputy administrator of the DEA, estimates that some 25 percent of the heroin entering the U.S. in the late 1970s transited Bulgaria, most often with official assistance.

Of course, Bulgaria has a number of other motives for drug trafficking. It brings in needed hard currency. It enables Bulgaria to supply and support groups in the Middle East and Central America with arms and ammunition; such groups occasionally pay for arms with narcotics, which are then resold in the West. For instance, Armenian terrorist groups were estimated in 1983 to be 90 percent financed through the sale or barter of narcotics. Likewise, it is believed that over 60 percent of all weapons reaching leftist Kurdish dissidents are acquired through the sale or trade of heroin and morphine base, usually supplied by KINTEX. Finally, drugs are useful in suborning key traffickers and weapons brokers for double duty as intelligence operatives, acting on behalf of the Bulgarian security police via KINTEX.

IN HER respected, if controversial, 1981 study *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism*, Claire Sterling reports that Bulgaria is a staging point for Soviet-made weapons distributed to various international terrorist groups, as is demonstrated by regular arms shipments to the Turkish underground from Varna, Bulgaria. She relates that when leaders of the Turkish People's Liberation Army fled for France, they stopped in Bulgaria to receive a consignment of arms and explosives for future use in Paris. On a tip from the Israeli secret service they were caught as they were driving westward, and their confession led French police to their key safehouse in Villiers-sur-Marne.

Another case of weapons smuggling involving Bulgaria occurred in June 1977, when the Cypriot-flag vessel Vassoula left the Bulgarian port of Burgas, allegedly bound for Cyprus with a KINTEX shipment billed as "spare parts." When Turkish officials learned that the vessel was actually going to transship its cargo in Turkish waters to small coastal vessels, they stopped it. They discovered 55 crates containing 495 portable rocket launchers, 21 crates with 55 rockets, 1,667 crates of ammunition, and 60 gas bombs.

Other investigations of Bulgarian involvement in international weapons traffic are still underway. Italy, for example, has been investigating an arms and smuggling ring centered in Trento and large enough to implicate at least a dozen Bulgarian agents. The operations of this

[3]See Paul Henze, "Organized Crime and Drug Linkages," in *Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism*, Uri Ra'anan et al., eds. (Lexington Books: Lexington, Mass./ Toronto, 1986).



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group extended into Iran, the Arab world and Africa, as well as the Balkans and Turkey. During the past two decades, Bulgarian merchant vessels and aircraft have been caught smuggling arms to Lebanon, Yemen, Chile, Tanzania, South Africa, and El Salvador.

One of the most notorious instances of Bulgarian terrorism occurred on August 26, 1978, when Vladimir Kostov, the Bulgarian TV personality and writer who had defected the previous year, was attacked in Paris with an umbrella containing a precision-made metal pellet filled with ricin, a rare and exceptionally deadly poison. While Kostov survived, Georgi Markov, a fellow Bulgarian similarly attacked in London on September 7, 1978, did not. Markov had been one of Bulgaria's top novelists and playwrights before he defected in 1969 and became an active and outspoken member of the émigré community in the West.

More recently, at the March 1982 trial of 17 persons charged with the kidnapping of U.S. Brigadier General James Dozier in Italy, the gang's leader, Antonio Savasta, claimed that Bulgaria had been interested in the kidnapping. Its motives: to destabilize Italy and obtain information about NATO. According to Savasta, Bulgaria had been ready to help the Red Brigades with arms, money, and training. Moreover, according to the report of Judge Rosario Priore, Investigative Judge at Rome Tribunale in Italy, Bulgaria had a marked influence on the type of questions put to General Dozier after his abduction.

In fact, the Dozier case reopened the discussion of Soviet bloc connections to Italian terrorism in the form of "the Bulgarian connection." As Michael Ledeen, former special assistant to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, has noted, it was discovered that the Red Brigades had discussions with the Bulgarian intelligence service during the Dozier affair, and that the Bulgarians had recruited at least one high-level agent in the Italian trade union movement. Ledeen explains that the attempt to kill the pope has been seen by Italian intelligence as part of the broader Bulgarian connection, against the background of decades of documented Soviet activity with paramilitary groups in Italy.

In that broader context, the testimony of General Ion Mihai Pacepa, former deputy director of the Romanian intelligence service, is of interest: He claims that Italian Red Brigades terrorists were being trained in Bulgaria at the time of his defection in 1978. Indeed, Pacepa was personally involved in an Eastern European narco-terrorism chain that involved Bulgaria as well as Romania.

EVIDENCE of Bulgaria's involvement in terrorism and drug and weapons trafficking has been piling up for over a decade. The response of the United States has been to try to work with the government of Bulgaria, through the DEA and the Customs Department, to curb the illicit traffic of drugs and weapons. Bulgaria's continued refusal to cooperate has recently prompted Congress to become involved: in February 1985 Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY) introduced the "Bulgarian Interrelation Review Act," (S. 515) directing the president to review all aspects of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria, and Concurrent Resolution 21, which condemns Bulgaria's abuses of the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods.

Senate Bill 515 directs the National Security Council to assess the merits of the following options: 1) suspending U.S. diplomatic relations with Bulgaria; 2) ceasing bilateral agreements with Bulgaria, including the maritime transport agreement; 3) imposing stricter controls on U.S. exports to Bulgaria; 4) encouraging other countries to review their policies with respect to Bulgaria; 5) requesting that the National Security Council place on its agenda the question of Bulgaria's involvement in arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and terrorism; 6) requesting the UN secretary general to convene a conference to determine what steps could be taken to end Bulgaria's abuses of the Customs Convention.

Within three months of the bill's enactment, the president would be required to report to the Congress the results of the review and what actions the U.S. would be taking.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 declares that it is the sense of the Congress that the U.S. should request the secretary general of the UN



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to convene a review conference concerning the Customs Convention. It also urges the president to encourage other contracting parties to that Convention to concur in this request.

The Department of Justice, through the Drug Enforcement Agency, has been active for the past decade in documenting and protesting Bulgarian drug trafficking, as well as terrorism and weapons smuggling orchestrated by the Bulgarian government. The DEA office in Vienna is responsible for collecting information about narcotics-related activities in Bulgaria. It has performed well. By contrast, and despite its director's interest in terrorism, the CIA seems relatively ill-equipped to investigate the Bulgarian activity, due in part to the deliberate reduction of its clandestine assets in Europe and the Middle East in recent times.

The Customs Service of the Treasury Department, as well, is involved in narcotics and weapons smuggling enforcement, and the detecting and prevention of terrorist acts. Since 1983, with increasing evidence of Bulgaria's smuggling and terrorist operations, the Customs Service has repeatedly protested Bulgaria's participation in conferences dealing with narcotics interdiction.

The State Department has been typically cautious, if not timid. Assistant Secretary of State Richard B. Burt told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 24, 1984, that he opposed legislation directed against Bulgaria because it "would be viewed as undercutting [the Italian officials'] investigation" of the attempt to kill the pope. Even worse than the State Department is the Commerce Department. The April 16, 1984, issue of the Department's publication *Business America* encourages "normalized trade relations with Bulgaria," which would allow the extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment and eligibility for credit and credit guarantees. The article promotes Bulgarian commercial operations and encourages Americans to do business with Sofia. The Commerce and State Departments also lobbied successfully to kill in conference a measure sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms and designed to block funds that the Commerce Department would use at a September 1984 trade fair in Bulgaria.

THE U.S. response to evidence of Bulgarian involvement in terrorist acts, drug smuggling, and weapons trafficking has been uneven. A more concerted effort is needed. To this end, the president should:

1) Instruct the Justice Department to conduct closed-door hearings. Underground figures who now cooperate with Bulgaria are reportedly willing to disclose information, if absolute confidentiality is assured, concerning the methods, dimensions, and goals of smuggling operations.

2) Work more efficiently with other Western nations in intelligence gathering and enforcement of current legal prohibitions against drug and weapons smuggling.

3) Reorganize the U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts dealing with Bulgaria's role, in consultation with the President's Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee.

4) Obtain additional funds for the Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, and the Customs Department to continue investigations of Bulgarian activities.

5) Adopt punitive measures against Bulgaria, including cancellation of bilateral agreements, imposition of strict trade measures, and indictment of Bulgarian officials who have been identified as key figures in smuggling operations.

6) Request an analysis of the cooperation between Bulgaria and the Soviet KBG as well as other members of the Soviet bloc. There is every reason to believe that Bulgaria's activities ultimately are orchestrated by Moscow.

7) Above all, there must be an integrated policy dealing with Soviet-backed low-intensity warfare, which is financed by narcotics smuggling.



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# George Washington, Isolationist?

Caspar W. Weinberger

WE CAN better understand the current pressures against the defense budget, and what I see as a possible retrenchment from our worldwide commitments, if we reflect for a moment on the political traditions and principles that shape our great republic.

After nearly 40 years of service to his country, George Washington offered his fellow citizens what he called the "counsels of an old and affectionate friend." Few, we must admit, could better lay claim to the title of "affectionate friend" than this giant of a man. And yet he feared that the words of his Farewell Address, which counselled unity to a nation he believed torn by faction, would be largely ignored. How wrong he was. Ironically, however, we hardly remember that address for its call for unity, its attack on party factions, or its caution against our striking out on ideological campaigns. Rather, we have taken out of context Washington's valedictory, and interpreted in crude fashion his warning to avoid entangling alliances. (I cannot help but be comforted by the fact that Washington also wrote speeches he thought would be disregarded, but instead were simply widely misinterpreted.)

Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, delivered this speech to the Hoover Institution Board of Overseers in Washington, D.C. on January 21, 1986.

Washington's Farewell Address has become a true political testament in America, for it so gracefully set forth the ideas and principles that our first president believed should guide the young republic. Unfortunately, that testament is generally regarded as urging an American isolationism, as advising the United States to remain forever politically separated from the "evils of foreign intrigues" that had cast so many nations into fruitless war. What has issued from this interpretation of that testament is the idea—sometimes it is only a feeling—that our worldwide commitments and alliances are somehow un-American, and that it would be far better if we could simply close ourselves off from that corrupt world beyond our shores.

Two important corrections need to be set against this popular interpretation of Washington's address. First, Washington did not believe that the republic should cut itself off from external commercial relations; he only advised that those relations remain impartial. Second, it seems clear that Washington's testament was prudent instruction to a very weak and fragile nation, blessed by geography to be physically distant from European conflicts. "Why," Washington asked, "forgo the advantages of so peculiar a situation?"

Washington had been struggling, in his last years as president, to keep the United States out of a particular alliance, one with revolutionary



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France—an association that could not have served American interests and might well have drawn us into war. Only the blind fury of ideology could have defeated his sound dictates and thrust our new nation into foolish conflict. Also do not forget that it was the evils of "foreign intrigues" that Washington was worried about. Washington's was the counsel of prudence, pure and simple.

It seems to me that it is the prudential character of Washington's testament that we tend to forget. Circumstances do not remain the same, alliances are sometimes required, and great exertions often demanded. Our founders would not be surprised to learn that their creation had become a great and influential world power. What would surprise them is our unwillingness, from time to time, to maintain our own strength and influence. It is commonplace to note that American foreign policy has tended to swing—pendulum-like—from involvement in the world to what appears to be a comfortable isolation. During those periods of withdrawal, we often hear a call to return to the teachings of Washington, to abandon our foolish attempt to influence world politics, and to "get our own house in order."

Immediately after World War II, we seemed to think that our own demobilization, combined with our homage to world law embodied in the United Nations, would forever prevent the re-emergence of fascism and totalitarianism. We simply did not understand that the slogan "bring the boys home" might not serve the interests of world peace or justice.

I suggest that excessive misgivings about foreign entanglements—this desire to withdraw militarily and politically—misses the central point Washington was trying to make. For Washington, neutrality was a policy that national unity and strength would give us the option of choosing, should we so desire. It was neither an unvarying policy, nor always the best choice—but clearly, neutrality would be more difficult if America were weak. We seem to forget that a desirable political goal often depends upon our willingness to create the military power to back it up.

If we remain united, Washington argued, "the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance...when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected." In the latter part of the 18th century, neutrality and political distance from the world's troubles were the only *prudent* courses for America to follow. And certainly neutrality is not inconsistent with our political principles. But, as the 20th century draws to a close, prudence clearly dictates another course. That it does, neither violates, nor puts us in opposition to, the framers' intentions. How could we act otherwise and remain true to ourselves, and remain true to the idea, which was fundamental to the founders' thought, that America is the strongest home of liberty.

THERE IS NO unvarying principle that requires we be either assertive or isolationist. To believe that there is ignores the most basic fact about politics—that politics is the realm of action; and action must be molded by circumstances. Since the birth in America of enlightened internationalism, we have understood that circumstances demanded an American presence worldwide. What other nation had the economic and political power to contain Soviet expansionism; to bring the world at least a modest amount of stability; and to guarantee freedom to those fortunate enough to have achieved it.

We were not prepared for such leadership, nor were we anxious for it—but that generation, the post-World War II generation, was prepared for one thing: it was prepared to explain to the people why we had to abandon, perhaps forever, the dream of an isolated America, sustaining itself on the basis of geographic separation and political unity.

Our dedication to this enlightened internationalism has undergone its own pendulum-like swings since the late 1940s—with a most dramatic shift away from world involvement occurring after the war in Vietnam. Clearly, we did not simply fold up our tents and retreat behind our nuclear deterrence—our withdrawal was more subtle than that. It is true that our defense budgets were cut dramatically, and the Soviets



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took advantage of our post-Vietnam syndrome by extending their influence through proxies—and in Afghanistan through the Red Army. But perhaps the worst damage was done here at home, where we sank into a paralyzing self-doubt and a repugnant moral relativism.

We heard about the end of the cold war, about how we could not be the "world's policeman"—not that this was ever intended in the first place. We heard that America's fear of communism was inordinate, and we even heard that our president and the Soviet general secretary "shared the same dreams and aspirations." More often than not *we* were portrayed frequently by some of our leaders and people as the greatest threat to peace; we were the ones threatening war with nuclear weapons; we were the neo-colonialists; we were the imperialists—America could always be hated, and in any event (those Americans and others felt) America of course should always be blamed first.

What is remarkable about this attitude is how it differs from our traditional desire to separate ourselves from the world when prudence so dictated. When Washington or Adams or Woodrow Wilson argued for isolationism, they did so on the basis of our national interest as they saw it. But the neo-isolationists hardly regard American national interests as primary. Rather they look to some unspecified "global interest," and claim that it is greatly threatened by American power. For this group, the United States should avoid "entangling alliances" because they think we are a corrosive force in the world. Also there is always the chance, they think, that we might strengthen such an alliance.

The most distressing aspect of this position is not its desire for *political* neutrality. Neutrality may or may not be a wise policy. Rather, it is its *moral* neutrality that condemns this argument and sets it radically against the traditions of American foreign policy. The United States and the Soviet Union are not equivalent morally. We should start and finish with that proposition.

The attitude of moral relativism, as revealed in the argument advanced by some that American power is at least as destructive as Soviet power, feeds the inclination for isolationism, as it saps our will to resist the obvious encroachments of tyranny—be they in the form of Soviet power, or terrorist nihilism. In the name of peace, we are lectured by these relativists on the immorality of American power, when it is often the mere existence of American power that keeps the peace. Because moral relativism offers no real reason to prefer American freedom to Soviet communism, it cannot distinguish, for instance, between the invasion of France in 1940, and the liberation of Europe in 1945. This is indeed the kind of absurdity one is led to if one embraces the popular notion that Soviet and American uses of power are essentially the same. And the ultimate obscenity in this dubious exercise is that the Red Army's invasion of Afghanistan and our action in Grenada are equivalent exercises in power politics.

IT WAS POLITICAL and not moral neutrality that George Washington recommended to his youthful nation. When we become a powerful republic, never doubting for a moment that we would, Washington said, "belligerent nations" will not lightly "hazard giving us provocation" and "we may choose peace or war, as our interests guided by justice shall counsel."

What distinguishes us from much of the world, and provides the final refutation to the neo-isolationists, are those three simple words Washington uses to outline the proper course for American foreign policy—"guided by justice." What other nation goes to such lengths—including an extraordinary degree of self-examination and self-criticism—to ensure its actions are just? That we are human—complete with imperfections—is no argument for isolationism, or inaction, or even self-doubt. What should be asked is not whether we are perfect, but whether we understand our principles of action, whether we still respect the ideas of our founding, and whether we are constantly measuring our actions against Washington's standards of prudence and justice. Indeed what should be asked is whether any other nation in mankind's long history has done more good for more people, whether inside or outside our boundaries.

At the end of his Farewell Address, Washington expressed the wish that his "counsels"



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would "prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations." One supposes that if he were to return and pass judgment on our last 200 years, he might well regret that we had had thrust upon us the role of world power. But he would surely understand and support our need to "entangle" ourselves in the politics of the world—for what he would most regret is the influence of those still blind to the threat of a powerful, totalitarian ideology that seeks to extinguish liberty, equality, and the nation he helped set free.

## Tullock on Moynihan on Acheson

In January 1950, I was in Tientsin China as a Vice Consul in the unrecognized American Consulate General there. The reason that I was there was that the Department of State had been planning on recognizing Communist China and hence had left the diplomatic establishment in place. Eventually it changed its mind and we were withdrawn about four months later. Although we were not locked up like the Consulate General in Mukden, nevertheless, our communications with the rest of the world were rather poor. I give this bit of personal biography to explain why I had not previously heard of the speech by Secretary Acheson quoted by Senator Moynihan ["The Potemkin Palace," Winter 1985/6]. The Senator refers to Dean Acheson's ability to 'make the obvious obvious." What Acheson said was, ". . .the Soviet Union's taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power in Asia." What four provinces? What is Acheson talking about? I would say that at best, he is making the obviously wrong obvious.

I am not particularly surprised at Acheson making this schoolboy mistake, he always had the most bizarre ideas about the far east. But I am deeply surprised at Senator Moynihan endorsing it. I am particularly surprised that he does so in an article which otherwise is very very sensible.

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# Defense and the NATO Alliance

Edward Teller

FROM ITS VERY OUTSET, President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has been misrepresented by the media. The instant rechristening of SDI as *Star Wars* has obscured both the vital issues and focus of the work. Widespread publicity in Europe suggested that SDI was intended to create a fortress America, when in fact its success essentially depends on cooperation among the nations of the Western world.

Nothing in the president's speech and announced intention—"to provide a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles"—committed SDI to space or any specific line of research. Indeed, the most promising defensive weapons are ground-based lasers; one interesting system involving their use could probably be available for deployment within five to 10 years—a defense against missiles fired from a distance of about 500 miles.

Defense against short-range missiles, it goes almost without saying, is extremely important to Europe and Japan. As of 1983, there were more than 250 Soviet SS-20 missiles aimed at NATO nations from a comparatively short range, and about 150 more SS-20s are similarly positioned in the Far East. Since their first deployment in 1977, such short-range missiles have been a justified cause for worry, and over the past decade, the Soviets have continued to modify, diversify, and perfect them. The SS-20, for example, has a range far greater than that required for NATO targets. Short-range defense, then, would restrict the versatility of such missiles. And as defenses against short-range missiles are developed and extended towards defense against longer-range missiles, the objectives of allied and United States defense will become more alike.

The frequently stated criticisms of defensive systems do not apply to laser installations. No nuclear components are involved, no predeployment in space is necessary, and militarization of space is not an issue. Furthermore, the program sketched above would not violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, because the treaty did not refer to tactical defense. What such a program *would* do is deny the use of space to offensive nuclear rockets capable of destroying both populations and defensive installations on the ground.

A successful defense obviously requires that the onset of an attack be promptly detected and communicated to the defenders. If possible, armed missiles should be discriminated from

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decoys; in any case, the missiles must be destroyed. Cost-effective, reliable defense against short-range missiles is much easier to accomplish than defense against long-range missiles for several reasons.

First, to detect short-range rocket launches, earth-based radars need no support from potentially vulnerable observation satellites in space. Conventional radar will be sufficient in most cases. For observation at greater ranges, radars will work at long wavelengths, which, being confined by ionization in the high layers of the atmosphere, follow the curvature of the earth over long distances. This over-the-horizon radar locates a missile by the electromagnetic waves, including those of long wavelength, that it emits when launched.

Second, many short-range missiles never leave the atmosphere completely because of the comparatively short distance between the firing point and the target. Since the atmosphere will make it more difficult for lightweight decoys to look like heavy armed missiles, a short-range attack may involve few if any decoys. Thus the computers currently available would not be overwhelmed by sheer numbers of incoming objects.

Third, rockets are most vulnerable during the boost phase—the first one or two minutes after they are fired—when it is easy to damage their acceleration mechanism. An added advantage is that the rocket at this point has not yet been able to separate into the various warheads it may be carrying. If fired from short range, the rockets will appear over the horizon rapidly. A defensive instrument would have the attacking weapon almost immediately in its sights, and this range can be extended by mirrors that pop up easily and rapidly to the relatively low elevation required.

Fourth, the problem of beam divergence (i.e., its dispersal and weakening over distance, like a flashlight) is less critical over short distances. Aiming and tracking are still less formidable problems: Much of the path of the short-range missile is in full sight of the attacked position, so that any missiles that escape destruction in the boost phase can be destroyed more easily en route by the ground-based defenses.

THIS TYPE of defense system would require lasers of very great intensity, and thus an ample power source that could operate for short periods of time. In Europe, the existing electric grid combined with storage devices could satisfy the requirement for temporary high power levels. Clearly, a defensive system of ground-based, high-intensity lasers, combined with reflecting mirrors would provide a most effective defense against short-range missiles.

In considering laser defense, it is obvious that the beam of a ground-based laser will lose its sharp direction while crossing the turbulent atmosphere. Light beams are bent slightly by the small changes in the air density caused by irregular winds continually present at various altitudes. The result is that the sharp laser beam is effectively dispersed and blunted, left without the surgical precision needed to destroy a rocket. Astronomers long ago invented a method to compensate for the twinkling of stars which is caused by the same phenomenon. Instead of using a single curved mirror in their telescopes, they began to use many small mirrors to focus the starlight into a sharp steady picture. The alignment of these mirrors along a properly curved surface varies in response to the observed twinkling and compensates for the irregularity in the air. This succeeds because the electronic adjustment of the mirrors occurs faster than the variations in the air density. The same trick that eliminates the twinkling of stars can prevent the blunting of the laser beam.

Various other problems of light-scattering also must be faced. Water droplets in thin clouds may be eliminated by an intense laser beam, but the beam cannot get through a thundercloud. Alternate positions for lasers will be required to deal with this problem. Such duplication, of course, has the advantage of making the defensive system less vulnerable to attack.

Many additional complications connected with the high intensity of lasers must be overcome. In a technical sense, the entire defense effort is dependent on ingenuity, and the highest order of talent and technology will have to be applied in order to succeed. No one group of



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people and no one country has a monopoly on ingenuity. What is called for is a combined effort of the democratic nations. The need for a cooperative effort on the part of all nations who value peace more than power cannot be overstated. And in itself, a visible demonstration of allied ability to work together on pure defense would be a stabilizing deterrent.

The difficult job of preparing a defense could be divided so that each group, with complete mutual information, would be able to do what it can do best. Germany, with its famous optical industry, could play a significant role in defending itself and its neighbors. The excellence of French applied research in the field of novel materials could be of great help (light and strong synthetic materials could be decisive in making the rockets that carry the defensive pop-up mirrors both cost-effective and sufficiently speedy). Japan's excellence in computers could contribute greatly to rapid, reliable command and control systems, which are required on an unprecedented scale.

The remarkably diversified SDI research in the United States has placed great emphasis on the development of systems of high intensity lasers which can be adapted easily to short-range uses in Europe, Japan, and Israel. While evidence indicates that the Soviet Union is farthest advanced in this field, the U.S. has made great progress. It may turn out that the U.S. can serve as the generic source of these systems, and that other nations will have a greater role adapting them to specific uses. However, it is too early to make detailed plans. These are merely examples and possibilities.

The outcome of the Geneva summit and the improving prospect of European cooperation are reasons for real hope. Now what is sorely needed is joint scientific effort, an *allied* effort of the sort that has a precedent only in wartime. Today, Soviet propaganda is aimed at preventing such cooperation. Yet, perhaps at a future time, an international cooperative effort, including the Soviets, might end the threat that any nation could launch hundreds of rockets, thus rendering the weapons of mass destruction "impotent and obsolete."



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# Categorical Fuzziness

## Ernest van den Haag

WE ALL feel some affinity for democratic regimes, and a natural revulsion against dictatorships that violate human rights. Our foreign policy must heed these feelings, for Americans won't support it otherwise. But what specific policy conclusions are to be drawn?

I have long admired Robert W. Tucker and Charles Krauthammer. But I find their attempt to charge one another with different isolationisms less than helpful. True, left isolationism tells us not to intervene against movements using leftist symbols and favors support of European allies, while denying us the military means of supporting anybody (that's a theory?). Right wing isolationists favor intervention in Grenada, Afghanistan, or Angola (that's isolationism?). Ancillary disputes about emphasis on Europe or the Pacific, unilateral v. multilateral action, human rights v. security interests seem equally abstract.

There is indeed something wrong with our foreign policy—mainly its absence. However the trouble is not isolationism, or interventionism, but fuzziness. Should we really allow our enemies to choose the battlefields to their advantage, as both isolationism and interventionism (a.k.a. collective security, or domino theory) would? Strict interventionists would intervene reactively wherever our enemies choose to intervene. Strict isolationists promise to react only when we have lost all allies.

Perhaps Irving Kristol is right: Our military support for European allies and Japan has merely replaced their defense efforts with our own. Yet, were we to withdraw our support suddenly, we would risk domination of Europe and Japan by the Soviet Union. At best we can reduce our support gradually and encourage replacement by the nations concerned. Why, then, propose unreal options? (Incidentally, what would we do with our returning troops? Deploy them on the Canadian border? Or reduce our conventional forces? Would we really be willing to leave Europe and Japan to the Soviet Union?)

The real issues are quite independent of the abstruse Tucker-Krauthammer models of isolationism and interventionism, historically interesting as they are. Let me turn to some.

In Eastern Europe we try to encourage the independence of Soviet satellites by extending trade credits. Yet none of them can possibly escape from the Soviet embrace. Credits to these more or less repulsive dictatorships—and to the Soviet Union itself—are hard to justify. Actually the populations of the satellites might strive for independence more if we helped them less. They would correctly debit their hardships to the Soviet alliance. (Perhaps our failure to help would induce the Soviet Union to do so. No harm to us.)

The Krauthammer-Tucker discussion gives no guidance on this, or on policy toward China. China diverts Soviet military resources and, unlike the satellites, is independent of the Soviet Union. Both countries have governments we abhor. But we must weaken the Soviet Union above all, even if to do so we must help other dictatorships that do not now imperil us, or world peace,

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and share our interest in containing Soviet expansion. (Should we have refused to help the Soviets against Hitler? We were overenthusiastic. But were we wrong in principle? If not, why would we be wrong in aiding China, or any truly independent country that does not want to be dominated by the Soviet Union?) Anything that weakens the Soviet Union, or absorbs resources which become less available for use against us, fosters our security—just as any expansion of Soviet power, be it a successful invasion of Afghanistan or a friendship pact with the Seychelles, weakens our security.

We are now hesitantly trying to contain Soviet expansion by supporting indigenous forces willing to resist it. Relying on native forces is certainly politically more cost-effective than direct intervention. But trying to repel Soviet expansion in Nicaragua or Afghanistan is not enough. We should not only support local resistance in Nicaragua or El Salvador or Afghanistan—we should also retaliate for Soviet attempts at power expansion by increasing pressure on vulnerable Soviet spots elsewhere on the globe. The Soviets should not be allowed to choose local battlefields without fear of retaliation elsewhere. The response to Nicaragua should never be limited to Nicaragua. It should involve pressure, say, on the pro-Soviet regimes in Angola (by helping Savimbi), in Mozambique (by helping the anti-government guerrillas), and in Ethiopia (by helping Somalia, Eritrea, and anti-government Ethiopians).

Arguments against this policy strike me as unconvincing. Usually they contend that these countries might be lured from Soviet dependence if we are nice to their governments. Yet their governments could not stay in power without Soviet help. Some African leaders may be displeased. But why should we grant them veto power as a gift? How do they deserve it?

Incidentally, why do we continue to debate whether the contras or the Sandinistas are nicer, as though it mattered? The latter are pro-Soviet, the former are not. Do we need to know more?

The defects of our policies are not produced by theories of isolationism or interventionism, nor even by ideological factors, which account only for minor extravagances such as disinvestment in South Africa. We are dealing with (1) fuzziness and (2) institutional deficiencies.

(1) Nobody seems to ask why we are interested enough in the independence of Namibia to negotiate with Angola about a Cuban withdrawal that the Angolan government cannot possibly afford, instead of helping Savimbi? Or, why we are subsidizing Samuel Doe in Liberia. Surely we are not ideologically attracted? Do we have hidden strategic interests there? Yet Doe receives more money than the contras in Nicaragua.

(2) The institutional trouble is that we have embassies for each country, and state department desks that tend to conceive of our policy toward, say, Ethiopia, or Romania, as a policy only toward either, and not as part of a global strategy. Assistant secretaries in charge of regions, such as Central America, supervise the desks. But the assistant secretary in charge of Central America is not expected to propose moves in southern Africa to make the Soviets pay for what happens in Nicaragua. And the assistant secretary for southern Africa would not like such proposals. He does not want his region to be used for global strategies. Nor do ambassadors. Our foreign policy is sectional at best, not global. The secretary of state, the president and various planning boards are supposed to think globally. But the pull toward meeting regional problems on a regional basis seems to be strong enough to prevent global strategy from being practiced. Assistant secretaries regard regional settlements and treaties as feathers in their cap regardless of global strategies.

Yet treaties to settle regional disputes are not necessarily in our interest. We are more interested—or should be—in imposing costs on Soviet expansion in any part of the globe by destabilizing regions currently under Soviet influence. We should not confine ourselves to local responses. It is only by retaliation that the Soviets may be discouraged. Here ideology and realpolitik converge quite nicely. Yet these specific policies have but a tenuous link to disputes about interventionism, isolationism, or ideology, which have become quite irrelevant.



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# The Coup that Failed—Indonesia 1965

Francis J. Galbraith

MANY IMPORTANT anniversaries were celebrated in the U.S. in 1985; the victories of World War II, the founding of the United Nations, the pull-out from Vietnam, the advent of the nuclear age—all these and more received heavy media attention.

In contrast, the 20th anniversary of an event that almost certainly saved Southeast Asia from communist domination was virtually ignored. With things going the way they are in Indochina and the Philippines, perhaps it is not too late to remember that event and some of its lessons.

The streets of Jakarta, Indonesia were unusually quiet early in the morning of October 1, 1965 as I drove to the American Embassy, where I was the deputy chief of mission. It soon became evident that this was no ordinary morning. In Merdeka Square, which stretched between the Embassy and the Presidential Palace, troops were deployed, with guns at the ready and, indeed, pointing at our Embassy. Telephones were dead. And a dramatic statement was being read over Radio Indonesia:

> On Thursday, September 30, 1965, a military move took place within the army in the capital city of Jakarta which was aided by troops from other branches of the armed forces. The September 30 movement, which is led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, commandant of a battalion of the Tjakrabirawa, the personal bodyguard of President Sukarno, is directed against generals who were members of a self-styled Council of Generals. A number of generals have been arrested and important communications media and other vital installations have been placed under the control of the September 30 movement, while President Sukarno is safe under its protection.

As additional staff arrived at the Embassy we learned that there had been violence at the homes of several prominent army generals, including those of Army Chief of Staff Yani and Minister of Defense General Nasution. Clearly some of them were dead. Their whereabouts, dead or alive, was not immediately known. Most puzzling of all was the absence on the radio of the voice of the Great-Leader-of-the-Revolution, Supreme-Commander-of-the-Armed-Forces, President-for-Life, Sukarno (no other first or last name) who, as his titles would suggest, had come to dominate the political scene in Indonesia. Under his rule, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had prospered. If national elections had been held in Indonesia at that time (Sukarno had suspended them since 1955), it was generally agreed the PKI would have emerged the number one party. Indeed, with two million members and front organizations totalling over 10 million, it was the largest communist party in the world outside the communist bloc.

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In contrast to Vietnam, where Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communist Party led the independence movement from its beginning, the PKI had tried repeatedly, but without success, to take over political leadership in Indonesia. Sukarno supposedly stood above all political parties. He advocated NASAKOM (an acronym of the Indonesian words for nationalism, religion, and communism). But by 1965 he was clearly favoring the PKI and its leader, D.N. Aidit. "I wish I had a thousand Aidits," Sukarno shouted during one of his frequent speeches before adoring crowds at the Soviet-built Senayan sports complex on the edge of Jakarta.

In the early 1960s, Sukarno had turned to the Soviet Union for arms and the Soviets had responded with something like $1 billion worth, including MiG and other aircraft, submarines, torpedo boats and even a cruiser, with which Sukarno threatened the Dutch. From the latter he demanded West Irian, the part of the Netherlands East Indies not included in the 1949 transfer of Indonesian sovereignty. (In 1962 the Dutch turned the area over to Indonesia, to some extent in response to U.S. urging, without noticeable pacifying effect on Sukarno.)

The PKI and the communist countries of Europe, Asia, and elsewhere gave Sukarno vociferous support for his policies of the early 1960s. These included "confrontation" (a low grade war) against Malaysia and Singapore, withdrawal from the United Nations and its agencies, sequestration of Western investment in Indonesia, vilification of the West as "the old established forces of colonialism, imperialism and capitalism," and the creation of what he called the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis.

Under Sukarno's rule little attention was given to much needed economic development, though after the damage inflicted during World War II and four years of post-war revolution it was urgently required. The country's infrastructure of roads and railroads, telecommunications, irrigation and drainage, plantations, oil installations, of its productive plant generally, was desperately in need of repair and improvement. There were severe shortages of basic foodstuffs and other commodities (rice, sugar, kerosene, clothing). Inflation had risen to over 600 percent. The U.S. had tried to interest Sukarno in an economic development program, but in his speech of August 17, 1964, on the occasion of Indonesia's celebration of its 19th year of independence, Sukarno shouted to the U.S., "To hell with your AID." Thereafter, as the U.S. built up in Vietnam it "built down" in Indonesia. The Soviets supported a few flashy projects, such as an uneconomic steel mill in West Java, a major highway in Kalimantan, and a sports complex in Jakarta where Sukarno held his political rallies. Despite the discouraging political climate, the U.S. built a much needed road between Jakarta and the nearby port of Tanjung Priok, and trained several thousand technocrats. Later, after Sukarno stepped down from the presidency and economic development finally got the attention it deserved, these technocrats were to play a key role in implementing a development program.

IN THE LATE 1950s all Dutch personnel had been expelled from Indonesia. And in 1963, when the British Embassy was burned down by a communist-led mob, most British personnel were withdrawn. PKI-led demonstrations against and damage to official American installations were frequent in the summer of 1965.

In late September 1965, preparations were underway for Armed Forces Day in an atmosphere of considerable tension, attributable not only to the festering war with Malaysia (and with the British, Australian, and New Zealand troops in support of Malaysia), but also to tension between the army and the PKI. Along with other activities keeping it in the limelight at the time, the PKI had been carrying out a unilateral program of land redistribution in some of the crowded rice farming villages of East and Central Java. In some cases the army had stepped in to stop the PKI. Also opposed by the army leadership was the plan pressed by the PKI on Sukarno to arm, with the help of the People's Republic of China, a "fifth force" or "people's army."

Rumors were rife at this time about the



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state of Sukarno's health. A team of doctors from Peking had examined him in August. It is surmised plausibly by some that they informed the PKI that Sukarno's days were numbered, and that it was this news which moved the PKI to act, while Sukarno was still alive, to establish its control of the army.

There are differing opinions of who and what was behind the events of September 30, 1965. Most of the evidence is contained in interrogation reports by various representatives of the Indonesian military establishment, only some of which have been made public. However, such interrogation reports as have been made public, including testimony at public trials, together with the way the events themselves unfolded, overwhelmingly support the view that a special group within the PKI (possibly with the knowledge and encouragement of President Sukarno) planned the coup attempt, and that pro-PKI officers in the army and the air force executed it.

A question that has to be asked, and that is not easily answered, is: Why did not the PKI have fall-back positions that, after its initial plans went awry, would have avoided the precipitous collapse that followed?

From the beginning of the affair, of course, the PKI stayed in the shadow of Sukarno. He was the all-dominating figure in Indonesia, and it must have seemed to the PKI leaders that they could not lose with his protection, just as they could not win without his support. The armed forces had, with a few exceptions in the late 1950s, always obeyed him. The PKI obviously counted on the armed forces obeying Sukarno on this occasion. But a new, relatively unknown (though high ranking) figure had, by force of unseen circumstances, appeared on the scene—the careful, determined, far-seeing General Suharto. The brutal way his fellow officers had been murdered, the obvious participation of the PKI, the evidence pointing toward Sukarno—all this galvanized Suharto into action against the PKI; and the officer corps—both outraged and fearful—overwhelmingly supported him.

Faced with a botched coup (the influential Nasution, as well as Suharto, escaped the killers), and this unexpectedly determined and independent reaction from the army, Sukarno abandoned the PKI. Ill and with his nerve broken, he retreated to his palace in Bogor, to be comforted by his second wife Hartini, rather than to Central Java where, together with Aidit, he might have served as a rallying point for pro-PKI and Sukarnoist troops and cadre.

EARLY on the morning of October 1, General Suharto (who, within two years, would assume the full powers of the presidency), dealt with the problem of who was friend and who was foe of the army (in the absence of General Yani, standing orders put him in command of the army). He had learned from a neighbor that those who had been killed or kidnapped included General Yani, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Generals Suprapto, Parman, Harjono, Pendjaitan and Sutojo—all of the army's general staff. Suharto's forces disarmed a group of communist youth who arrived in Merdeka Square on the afternoon of October 1. On the same afternoon, *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily), the PKI mouthpiece, editorialized in support of the September 30 Movement. Air Force Chief of Staff Omar Dani also issued a statement giving his support. And in the next couple of days the bodies of General Yani and his five colleagues were found in an abandoned well in a part of Halim Air Force Base, just outside Jakarta, where PKI youth and women activists had been training with arms which, it was subsequently learned, were provided by the PRC through Air Marshall Omar Dani. For General Suharto the identity of the foe was rapidly emerging.

For the next several months, a somewhat recovered Sukarno and Suharto maneuvered for dominant position. Suharto seeming to obey his president while opposing Sukarno's protection of the PKI and others implicated in the coup attempt. Thousands of communists were arrested. Communist sympathizers and subversives were purged from the armed forces. Some of those implicated were put on military trial in Jakarta. PKI leader Aidit was found hiding in Central Java, and then shot.

In the villages, non-communists turned against their former communist tormenters. Some estimates put the number killed as high as



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half a million or more. No one I know has produced eye witness accounts or photographs of the killings or cadavers, skulls, or other such evidence of mass murders. The real story of what went on under the coconut palms and in the rice paddies probably will never be told. The concept of human rights generally followed in the West was not prominent in the Indonesian government's handling of those suspected or known to be communists.

In March 1967 Sukarno signed over presidential power to Suharto. Indonesia rejoined the UN and took a leading role in establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization that since its inception has kept the peace among its members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and taken the lead in trying to get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia. Good relations with the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe—Indonesia's natural trading partners and most promising donors of economic assistance—were restored. Relations with the PRC have remained suspended since shortly after the coup attempt, but there is growing trade between the two countries.

There are those who say that but for the U.S. presence in force in Vietnam at the time, the Indonesian Army would have hesitated to act against the PKI. In my opinion, such reasoning fails to give credit where credit is due: to the Indonesians themselves and especially to General Suharto whose cool and effective handling of the threat saved his country from chaos and conflict. In any case, it is worth noting that no American soldier and only a relatively small amount of American money were involved in saving Indonesia from communism. The Indonesians did that job in their own way. And the U.S. was wise enough to remain uninvolved.

Some credit, however, should go to those who were guiding our policies toward Indonesia on and after September 30, 1965. Patience and forebearance in the face of PKI provocations meant that the U.S. could be there, and of help to Indonesia, when the opportunity arrived. A low U.S. profile and U.S. restraint, until the struggle between Sukarno and Suharto was decided, kept the U.S. free from charges of involvement in Indonesian affairs. Once Suharto became president, the U.S. took the lead in substantial programs of multinational economic assistance. With these programs the Indonesian government executed a series of five-year development plans that achieved an annual economic growth rate of more than six percent for the next decade and a half.

In the early 1950s, especially in Asia, the PRC convinced many that its choice of the communist path to development was the wave of the future. Almost no one seems to believe that now. Non-communist ASEAN, along with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan are the examples of progress in East Asia. The failed communist coup of September 30, 1965 in Indonesia gave a predominantly non-communist shape to the political map of Southeast Asia. Had it succeeded—and it was a very closely run thing—all Southeast Asia would have been outflanked, with catastrophic consequences for the region itself as well as geopolitical implications extending far beyond it.



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# Mr. Wick Goes to Moscow

Peter Samuel

IN ONE of his classic works *Leftwing Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, Lenin berated dogmatic comrades who maintained an unremitting hostility to the bourgeois enemy. It was necessary for tactical reasons, he wrote, to "master all forms" of political warfare and to "adapt our tactics." Those who objected to "tacking, conciliatory maneuvers, or compromising" were guilty of a "left doctrinairism" which was "causing great prejudice to Communism." It became the essence of Leninism that the Party should be ideologically flexible in tactics. Under the guise of a united front, it would befriend the many, temporarily, to isolate and defeat the few over time. Different faces would be shown—sometimes the snarling face of ruthlessness to intimidate (recently KAL007, Afghanistan), other times the smiling face of sweet reasonableness to lull (Gorbachev at Geneva). Soviet leaders like Stalin and Khrushchev were capable of considerable personal charm and sociability, and also of enormous, boorish nastiness. The system apparently teaches them the utility of the good cop, bad cop routine.

In recent months we have been seeing mostly the good cop, what with the so-called Spirit of Geneva and the 15-year plan for phasing out all nuclear weapons that was announced mid-January. But there are signs that some people in high places are getting carried away by the smiling face being worn at present by the Soviets—for example the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Charles Wick.

One might hope that a propaganda chief of all people would look past the smile and ask whether the "Spirit of Geneva" has fundamentally altered the Soviet-American relationship. Mr. Wick, however, talks as though there has been a fundamental change, though he gives evidence only of new atmospherics. At his January 23 press conference in Washington, after his return from the Soviet Union, he opened by saying: "I bring you good news from Moscow. Our meetings [with the Soviets] were in the true spirit of Geneva. They were frank, they were open and I believe they will be very fruitful. The Russian leaders were warm, hospitable and very cooperative. I could not be more pleased. . . . I thank them for that and I could not be more optimistic. . . . All of our discussions in the Soviet Union were marked by the particular realization that, from the very top down, this was the watchword: 'Let's make it work.' "

Now, it is almost certainly true that the Soviets do want a resumption of the person-to-person exchanges that occurred during detente. No doubt they would like a return to the scale of scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges that prevailed through most of the 1970s. After all, those exchanges enabled the Soviets to gain access to American technology and government. We have learned, for instance, that the Soviets in the 1970s prepared for the large-scale theft of American high technology, which they have managed to incorporate into their aircraft and missiles, saving them vast

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research and development expenditures. Sporting teams and tourist visits apparently offered wonderful opportunities for *Spetnaz* special forces soldiers to reconnoiter enemy territory. The 'detente' of the 1970s was accompanied by criticism of an 'inordinate fear of communism' and saw U.S. security and intelligence standards drastically loosened and downgraded—enabling the Soviets to build a network of agents in the U.S. government, of whom the Walkers, Pelton, and Chin may be only the tip of the iceberg. The Soviets must have been highly disturbed by the last five years of increasing security consciousness and their decreased access to American science and government. What better way to restore the 1970s free ride into America than a "Spirit of Geneva" and the resumption of scientific, cultural, and sporting exchanges? One need not doubt their "sincerity" and their "cooperative" attitudes in this endeavor.

MR. WICK at his press conference revived another old detentist delusion when he commented that "cold war rhetoric, distortions, misunderstandings, unseemly allegations and the like have contributed to international tensions and those tensions . . . could be reduced by wider *contact* between the people of both countries." The USIA chief has it wrong. During a decade of detente in the 1970s (in which the U.S. showed rhetorical forbearance, with talk of the North-South problem displacing discussion of the East-West problem), the West suffered terrible setbacks in its rivalry with the Soviets—Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Iran spring to mind for starters. That happened in large part because of the abandonment of what Mr. Wick, sounding like an Anthony Lewis or a Mary McGrory, chooses to call "cold war rhetoric." If the leaders of the country cease talking of the Soviet Union as an inherently expansionist, aggressive regime liable to take advantage of any weakness to extend the communist system, then the domestic political basis for a strong defense effort and for assistance to embattled friends is completely undermined. If the Soviets are truly rather reasonable people with whom we can live peacefully only by rhetorical forbearance and greater efforts at understanding, why should we Western taxpayers make the sacrifices involved in high defense budgets or get in the messy business of supporting freedom fighters battling Soviet proxies?

Mr. Wick has a boss who aptly described the Soviets in 1981 as the "focus of evil" in the world; perhaps the USIA chief now considers this an "unseemly allegation." President Reagan was no doubt thinking of Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, the Soviet role in systematically promoting terrorism, their unparalleled nuclear and conventional military build-up, their cruel persecution of dissidents, their gulags, and their development of fiendish new chemical and biological weapons . . . when he uttered an allegation so unseemly.

One can scarcely blame the Soviets for wanting our leaders to desist from candid, principled, and clearsighted descriptions of what they are about, and for saying that such candor is destructive of relations—they know that such statements are liable to mobilize resistance to their international expansions. Thus in the early 1980s when Mr. Reagan was candidly characterizing the Soviets as an Evil Empire, U.S. defense expenditure was rising strongly; in the new spirit of Geneva summitry, it has peaked and may now be turning downward.

Soviet power in the world stands to be greatly enhanced by a less vivid and focused American perception of the Soviet threat, hence their fervid efforts to stop ABC from making the "Amerika" mini-series and to discourage Hollywood from making films whose heroes are American patriots battling nasty, duplicitous communists. The patriotism and conservatism of the young generation of Americans is surely profoundly unsettling to the Soviet leadership, and they need to put as many dampers on it as possible.

At his press conference Mr. Wick also said: "The exciting thing about this [exchanges] agreement is that it will promote the kind of understanding and mutual trust in their people and in our people, hopefully, on which can be built a genuine foundation for genuine arms



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control. When peoples understand each other, the governments cannot be far behind."

Americans do not distrust Russians as people nor vice-versa. The mistrust, Mr. Wick, is mistrust of the Soviet government: for its professions of peaceful intent while building the world's most fearsome military machine, for proposing new arms control treaties while flagrantly violating the existing treaties, for signing the Helsinki agreement on human rights and treating it with contempt, for underwriting and encouraging terrorists throughout the non-communist world, for bankrolling military build-ups in such remote places from Moscow as Angola and Nicaragua.

It is a very strange kind of understanding of the Soviet Union that Mr. Wick is promoting when he suggests that the Soviet government is as responsive as the U.S. government to the mood of its people.

## Underestimating Mengistu

Paul B. Henze's article "The Dilemmas of the Horn" (Winter 1985/6) should be viewed as a welcome contribution to an under-analysed area-study. However, it is difficult to reconcile the thrust of his argument with his conclusion. For instance, Henze points out that the Ethiopian regime and their Soviet sponsors preside over one of the most brutal systems of government in the world. Yet, he then insists that, given the disgust of the Ethiopians with their rulers, they will inevitably "loosen" themselves from the regime in order to realize their considerable potential.

Unfortunately, as the tortured history of our era demonstrates, regimes such as Mr. Mengistu's do not evolve benignly into a more desirable form. Ethiopia is not Egypt. Unlike Sadat, Mengistu cannot simply request that the Soviets depart. The Soviets have imposed a full-blown Marxist Leninist model, of which the gruesome consequences of collectivized agriculture are but one feature. Where these models prevail elsewhere in the world, neither a change in the indigenous leadership, as in the case of South Yemen, nor the ill-will of the population have led to the type of outcome Mr. Henze envisages. Indeed, totalitarian systems are removed only by force. This is the principle behind the exertions of anti-Soviet national liberation movements from Afghanistan to Nicaragua.

Yet, as the experience of these states suggests, the ability of a totalitarian regime to maintain power should not be underestimated. While one may hope that the Ethiopian case will be different, the behavior of its rulers provides little basis for optimism.

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# Soothing One's Enemies

Michael Ledeen

THE BEST JOKE of the quarter came—as it so often does—from the *Washington Post* in a front-page story by David Ottoway. The headline tells it all: "Qaddafi's Love-Hate View of U.S." The central thesis (as it were) of the article is that Qaddafi loves American technology. "You've got to understand: Qaddafi loves America," an unnamed source told Ottoway, "he's stung by our rejection." Thus it is of course Reagan who doesn't understand and who is behaving unreasonably. In Ottoway's words, "President Reagan seems to have his own fixation on Qaddafi and to have singled him out."

The tone of the *Post*'s coverage of the Libyan affair was fairly consistent, and in keeping with the Ottoway piece. We were presented with a picture of what used to be called a "tinpot dictatorship," a nasty place but one that probably isn't worth any serious action from the United States. This was the message from Bob Woodward on February 2, citing his usual store of classified documents (in this case a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Libya) to argue that any single attack against Libya would only make matters worse, and that a real war against Libya would be foolish. Thus, it's best to do nothing.

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But what is Libya all about, anyway? On January 19, the *Post*'s man in Tripoli, Christopher Dickey, told us: "Revolutionary Fervor Tripoli's Only Diversion." Again, the image of a place that isn't worth any great effort. "Tripoli is like a ghost town full of the living. At the busiest hours of the day, many of the shops are closed. Their foreign owners have left, and no Libyan has replaced them. Or there is nothing to sell since oil prices dropped and imports nearly ceased." A boring place, in other words. You have to read all the way to the end before you discover that it is also a very nasty place, where, in the words of a European diplomat there, "The Libyans are very much afraid...A brother is afraid of another brother, the father is afraid of the son, because they can denounce you very easily." We also discover that the revolutionary committees and the "agents of the secret police work together to forestall any overt signs of imagination, much less intellectual exploration."

It is instructive to compare this kind of coverage with a long article in *La Stampa* of Turin, Italy that appeared on January 25 (keep in mind that *La Stampa* is owned by Fiat, which in turn has a substantial Libyan participation. *La Stampa* in the past has been accused of catering to Libyan sympathies in its coverage of Middle East affairs). In this superb article by Signor Mimmo Candito we learn a good deal about life in Libya: that per capita income has



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been halved in the past six years, that no one any longer expects anything good to come of the current regime, that opposition is growing, and that internal repression is savage.

> News circulates by whisper, in half-phrases, with allusions of many and the story of few, very few, eye-witnesses. They know about the raids in the apartment buildings, the two thousand arrested after the armed attack at Bal Al Azizya, the two students hung at the University, the twelve officers swinging in the Green Square, the air attack against the barracks at Bengazi. The lucky turn by Qaddafi during the most recent attack against his automobile...

So Libyans are reluctant to talk, above all to a foreigner who may well be an informer for the regime. But, as Candito discovered, in addition to the armed confrontation with the United States (a stalemate) and the mass media competition with Reagan (won by Qaddafi), there is a third war in Libya, "of which one knows little but which however has been under way for some time. It is the war of the internal opposition, the slow, progressive growth of a conspiratorial front determined to overthrow the Colonel."

All of this makes one wonder about the determination of our journalists to dig out the tough, but important stories about nasty regimes. There is no doubt that if, for example, the government of Jose Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador or any recent government in Turkey had carried out anywhere near the number of executions that Qaddafi's has, the *Post* would have provided us with great detail, and would have reported the existence of considerable opposition. Nothing of the sort takes place with Qaddafi, except for a couple of vague paragraphs at the bottom of the story. Why? Two answers immediately suggest themselves: the first is the desire to challenge the portrayal of Libya provided by the American government (which must be challenged at all costs); the second is the fear of being killed by Qaddafi for writing the truth about his barbaric country. If the first, we are dealing with political infantilism; if the second, it means that terrorism is winning, and confirms that the battle for the hearts and minds of the world is also conducted with terrorists' guns and the ropes of the hangmen.

THERE IS probably an additional motive for the news media's reluctance to study our enemies too carefully: they most likely fear that if the American people looked closely at the matter, they might get so exercised that we would be in *real* conflict. Way back in 1937, when it seemed possible that Great Britain might opt for conflict, rather than detente, with Hitler, the editor of the London *Times* jotted in his diary this heartfelt observation:

> I should like to get going with the Germans. I simply cannot understand why they should apparently be so much annoyed with *The Times* at this moment. I spend my nights taking out anything which I think will hurt their susceptibilities, and in dropping in little things which are intended to soothe them.

So it is that the New York *Times* strains to say nice things about the Soviet Union, which is one of the world's great sponsors of international terrorism. For example, in his year-end roundup on terrorism (front page, December 30), Robert D. McFadden wrote that "Moscow and other Soviet-bloc countries, in response [to attacks against Soviet diplomats in Beirut] seemed to edge away from their past *tolerance* toward terrorist groups, calling for severe punishment for them."(emphasis added). The proper issue is not verbal tolerance or denunciation, but the considerable support that the Soviets give the terrorists. Worse still, in dealing with Nicaragua McFadden compares the *past* (sanitized) actions of the Sandinistas with the *current* (alleged) actions of the contras:

> Rebel units in Nicaragua have burned down scores of health centers, schools and other public buildings. They have been accused of many kidnappings, rapes and murders, and President Daniel Ortega Saavedra has denounced these at every opportunity, blaming the United States for supporting the rebels.



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> During its 20-year struggle to gain power...the Sandinista Front staged dozens of robberies, hijacked airplanes, and attacked, seized or killed members of the National Guard who were implicated in incidents of torture...
>
> The Reagan Administration has repeatedly pointed to the solidarity between the Sandinistas and leftist rebels in other countries as proof that Managua has become a haven for terrorists. The Sandinistas say their Government is the victim, not the perpetrator, of terrorism.

Not a word here about the documented cases of Libyan, Italian, Palestinian, and Spanish terrorists present in Nicaragua, or about the established links between the Sandinistas and the terrorists operating in Honduras and El Salvador. Nor is there any suggestion that the Sandinistas killed anyone other than Somocista torturers, even though there was a lot of shooting over the course of 20 years. This is of a piece with the focus on Soviet words, rather than actions, and of the attention paid to Qaddafi's presumed personal tastes rather than his murderous regime.

Not only do these practices dull American sensibilities to the realities of the world, they also have quite concrete consequences out there. Sometimes they even cost lives. In the Soviet Union, for example, dissidents depend upon publicity for survival. But they are not going to get any help from some of our correspondents in Moscow. Nick Daniloff, correspondent for *U.S. News and World Report*, tells us (in an interview quoted by David Satter in the *Wall Street Journal* on November 14th): "I don't consort with dissidents. The magazine considers them a passing phenomenon of little interest. In a political sense, they don't have any influence—and they are perishing." As Satter commented, in the Soviet lexicon a "dissident" is "anyone ready to meet with a foreign correspondent without lying to him," and there are quite a number of these people. But "their bravery is of no use if it is not met with bravery on the part of correspondents who feel some responsibility to learn the truth about the nature of the country....Unfortunately, this is almost never the case."

IF YOU THINK that Satter is exaggerating or taking one extreme case, look at the letter to the editor of the *Wall Street Journal* from Stuart H. Loory, Moscow Bureau Chief for the Cable News Network, published on February 3. Loory gives us his thoughts on the nature of totalitarianism (it "denies not just the needs of the human spirit but the sanctity of human life. Authoritarians do not kill wantonly"), the moral failure of America ("all the administrations during my working lifetime, from Eisenhower to Reagan, have shown an ability to ignore needlessly the sanctity of human life when they thought necessary"), and the legitimacy of the Soviet regime:

> I can say without reservation that if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were to submit itself to the kind of free elections held in South Vietnam in the 1960s or El Salvador in the 1980s it would win an overwhelming mandate. But that's not saying much. If suddenly a true, two-party or multiparty system were to be formed in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party would still win in a real free election. Except for certain small pockets of resistance to the Communist regime, the people have been truly converted in the past 68 years. The people want a tremendous increase in living standards, more freedom and a better economy but they think this system can provide them.

Now aside from the inane definition of totalitarianism (hardly anyone cares about the proper use of terms anymore), and the gratuitous insult to the brave electorate of El Salvador, the most bothersome thing about Loory's letter is his presumption to be able to determine the true state of mind of the Soviet populace. One of the most useful experiences I have had was when I went to Grenada with an ABC News crew a year and a half after the American invasion. The ABC people interviewed dozens of people about the Maurice Bishop regime, which was believed in its time to have been quite popular among the Grenadians. Yet most everyone interviewed spoke about the horrors of the period, and many of them said that they had known about the horrors at the time they were taking place. "Why," asked an ABC newsman, "did we not



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hear about these things at the time?" "Because," the Grenadian answered, "if you had come here then and asked me the same questions, I would not have told you the truth." Under a totalitarian system (or, indeed any relatively effective dictatorship), a "dissident" is a person who tells the truth about the system. But this does not mean that those who remain silent do not know the truth, nor that they will not act in accordance with that truth if the system is removed and they are permitted to express their sentiments freely. Alas, our people have greater contempt for the Soviet citizens than do Mr. Gorbachev and his organs of state security: The latter maintain a vast army in order to prevent the Soviet people from expressing their true feelings. Too many of our correspondents follow the guidelines laid down in the 1930s by the editor of the London *Times*.



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# Confusion and Clarification

Robert W. Tucker

WE ARE in a period of growing controversy over foreign policy. Since World War II, we have been through several such periods. In each, the charge of isolationism has been made usually against those critical of an administration's policy. Sometimes the charge has been deserved, sometimes not. In the late 1940s and 1950s, it was rightly made against right-wing Republicans who opposed the alliance commitments that have since been central to post-war policy. It was wrongly made against those who, though supporting these commitments, objected to the universalist pretentions of the Truman Doctrine and warned against the indefinite extension of containment. Again, it was wrongly made against opponents of the war in Vietnam who denied that the interests at stake in Vietnam were sufficient to justify the costs of our armed intervention there. And in the 1970s, it was rightly made against those—mostly in the Democratic party—who rejected the "old internationalism" of the cold war and called for a "new internationalism" devoid of alliances, competition in arms, and intervention.

The isolationist charge continues to have political resonance today. It does so because it evokes our interwar experience. A more detached and considered view, however, would show us that the judgment commonly made of isolationism is mistaken in that it equates a particular experience with a policy the wisdom and desirability of which are dependent upon circumstance and interest. Of course, an isolationist policy may neglect and ultimately imperil a nation's interests. But so may an interventionist policy. In the wake of Vietnam, many critics of the war made as sweeping a judgment about intervention as the interventionists of the World War II period made of isolationism. They were no more justified in doing so than were those who had earlier condemned, without qualification, isolation.

An earlier essay ("Isolation and Intervention," Fall 1985) developed these themes and assessed their current significance. In a reply ("Isolationism: A Riposte," Winter 1986), Charles Krauthammer insists that what I wrote was essentially a defense of right isolationism. Since I do not aspire to public office, I have no particular sensitivity to the charge of being an isolationist. Moreover, it is the case that as between the two fundamental dispositions in foreign policy, isolationism and interventionism, I incline to the former. All other things being equal, I would prefer the nation to occupy a position of detachment from the ambitions and conflicts of others. This preference is not only a matter of temperament. It responds to the belief that nations can do and have done one another more harm through their "concern" than through their indifference. Yet it also reflects the conviction that the American promise has always been domestic and that

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foreign policy should detract from this promise as little as possible.

In the early 1970s, I elaborated the case for a new isolationism in a little book (*A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise*, 1972) that Charles Krauthammer is determined to see is not forgotten. The case rested largely on two assumptions. The first was that the structure of American security, particularly its physical security, had undergone a profound change since World War II, owing mostly to the advent of nuclear missile weapons. These weapons invalidated much of the reasoning on which balance of power politics had always proceeded. What was almost unthinkable before World War II, the possession by one state of a surfeit of (deterrent) power, had become a strategic reality. As a result, for the great nuclear power, allies no longer served the same purpose they had done in the pre-nuclear age. While allies might now detract from the great nuclear power's physical security, since they provided the most likely occasion for nuclear conflict, they could not add to this security, since they could not protect a great power against the ravages of a nuclear conflict.

On the grounds of physical security, then, the case for a new isolationism seemed quite plausible. But the case could not rest on physical security alone. Even if a new isolationism was compatible with the nation's physical security, it would still prove undesirable if it resulted in a fortress America alone in an increasingly hostile world where we had ceased to play a significant role. In part, it was to escape this prospect that we had intervened in World War II. Even if a fascist victory would not threaten America's physical security, the argument for intervention ran, it nevertheless threatened the nation's greater-than-physical security since it held out the prospect of a world in which America's political and economic frontiers would become coterminus with her territorial frontiers, a world in which societies that shared our culture, institutions, and values might very possibly disappear—in sum, a world in which American influence would become irrelevant. Physical security and economic well-being apart, it was to prevent this prospect from materializing that the nation abandoned isolationism and intervened in the war. It was for substantially the same reasons that in the years following the war, the United States pursued a policy of containment.

The second assumption on which the case for a new isolationism rested was that it would not again raise the very prospect we had worked and sacrificed so long to prevent. This assumption depended, in turn, on an estimate of Western Europe's and Japan's ability to provide for their own security and their willingness, in the right circumstances, to do so. Chief among those circumstances was a strong push from this country. At the time, it seemed to me that if our major allies, the industrial democracies, could be given the incentives to provide once again for their own security, we could assume a more modest role in the world. That role, however, would still be important. We would remain, after all, a great power—indeed, the world's greatest power. Still, our role promised to be quite different from what it had been since World War II. For the order that was once expected to evolve from the new dispensation would no longer be one over which American power presided. And this meant, in turn, that the price of a new isolationism was a world in which America's influence, though still considerable, would markedly decline.

I have since altered my view about the risks and the promise held out by a new isolationism. At the time, the promise seemed to outweigh the risks. But I soon concluded that I had been much too optimistic and that the risks were much too great to run. These risks, in my view, were not primarily that the Soviet Union might run amok in the Third World but that Western Europe and Japan might well fail to respond to our new policy and that, in consequence, we would sacrifice the great interest over which we had devoted so much of our blood and treasure.

IT IS NOT so much for these past sins, however, that Charles Krauthammer taxes me but for what he regards as my present sins. In his view, I remain an isolationist, in policy as well as in disposition, because I wrote that: "Those who support our major alliances,



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and accept all that this support must imply, cannot be considered as isolationist however much they may oppose intervention elsewhere." Krauthammer manages to read "elsewhere" to mean "everywhere else" and asks whether this can possibly be true. The answer, of course, is no. Although it is our major alliance relationships that continue to form the core of our policy, this core cannot simply be sealed off from the rest of the world. Support for these alliances may well necessitate intervention elsewhere.

One cannot forswear intervention, then, in the whole of the Third World and not be, in effect, an isolationist. But there is a considerable difference between acknowledging the undoubted significance that the periphery has for the core and insisting that it is no longer possible to distinguish between the two. Yet this is what Krauthammer has done. The center, he writes, "is no more Bonn and Vienna than it is Havana and Managua . . . A bipolar world has no 'center', only webs of relationships radiating from the superpowers." If this were indeed the case, if our interests now formed a vast and undifferentiated whole, a rational and prudent statecraft would be virtually impossible. While Krauthammer is right in saying that a bipolar world has no "center," this does not mean that in a bipolar world, interests cannot be distinguished in terms of their importance. When we say that our post-war policy has been and remains Eurocentric, we do not imply that Europe remains the center of the state system but that in the contest between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. it remains by far the most important stake. That the fate of Europe may be affected by what goes on elsewhere does not alter the truth of this proposition.

The issue, then, is not whether Europe remains the center of the state system—obviously it does not—but whether its importance (along with Japan) is such that a commitment on behalf of its security, with all that this must imply, is sufficient to preclude the charge of isolationism. Krauthammer believes it is not. He insists that in a bipolar world in which there are "only webs of relationships radiating from the superpowers" we can no longer make those distinctions essential to the conduct of a conventional statecraft. This is, in part, why he inveighs against "selective disengagement," which he identifies with the conservative isolationist tradition. Once committed to the control of the Western hemisphere and to expansion in the Pacific, he writes, conservative isolationism has returned but with a change of venue. Now some of the "new right isolationists wish to remain in Europe but disengage from the rest of the world." But, Krauthammer admonishes, "the exchange of one territory for another is no renunciation of isolationism."

Surely, however, it all depends on the territory being exchanged. Unless one favors intervening anywhere and everywhere, unless one is literally committed to "unselective engagement," all of us favor some version of what Krauthammer mistakenly identifies as conservative isolationism. It is true that great powers regularly proclaim that there is no territory on earth in which they do not have an interest. But this claim can scarcely be held out as a test of non-isolationist status. All statecraft, even that of the greatest powers, must practice some kind of selective disengagement. If only because resources, material and moral, are limited, all statecraft must engage in the exchange of one territory for another.

Although Krauthammer objects to what he sees as my attempt to divine Secretary Caspar Weinberger's motives ("a shadow activity of dubious verifiability"), he nevertheless pretends to know mine. My emphasis on the alliances with Western Europe and Japan, he implies, may be traced to a desire to escape the isolationist label. How does he know this? Apparently because I justified the expense and danger incurred by the alliances in terms of the need of "friends and kindred spirits" rather than "in the name of freedom." "The American motive for defending Europe," Krauthammer declares, "lies much more in aversion to totalitarianism and a desire to see the success of freedom, than in a desire for 'friends and kindred spirits.' " But what can a care for and commitment to the security of "kindred spirits" possibly mean other than an aversion to totalitarianism and a desire to see the success of freedom? Suppose



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we strike the phrase that Krauthammer finds so objectionable and substitute "democratic societies." Is anything really changed? And if not, is Krauthammer's objection merely the result of excessive literal-mindedness? I think not and for reasons I will subsequently give.

Of all Krauthammer's arguments, the one I find the most mystifying is his insistence that "if the *highest* value is not to animate one's foreign policy, then no value must." This argument is made in response to my statement that "while freedom is the highest of political values, this does not make its universalization a proper interest of foreign policy *in the sense that its pursuit justifies the sacrifice of blood and treasure*." I have underlined the qualifying clause because it is all important and because Krauthammer in his reply has omitted it. I certainly have no objection to our foreign policy being informed or animated by the values of freedom. Who does? But it is quite another matter to pursue freedom for others who do not have it at the cost of our blood and treasure. At issue here is not the defense of freedom, whether our own or our allies, but its universalization and particularly the price we should be willing to pay for its universalization. Krauthammer has very little to say about the price other than to invoke the counsel of prudence.

The matter of cost apart, I am still at a loss to understand why Krauthammer insists that my "brand of realpolitik denies that foreign policy is the realm of values. It is the realm of prudential calculations of safety." It is surely the latter, but it is not only that. After all, what are we being prudent about? Evidently about our collective and individual freedom and well-being. Again, the issue is not freedom as such. Instead, it is how and for whom this value is to be sought and sacrifice to be made. The first charge—not the only but the first charge—on our foreign policy is the security and independence of the nation and the individual freedom and welfare of its citizens. Is Krauthammer saying that if it is first and foremost *our* freedom that animates our foreign policy, and that if the pursuit of freedom elsewhere must be justified largely by its contribution to our freedom, then foreign policy is devoid of value? If so, then value is equated with its universalization. When given expression in policy, this is a view that has led on more than one occasion to baneful consequences.

What is at the bottom of all this? It is that Charles Krauthammer wishes to pursue a more ambitious and activist—that is, interventionist foreign policy. This policy of supporting anti-communist insurgencies is to be animated primarily by a desire to extend freedom. Although not directed only against Marxist-Leninist states, this is clearly its principal focus. It is a strategy, as Krauthammer has written, of bleeding the Soviet Union at the periphery of its empire. Its apparent attraction is that it holds out great promise at very low cost. In contrast to the global containment of the past, this new version of containment will require very little treasure and possibly no (American) blood at all. Yet the promise of the new containment is greater than the promise of the containment of yesterday. Whereas the latter was designed only to preserve the status quo, the former is designed to revise the status quo in our favor. Such revision, we are told, would signal the beginning of a new era, one in which the terms of the long contest with the Soviet Union would at last shift in our favor.

This is the policy that Charles Krauthammer believes we should now give our full support and that explains his otherwise curious sensitivity to my emphasis on a policy focusing on the security of our allies ("kindred spirits"). What we have here is yet another version of a difference we have had since the beginning of the cold war. Krauthammer, following a now hallowed political tactic, wishes to discredit those who entertain strong reservations about the wisdom of his favored policy by identifying them as isolationists. The tactic may yet succeed. Even if it does, it will remain without merit.



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